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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on the field of Integrated Reporting (IR) to examine evidence on 
corporate governance, earnings quality, agency cost and firm market valuation. The 
primary objective is to investigate the level of accounting information provided by 
firms. First, I observe that IR disclosure quality is associated positively with corporate 
governance variables and conclude that a higher number of independent and non–
executive board members on the nomination committee tend to display higher IR 
disclosure quality. Second, aligned with earning quality literature, I  indicate that firms 
which present high IR quality information tend to adopt milder earnings management 
techniques. The Jones (1991) model is used to estimate the discretionary accruals in 
order to test earnings quality. Third, to measure agency cost, I create a variable by 
multiplying Tobin’s Q ratio with weighted operating cash flows (Lang et al., 1993; 
Healy and Palepu, 2001). I conclude that higher IR quality information decreases 
agency costs. Fourth, I identify the association between firm performance and IR 
disclosure quality. Fifth, I examine the way in which the quality of IR disclosure 
improves the value relevance of summary accounting information (i.e., the market 
value of equity). Finally, this study explores how the use of integrated analysis can 
create value, testing the behavior of a multiple-based valuation model (P/E). The 
sample is consisted of 82 international firms and examines the period from 2011 to 
2015. I create an IR disclosure score index based on a checklist, with weighting being 
assigned to the respective chapters of the King III report and the King III code, and I 
interpret the IR disclosure quality by applying two different estimated indexes. I predict 
that firm performance, as measured using Tobin’s Q index, is positively associated with 
IR disclosure quality. My findings suggest a change in value relevance with permanent 
characteristics, which supports the long-term goal of the International Integrated 
Reporting Council (IIRC). In essence, keeping other factors constant, high IR 
disclosure quality is linked with an increase in market valuation. Investigating the 
impact of IR on a multiple valuation model, I demonstrate that a high level of IR 
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disclosure information tends to prompt a higher valuation P/E index for firms compared 
to a lower level of IR disclosure quality. Moreover, I test the relation between a 
multiple-based valuation model and earnings management. The models test two 
different proxies that capture a range of earnings management activities (discretionary 
accruals and earnings smoothness), implying that firms with high earnings quality 
display high value. This study concludes that from the point when the IR Framework, 
2013 was introduced, firms disclosed more than only financial information and began 
to outperform. 
 
 
Keywords: Integrated Reporting, corporate governance, earnings quality, agency cost, 
value relevance, multiple-based valuation model, firms’ performance, accounting 
disclosure quality. 
JEL Classification: G32; G34; M40; M41; M42 
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1. Introduction  
The goal of financial reporting is to provide an accurate portrait of the present and future 
performance of firms. However, the traditional financial reporting model sometimes 
fail to illustrate the economic implications of business innovations in a timely manner 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001). Parallel and financial reporting-independent sustainability 
reporting has been introduced to examine a different set of corporate impact effects. 
Many firms consider non-financial information something special. They report the 
minimum accounting information that the King III report and some shareholders 
demand. Many arguments favor companies; therefore, financial markets do not focus 
on Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) investments and instead continue to 
manage their investments, regarding profits as the only target (Juravle and Lewis, 
2008). The fact that ESG information is presented separately in sustainability reports 
has led to criticism that non-financial information is not considered with the same 
priority and relevance as financial information. Investors may be confused and fail to 
understand the benefits of the separate reporting frameworks. Until recently, financial 
and sustainability reporting had developed separately, leading many firms to attempt to 
explain their strategies for value creation and the disclosure level of their accounting 
information in two different languages, formats, and reports (Eccles and Krzus, 2010, 
pp.2-3). On August 2, 2010, The Prince’s Accounting for Sustainability Project (A4S) 
and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) announced the formation of the IIRC (IIRC, 
2011) and explored whether financial and sustainability reporting could be merged.  
IR involves reporting both financial and non-financial ESG information in a single 
document. The goal is to improve annual reports and to supply more detailed financial 
information about current and future prospects (Anderson et al., 2004; De Villiers et 
al., 2017). According to the IIRC’s framework, the primary objective of IR is to 
‘improve the quality of information available to providers of financial capital to enable 
more efficient and productive allocation of capital’ (IIRC, 2013a, p. 2). Moreover, 
according to Bernardi and Stark (2015), IR develops and identifies with environmental 
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and sustainability reporting by capturing the interconnections between the financial and 
non-financial drivers of performance. 
A large part of the literature has been dedicated to the implementation of IR, e.g., Atkins 
et al. (2015), Atkins and Maroun (2015), Serafeim (2015) and Stent and Dowler (2015). 
Van Bommel (2014) and Flower (2015) argue that the impact of IR may vary because 
of the different economic and social structures and perceptions. Nevertheless, Barth et 
al. (2015) and Bernardi and Stark (2015) report positive economic consequences 
associated with IR. Eccles and Serafeim (2011) and Adams (2015) argue that IR may 
enhance the quality of disclosures that relate to environmental protection. Knauer and 
Serafeim (2014) and Serafeim (2015) find that IR appeals positively to long-term 
investors. Atkins and Maroun (2015) show that institutional investors believe that 
annual reports with IR display higher accounting quality and status. Barth et al. (2015) 
report that IR exhibits a positive association with firm value. Baboukardos and Rimmel 
(2016) find that earnings variables increase after IR is adopted. 
The preparation of an integrated report would be expected to direct managerial 
decisions to more long-term objectives than to short-sighted or self-defined financial 
targets. The motivation of this thesis lies behind questions such as the extent to which 
IR leads to lower levels of earnings manipulation or tax evasion or whether users of 
integrated reports, such as investors and financial analysts, modify their capital 
allocation decisions based on the value relevance and the quality of integrated reports 
(see  De Villiers et al., 2017). Moreover, it attempts to verify the IIRC’s statement that 
IR provides a clearer picture of the business’s management, with the strategy of helping 
management control various risks and identify investment opportunities more clearly 
(IIRC, 2015). 
A sample of 82 international firms is used, focusing on the period 2011-2015. Based 
on the respective chapters of the King III Report and King III Code (IoD, 2009) and the 
content elements in the IR Framework, 2013, a firm-specific integrated disclosure score 
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index is constructed that captures its degree of compliance with IR disclosures. Using 
a sample of international listed firms, it is first found that the use of corporate 
governance mechanisms is positively associated with IR disclosures. Various board 
characteristics are used such as independence, duality, and diversity (Prado-Lorenzo 
and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010) and tests the effect between corporate governance variables 
at the IR disclosure quality level. It is observed that the quality of accounting 
information increases. This finding challenges firms to include a high number of 
independent and non-executive board members on their board and nomination 
committees (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). It is concluded that firms with a high 
number of independent directors and boards have high environmental performance (De 
Villiers et al., 2011).  
Second, it is confirmed that firms with high IR quality are less likely to engage in 
aggressive earnings management. Discretionary accruals are used as a proxy for 
earnings management because they can be used as surrogates for earnings quality and 
earnings management (e.g., Jones, 1991; Subramanyam, 1996; DeFond and 
Subramanyam, 1998; Kothari et al., 2004). Accruals are the best instrument for earnings 
management compared to cash earnings because accruals can be difficult to manage 
and cannot be easily manipulated (Schipper, 1989; Burilovich and Kattelus, 1997). The 
results of this thesis are consistent with the findings of Chevis et al. (2007) and Iatridis 
(2011), who present a negative and significant association between discretionary 
accruals, profitability, operating cash flows, liquidity levels and the proportion of 
common shares owned by institutional shareholders. 
Third, an additional analysis indicates that firms with high IR disclosure quality exhibit 
lower agency costs than those with low IR disclosure quality. The IIRC verifies that the 
short-term structure of the existing financial reporting framework does not help 
managers make long-term predictions and organize their decisions about future 
strategies (KPMG, 2015). After IR implementation, incidents in which management 
often omits structural data, particularly those related to ESG information (KPMG, 
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2015), are eliminated. It is proven that firms engage less in earnings management and 
exhibit high levels of leverage. Moreover, in firms with high IR disclosure quality and 
with low agency costs, it is found that the CEO is also the chairman of the board 
compared to firms with high agency costs and low IR disclosure quality, in which the 
CEO is a non-executive director. The findings of this thesis complement the analysis 
by Haniffa and Cooke (2002), who conclude that management decides what 
information should be disclosed. IR makes boards responsible for the disclosure level 
of accounting information (financial and non-financial) in annual reports; therefore, 
disclosure may be a function of the structure, characteristics and constituents of boards. 
This has an impact on the agency relationship, in which shareholders and investors 
require more information to be disclosed by management. 
It is found that firm valuation is positively associated with IR disclosures. The first view 
advocates that if IR is beneficial to shareholders, then firm valuation should be 
positively related to IR. Supporters suggest that IR improves the quality level of 
accounting information that is available to providers of financial capital, creating a 
more efficient allocation of capital. IR leads to better engagement between investors 
and management, providing a better articulation of the linkages among the firm’s 
performance and value creation, thereby depicting the mission and vision of IR, the 
firm’s strategies and the corporate governance techniques. IR directs firms to provide 
information about their performance by establishing measurement and monitoring 
systems to provide information for decision making. Moreover, IR focuses on a firm’s 
strategy, which identifies how it intends to maximize opportunities and mitigate or 
manage risks. When IR disclosure quality increases processing costs, information 
provided to investors is reduced; hence, this should improve the speed and the amount 
of firm-specific information being incorporated into asset prices (Healy and Palepu, 
2001; Sims, 2006; Veldkamp, 2006; IIRC, 2015; De Villiers et al., 2017). 
Conversely, the second view suggests that IR can be detrimental to shareholders. When 
firms decide to disclose proprietary information, it appears as disclosure costs, thereby 
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leading firms to disclose less (Verrecchia 1983, 1990). Based on this aspect, if IR 
provides incentives for firms to disclose proprietary information, then firm valuation 
will be negatively related to IR. Similar to the context of Lee and Yeo (2016), two 
factors can increase disclosure costs when firms apply IR. The first factor is related to 
the increase in proprietary information relevant to the firm’s strategy, business model 
analysis, opportunities and risks. The second relates to the increase in direct compliance 
costs such as the use of extra monitoring procedures by management. This monitoring 
is achieved by recruiting a significant number of independent managers and directors 
and by establishing independent committees. To sum up, firms present a negative 
valuation when they adopt organizational processes that are costly and of little benefit 
to them in order to comply with IR. 
This thesis focuses on the alignment between financial and non-financial information 
provided by firms and examines the level of accounting information provided by firms 
that enrich their annual reports with IR components. It examines how the level of IR 
disclosure quality improves the view of firm performance and the value relevance of 
summary accounting information (i.e., the book value of equity and earnings). IR 
disclosure quality is interpreted by applying two different estimated indexes, which are 
symbolized as DS and DDS. DS is an IR disclosure score index derived from the scale 
of the total received scores of each firm to the maximum score (28 observations based 
on the KING III checklist). DDS is a dummy index equal to 1 if a firm has received an 
IR disclosure score equal to or greater than the median price notifications percentage 
of all sampled firms and 0 if otherwise. If IR can be used effectively to interpret the 
advantages of the King III report principles and to explain to investors how an 
organization creates value over time, it is expected that the positive association between 
value creation and IR disclosure quality (both in DS and DDS) will be stronger in 
smaller firms and with differentiation between the CEO and chairman. Consistent with 
the prediction of this thesis, it is found that firms with a high IR disclosure quality tend 
to display high market value per share. The findings of this thesis suggests that higher 
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market valuation appears in firms with high levels of leverage, profitability and 
liquidity. Stakeholders can better evaluate large firms with a high proportion of fixed 
assets to total assets in comparison with firms without these characteristics. 
Finally, the thesis examines how integrated analysis can create value, testing the 
behavior of a multiple-based valuation model. Certain results are found that support IR 
and the theory of this thesis is that the level of IR disclosures based on the King III 
report principles and IIRC framework is a mediating variable in determining the 
effectiveness of IR in capital markets context. The results of this thesis also provide 
support for the idea that specific aspects of IR disclosures based on the King III report 
principles and IIRC framework are more important than others for certain sets of firms 
in understanding future performance. The P/E multiple is used as the dependent variable 
of this thesis. To test the robustness of the thesis analysis, it is changed P/E multiple 
with P/BV. Moreover, the relationship between a multiple-based valuation model and 
earnings management is tested. The models test two different proxies that capture a 
range of earnings management activities, such as the magnitude of total accruals, the 
smoothness of earnings relative to cash flows and the association between accounting 
accruals and operating cash flows, implying that firms with high earnings quality 
display high value.  
The motivation for adopting IR stemming from the analysis of these results, is to 
simplify and integrate the information regarding the firm’s business, in an effort to 
communicate in a complete and transparent way its capacity to create value in the 
present and the future. Therefore, the analysis confirms that a new era of reporting will 
be characterized by the adoption of IR, supported and accompanied by integrated 
thinking (IIRC, 2015).  
The main motivation that emerges from this analysis corresponds to explain how IR 
implementation is linked and completes the basic accounting theories such as 
stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, resource dependence theory, and agency 
theory. 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
07/06/2020 14:11:01 EEST - 137.108.70.13
19 
 
The motivation of this thesis is to highlight that the use of IR empowers and evolutes 
stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory is the basis for the fourth, fifth and sixth research 
hypotheses, in which the relation between the IR disclosure quality and firm market 
valuation is tested. Stakeholder theory is not restricted to explaining the accountability 
of the board to shareholders only, but also to other interested parts. Advocates of 
stakeholder theory argue that this theory colors the firm’s portrait, providing both social 
and economic values and that consideration of ethics and morality, which is important 
for the estimation of a firm’s value (Freeman, 1983, p. 248). The IIRC Framework 
states that stakeholders need to be informed about capital and non-capital investments, 
for example, expenditures for property, plant, and equipment, intellectual property, and 
people. Moreover, it explains to stakeholders how investments create a competitive 
advantage for the firms and organizations, to the elasticity of the business model. 
Finally, stakeholders should be provided with an analysis of the positive and negative 
impacts on financial capital (funds available through operations, debt or equity 
financing), manufactured capital (plant, property, equipment), intellectual capital  
(patents, copyrights, licenses), human capital (the organization’s people-their 
capabilities, experience, drive to innovate), social capital (shared organizational values, 
relationships with customers, suppliers, communities), and natural capital (air, water, 
land) including significant effects on the capitals up and down the value chain (IIRC, 
2013a, Framework: 2.14 and 4.31; Kruz, 2017). 
Moreover, all of the research hypotheses are based on and verify stewardship theory. 
IR is aligned with stewardship theory. According to stewardship theory, there is 
satisfaction for investors, as well as to other participants of the firm, stemming from the 
manager’s goal of maximizing the firm’s objectives (Clarke, 2004). Stewardship theory 
offers support to the idea that CEO duality contributes to timely decision-making, 
effective execution of plans and efficient monitoring, leading the firm to better 
performance (Huang et al., 2012; Arosa et al., 2013; García-Ramos and García-Olalla, 
2014; Villanueva-Villar et al., 2016). The findings of this thesis suggest that stronger 
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corporate governance mechanisms lead to higher performance. It is observed that firms 
in which the CEO is simultaneously chairman of the board of directors, present higher 
performance in comparison with firms in which the CEO and the chairman of the board 
are independent persons. Firms with a high proportion of independent and non-
executive board members on nomination and audit committee tend to display higher IR 
disclosure quality (Zahra and Stanton 1988; Core et al., 1999; Haniffa et al., 2005; 
Huafang and Jianguo, 2007;Donnelly and Mulcahy 2008) 
This thesis is aligned with resource dependence theory, where boards are considered to 
control inter-organizational dependencies and act as a strategic resource for securing 
critical resources for the firm (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The first three research 
hypotheses highlighted the role of independent directors and non-executive board 
members as a linking mechanism between the firm and its environment that may 
support the managers in the achievement of the various goals of the organization 
(Johnson et al., 1996; Arosa et al., 2013; Villanueva-Villar et al., 2016). 
All the research hypotheses are based on and verify agency theory. IR empowers and 
confirms the implication of agency theory, in terms of corporate governance, that 
outside directors should defend shareholders’ interests through appropriate monitoring 
mechanisms that protect the shareholders from the self-interest of the management. In 
this way, having a large number of outside directors on the board could have a positive 
impact on performance through service monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Arosa et 
al., 2013). 
A last  motivation that emerges from this study corresponds to market requirements 
regarding the need for an increasing amount of information, that is not only financial 
but, more importantly, is able to communicate how the company can create value in the 
present and in the future; the objective of the IIRC is to integrate information and to 
represent the value created by the company enters the business logic and manifests itself 
both internally and externally through the publication of the IR document (IIRC, 2015). 
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The remaining sections of this thesis are as follows. In Section 2, a literature review is 
presented. It introduces the IR concept and reviews in two different sub chapters the 
evidence of IR in corporate governance, earnings quality and agency costs and evidence 
of IR in firm valuation. Section 3 presents the research hypotheses employed. Section 
4 describes the design of the sample selection and develops the models. Section 5 
discusses the empirical results, and section 6 checks the robustness of the thesis results. 
Finally, section 7 presents the conclusions and the contribution of this thesis. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction  
Financial Markets move on information and develop rapidly. The more forward-
looking and detailed information organizations provide, the better markets operate 
(Ernst and Young, 2014). Although firms are producing more sustainability reports and 
corporate social responsibility reports, they do not provide financial information and 
non-financial information in an integrated manner that helps shareholders to become 
informed (IIRC, 2011). There is a need for organizations to explain their business 
models and define the way that they create value over the short, medium and long-term. 
Parallel and independent to financial reporting, a new framework focuses on non-
financial information and  data, creating motivation for long-term investments related 
to ESG and financial factors. Moreover, the fact that there is no standard format for IR 
shifts the responsibility to stakeholders to make more secure investment decisions and 
to determine and link sustainability and economic values using the internet (Eccles and 
Saltzman, 2011). 
According to the King III report, IR exhibits “a holistic and integrated representation 
of the company’s performance in terms of both its finance and its sustainability” 
(IRCSA, 2011). The implementation of IR gives investors a clearer view of 
organizational strategy and has the power to instill confidence in long-term business 
model viability. IR clarifies a company’s management strategy, which enables 
management to control various risks and identify investment opportunities more clearly 
(IIRC, 2015). Firms using IR empower the value of their brand and reputation by 
providing information relevant to the working conditions of both employees and 
workers in their supply chain, to the relationships with the communities in which plants 
and other facilities are located and to the structure of compensation plans (Krzus, 2011). 
The IIRC suggests that the short-term structure of the existing financial reporting 
framework does not help managers to make long-term predictions and organize their 
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decisions about future strategies. Management often omits structural data, particularly 
that related to ESG information (KPMG, 2011). The mission of the IIRC is “to create 
a globally accepted IR Framework, 2013 which brings together financial and ESG 
information in a clear, concise, consistent and comparable format”1 to “help business 
to take more sustainable decisions and enable investors and other stakeholders to 
understand how an organization is really performing”2. Both financial and non-
financial data are included in a single document. This document demonstrates how 
effective sustainability reporting contributes to the positive financial performance of a 
firm and vice versa and identifies the conciliatory decisions that the firm should make 
to balance its financial and non-financial performance. Although all listed firms are 
required to provide an annual report on their financial performance, reports related to 
non-financial information are not obligatory in the majority of countries. When firms 
apply IR, they provide both financial and non-financial information (Ioannou and 
Serafeim, 2010). 
IR does not place undue emphasis on short-term financial performance. This type of 
reporting allows management to supervise business on a day-to-day basis (Eccles and 
Krzus, 2010, p.252; IIRC,2013c; Potter and Soderstrom, 2014) and explains how the 
firm considers and integrates its strategies (Abeysekera, 2013).The IIRC notes that IR 
demonstrates the linkages between an organization’s strategy, governance and financial 
performance and the social, environmental and economic context within which it 
operates. IR addresses not only investors but also other stakeholders such as customers, 
suppliers and banks (Krzus, 2011).Its main purpose is not to help business make more 
sustainable decisions, but rather to encourage an alternative way of thinking about profit 
maximization and long-term corporate success. In addition, IR enables investors and 
                                                 
 
1http://www.theiirc.org/the-iirc/,accessed December 2017 
2http://www.theiirc.org/about/,accessed December 2017  
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other stakeholders to understand how an organization is actually performing (IIRC, 
2013c; Adams, 2015). 
IR is a new reporting framework that proposes the integration of financial and non-
financial information in a single report (De Villiers et al., 2017). IR topic has generated 
under serious scrutiny lately and most discussions focused on the need to regulate this 
field. Its goal is to contribute to the improvement of reporting quality of accounting 
information for reporting firms. IIRC is the main governing body which manages the 
IR procedure and promotes its application (Oprisor, 2015). 
IR is a concept that has been created to better articulate the broader range of measures 
that contribute to long-term value and the role organizations play in society. Central to 
this is the proposition that value is increasingly shaped by factors additional to financial 
performance, such as reliance on the environment, social reputation, human capital 
skills and others. This value creation concept is the backbone of integrated reporting 
and, is believed to be the direction for the future of corporate reporting. While 
integrated reports benefit a broad range of stakeholders, they’re principally aimed at 
long-term investors. Integrated reporting starts from the position that any value created 
as a result of a sustainable strategy - regardless of whether it becomes a tangible or 
intangible asset - will translate, at least partially, into performance. Market value will 
therefore be impacted (Ernst and Young, 2014). 
In this part, firstly the definition of IR, the purpose of IR and the incentives that IR 
generates are presented. A subsection is devoted to the business model and the new 
capital analysis. The financial and non-financial reporting principles and characteristics 
that IR is based on are demonstrated. Three theoretical perspectives of accounting 
theory are analyzed ; the agency theory, the stewardship theory and the stakeholder 
theory. Then, a review of the basic accounting pieces of this thesis is implemented. A 
literature review of the linkage between IR and corporate governance, earnings 
management, agency costs and firms valuation is examined. 
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2.2. Overview  
IR is a concept that has been generated to better articulate the broader range of measures 
that contribute to long-term value and the role organizations and firms play in society 
(Ernst and Young, 2014).It is a "process that results in communication, most visibly a 
periodic “integrated report”, about value creation over time. An integrated report is a 
concise communication about how an organization’s strategy, governance, 
performance and prospects lead to the creation of value over the short, medium and 
long term."(IIRC, 2013a) 
An integrated report has as a primary purpose to increase the quality of disclosure 
information to providers of financial capital. It achieves this using broader and more 
relevant accounting information that can assist in effective capital allocation decisions. 
IR recognizes investors as a part of this system. However, the current research into IR 
focuses on investors (IIRC, 2015). The integrated presentation of a firm’s performance 
is achieved by providing financial and non financial information. IR focuses on firm 
performance, makes clear the way of the value relevant information fits into firm’s 
operations, and orientates the firm in making more long-term investments (IIRC, 
2013a). 
Prior research has revealed that investors need information beyond purely financial 
data. The advantages to investors of using broader non financial information are 
numerous and have been examined in several studies that survey investor attitudes to 
such information. The advantages illustrated include (amongst others) an improved 
relationship between the firm and investor, a greater insight into an organization’s 
business model, strategy and long-term outlook, as well as a greater understanding of 
the stocks and flows of capital (IIRC, 2013a; IIRC, 2015). 
Investors have also observed that using such information eliminates gaps and informs 
decision making. They also mark that the use of a mixed set of financial and non 
financial information leads to a better understanding of the drivers of the firm’s 
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performance and value creation. The advantages recognized at the firm level could also 
help investors. For example, studies suggest that firms who use IR techniques 
outperform those that don’t and also attract more long-term investors. (IIRC, 2015; 
Krzus, 2017). 
The type of information that investors search for contains a general explanation of the 
business model, the way the firm generates cash, and creates value, a well-articulated 
strategy and anticipated future opportunities and vulnerabilities. Ιnvestors are using IR 
information in many ways, including to help manage investment risk, make expectation 
about industry dynamics and the regulatory environment, confirm an investment thesis 
and assess a firm’s forward looking information (IIRC, 2015). 
The goal of IR is to produce complete financial and sustainability reports. An IIRC 
framework has been published, but some questions remain about how it should be 
applied. Questions are made whether there is a need of a new report, or a need of one 
report  (Eccles and Krzus, 2010). Moreover it is tried to answer the question if this 
report is useful for investors, and for other stakeholders (Flower, 2015).  
2.3. Definition 
However, there is not yet a common definition of IR. Three different definitions are 
provided in order to make this concept more understandable. The IIRC defines IR as 
follows:  
“IR demonstrates the linkages between an organization’s strategy, 
governance and financial performance and the social, environmental and 
economic context within which it operates. By reinforcing these 
connections, IR can help business to take more sustainable decisions and 
enable investors and other stakeholders to understand how an organization 
is really performing.” (IIRC, 2013b) 
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The next definition is stated in the draft framework on IR for listed companies in South 
Africa and is defined as follows: 
“a holistic and integrated representation of the company’s performance in 
terms of both its finance and its sustainability .” (IIRC, 2011) 
 
Another definition of IR derives from GRI:  
“An integrated report presents information about an organization’s financial 
performance with information about its ESG performance in an integrated 
way.” (GRI, 2011a) 
 
IR is in its first stages and is still under development in practice. Nevertheless, it can be 
used in all industries, in private and public firms and in all types of organizations and 
its application is intended to improve communication between companies and capital 
markets. By combining financial and non-financial information the firm’s strategy and 
performance is revealed and highlights the interdependencies of the information 
(KPMG, 2011) which can be a useful mechanism for companies (Adams and Frost, 
2008). 
2.4. The call for IR 
Capitalism relies on the efficient allocation of capital to reward investors with returns 
over the short, medium and long turn periods. Firms have a basic goal to manage the 
financial capital provided by investors and also to create and maintain the value 
generated from other non-financial capital sources, such as people, trademarks/ 
copyrights and natural resources. The 2007, financial crisis tested the western model of 
capitalism because of its high dependence on short term financial factors over other the 
long term. It highlighted the need for Corporate reporting to merge financial stability 
and non financial information, in order to increase the level of accounting disclosure 
quality. IR is required to create a concise report to underpin both of these problems that 
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appeared during the financial crisis by communicating to providers of financial capital 
the information that they need. 
IR connects a wide range of factors and then determines the value of an organization or 
firm. There is some financial data which is easy to estimate in financial statements, such 
as property and cash, while many, such as intellectual capital, competition and energy 
security, are not. IR illustrates the broad and longer-term consequences of the 
organization or firms’ decisions in order to create value. IR goals to create a framework 
in which an organization or a firm can communicate in a clear, and articulate way about 
the allocation of resources and relationships, in order to create short-, medium-, 
andlong-term value, helping investors to allocate resources most efficiently (IIRC, 
2013a). 
IR aligns with a long-term strategy and provides basically medium and long-terms 
metrics and targets. IR goals to interpret the milestones, targets, and KPIs (such as new 
products and services, new markets, customer satisfaction, cost management, and how 
well the assets operate in order to create value) which will be used to highlight whether 
goals and objectives have been achieved over the medium- and long-term (IIRC, 2013a, 
Framework:4.28). Moreover, IR emphasizes to inform investors with sector- and 
company-specific quantitative indicators in order to estimate correctly the firm’s 
targets, to manage risks, and to leverage opportunities (IIRC, 2013a, Framework: 4.31). 
IR illustrates the importance level of the selected indicators, their implications, the 
methodology and the basic assumptions used in composing them (IIRC, 2013a, 
Framework:4.31). IR tries to interpret how changes in the external environment could 
influence metrics and targets and the achievement of medium- and long-term strategic 
objectives (IIRC, 2013a, Framework: 4.37). Also, IR illustrates how the improvement 
in the external environment could include the availability, quality, and affordability of 
resources that are used by the organization and firms. An example is that of the 
continued availability of skilled labor or natural resources (IIRC, 2013a, 
Framework:4.37). Finally, IR explains the evolution between past and current 
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performance and between current performance and the firm’s medium- and long-term 
strategy (IIRC, 2013a, Framework: 4.31; Kruz, 2017). 
2.5. The purpose of IR 
The primary purpose of an integrated report is to explain to providers of financial 
capital how an organization/firm creates value over time (Atkins and Maroun, 2015; 
Stent and Dowler, 2015). As part of achieving this purpose, an integrated report should 
“provide insight into the nature and quality of the organization’s relationships with its 
key stakeholders, including how and to what extent the organization understands, takes 
into account and responds to their legitimate needs and interest” (IIRC, 2013b, para 
3.10). Nevertheless, the primary purpose of an integrated report is to explain to 
providers of financial capital how an organization creates value over time. An 
integrated report benefits all stakeholders interested in an organization’s ability to 
create value over time, including employees, customers, suppliers, business partners, 
local communities, legislators, regulators and policy-makers. (IIRC, 2013b, p.4). 
The IIRC Framework takes a principles-based approach. Its goal is to achieve an 
appropriate balance between flexibility and prescription that recognizes the wide 
variation in individual circumstances of different firms and organizations, while 
enabling a sufficient degree of comparability across firms and organizations to meet 
relevant information needs. It does not obligate to be used specific key performance 
indicators, measurement methods, or the disclosure of individual matters, but states a 
small number of requirements that are to be applied before an integrated report can be 
said to be in accordance with the Framework (IIRC, 2013b, p.4). It uses the Internet to 
provide more detailed results to all of their stakeholders to improve their level of 
dialogue and engagement with them (Eccles and Saltzman, 2011). An integrated report 
may be prepared in response to existing compliance requirements, and may be either 
an independent new report or be included as a distinguishable, prominent and accessible 
part of another report, mainly in an annual report. It should include a statement of the 
governance committee of each firm or organization that accepts the integration of the 
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report. This statement should be explained and comply with IIRC Framework (IIRC, 
2013b, p.4). 
This facilitates investors in making more secure investment decisions and to determine 
and link sustainability and economic value. It does not give undue emphasis to short-
term financial performance. By aligning financial and non financial information, it 
gives the responsibility to management to supervise business on a day to day basis 
(Eccles et al., 2014). This proves how IR adds tremendous value to the company and 
all of its stakeholders, including shareholders, and also ultimately contributes to a 
sustainable society (Eccles and Krzus, 2010, p.252; IIRC,2013; Potter and Soderstrom, 
2014).  
The IIRC statement mentions that the existing financial reporting framework focuses 
on the wrong things over the wrong time frame. Its short-term structure does not help 
managers to make long-term predictions and organize their decisions about future 
strategies. Management often omits structural data, especially that related to ESG 
information (KPMG, 2010). The IIRC Framework  aims to achieve three goals. First 
IR should try to enhance accountability and stewardship for the broad base of capitals 
(financial, manufactured, intellectual, human, social and relationship, and natural) and 
to promote understanding of their interdependencies. Second IR aims to support 
integrated thinking, decision-making and actions that focus on the creation of value 
over the short, medium and long term. Finally, it targets the promotion of a more 
cohesive and efficient approach to corporate reporting, that draws on different reporting 
strands and communicates the full range of factors that materially affect the ability of 
an organization to create value over time (IIRC, 2013b, p.4). Cheng et al. (2014) to their 
research advocate all the above goals.  
 
2.6. Advocacy and Critique 
It is used the critical framework of Alvesson and Deetz (2000) that encouters insight, 
critique and transformative redefinition. This framework has been applied in the 
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accounting literature in order to criticize an interventionist research project (Dumay, 
2010), and on interviews as a research method (Qu and Dumay, 2011). In this 
framework, the notion of ‘insight’ is introduced, which can be defined as the 
interpretive goals of local understanding closely connected to real situations (Alvesson 
and Deetz, 2000; Dumay, 2010). 
The IIRC has widely presented its objectives and  has analyzed the way the integrated 
report can provide an alternative to traditional financial reporting. Initially, embraced, 
the taken-for-granted concepts of IR have now highlight of sustainability accounting 
(Flower, 2015). However, the IIRC seems not to consider the interests of wealth criteria 
in the sustainability accounting. While most categories of capital are defined and clear, 
such as financial capital, which is the firm’s “pool of funds” (IIRC, 2013a, paragraph 
2.17) and manufactured capital, which comprises material objects created by man, only 
a single reference is made to sustainability in the IIRC Framework. This reference is 
illustrated to a separate sustainability report and is not part of the integrated report 
(IIRC, 2013a, paragraph 1.13). It is more likely that this separate report would be kept 
up with the GRI’s Guidelines (Flower, 2015). This development seems unusual because 
the principal motivation of the bodies that created the IIRC (the GRI and Accounting 
for Sustainability (A4S)) was to improve the reporting of sustainability.  
The main purpose of IR theory is to propose that an integrated report should indicate 
how value is created as estimated by the increase, less the decrease in the value of the 
six capitals (McCaffry and Topazio, 2015; IIRC, 2015). Flower (2015) argues that IIRC 
has abandoned sustainability accounting. He concludes that the IIRC‘s concept of value 
is “value for investors” and not “value for society”. Specifically, his article gives 
possible alternative interpretations of the word “value”,  which is the critical point of 
his analysis. The term “value to society” is related to the social and environmental 
accounting, the term “value to stakeholders” is related to stakeholder theory and the 
“value to present and future generations” is related to sustainability. Moreover, the term 
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“providers of financial capital in paragraph 1.7 of IIRC framework focuses on the term 
“value to investors”.  
According to Flower (2015, p. 6), the main purpose of the integrated report is, in fact, 
to analyze the value creation procedure for the providers of financial capital. The IIRC 
Framework confirms that firms managers, who prepare the integrated reports interested 
in the benefits that arise from the six capital use (in the form of dividends and other 
return of capital), as it is reffered in paragraph 2.4. of IIRC framework  and specifically 
to “financial returns to the providers of financial capital”.  
Moreover, Flower (2015) states that IR will not become the reporting norm because it 
lacks regulatory enforcement. The only situation in which the IIRC can convince 
international regulators to make IR compulsory and become the reporting norm. This 
is occurs with IFRS and GAAP. Further, Flower (2015) concludes that the IIRC places 
no obligation on firms to report harm inflicted on entities outside the firm (such as the 
environment) where there is no subsequent impact on the firm. He highlights the fact 
that the proposals of IIRC will make little contribution on to corporate reporting 
practice, because of their lack of force. 
During the time it is generated the need for improvements of financial reporting (Milne 
and Gray, 2013), and user always find the ways to obtain the information that they need 
(Jenkins, 1994). Flower (2015) criticizes the behavior of the accountans and of 
multination firms, which use the IR notion as a tool to control the agenda of wealth 
creation for investors. He argues that the IIRC has been the victim of “regulatory 
capture”. The IIRC council is constituted mostly of accountants. Dumay (2016) 
mentions that the call for changes to reporting backround are to the benefit of the 
accountants rather than a genuine attempt to reform the shortcomings of financial 
reporting.  
There is a growing body of experimental research on the application of IR that tackles 
the different aspects related to corporate governace, earnings managenet, agency cost 
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theory, firm’s performance and valuation, which has inspired the present thesis. With 
regard to the research hypotheses of this thesis, prior research findings focus on the 
effects of integrating financial and non-financial information and on the effects of 
assuring non-financial information. It is supported that IR encouraging a long-term and 
sustainable orientation will benefit both firms and stakeholders. IR preparers promote 
integrated thinking as a practice, which helps investors to make better internal decisions 
with lower reputational and regulation risk, and greater corporate transparency. IR helps 
firms to develop financial stability and to contribute to a more sustainable society 
(Eccles and Krzus, 2010; Eccles and Saltzman, 2011; Krzus, 2011; Reimsbach et al., 
2017).  
Prior studies have concluded on a positive level of non-financial assurance on the 
perceived reliability of the respective information which is provided to investors 
(Brown- Liburd and Zamora, 2015; Hodge et al., 2009; Pflugrath et al., 2011). This 
effect, however, appears to be context-specific and more pronounced when non 
financial-related information quality is positive (Brown-Liburd and Zamora, 2015; 
Coram et al., 2009). As a result, such increased perceived reliability and credibility can 
even translate into higher stock price estimates (Coram et al., 2009). Empirical research 
on IR, however, is still very scarce. As shown in empirical research by Arnold et al., 
(2012), an anchoring bias influences the assessment of non-financial information that 
is provided in an integrated report may help to avoid distorted valuations, thus serving 
as a debiasing tool. Reimsbach et al., (2017) focuses on the processing of non-financial 
information, which is presented initially in separate parts of financial statetements and 
then in integrated reports. Then, they add and estimate the influence of assuring this 
non-financial information to their analysis, emphasizing how these two important 
aspects of non-financial disclosure interact. 
Ghosh and Wu (2012) and Alwert et al., (2009) conclude that both financial and non-
financial information are used by analysts when make financial judgements. Other 
studies examine the impact of information derived from sustainability reports and 
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conclude that the qualitative and quantitative nature of the given information 
(Rikhardsson and Holm, 2008; Van der Laan Smith et al., 2010), the level of disclosure 
quality of information of each firm (Reimsbach and Hahn, 2015) and the type of media 
used to provide the information (Cho et al., 2009) can vary according to cross-national 
characteristics (Van der Laan Smith et al., 2010). 
Based on Sztompka’s (1999) theory on trust in social relationships, Chaidali and Jones 
(2017) investigate the sources of trust as cited by the IIRC and its partners, to enroll 
preparers into adopting IR adoption and how preparers reacted to the latter. Their 
analysis especially focuses on the interview preparers who create corporate reports, 
such as the integrated report. They observe that the preparers are often suspicious of 
the motives of the IIRC professionals and express concerns about the performance, 
structure and appearance of the integrated report. Preparers tend to believe that the 
composition of the IIRC Board impairs the credibility of the integrated report and 
negatively influences their trust in this initiative.  
Furthermore, Chaidali and Jones (2017) conclude that the preparers are concerned 
about the credibility of a single report and seem uncertain of the benefits or the 
beneficiaries of IR. Finally, they state that preparers report problems arising from a lack 
of adequate and clear guidance, high preparation costs, the format, and the length of the 
report. As a result preparers believe these undermine the IR’s credibility. Chaidali and 
Jones (2017) study supports the IR theory and contributes to the ongoing debate on the 
importance of trust in the marketing of new professional initiatives. It reveals that there 
shaping of the IR’s principles was a result of the IIRC’s endeavour to expand its 
accounting expertise territory within a fragile nexus of trust relationships.  
As an answer to Chaidali and Jones (2017) research, Reimsbach et al., (2017) study the 
affect of voluntary disclosure quality of IR on acqusitions and measure by how the 
choice of reporting format interacts with the voluntary assurance of non-financial 
information. Using a sample of professional investors, they highlight the importance of 
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assurance in the the context of voluntary disclosure and the relevant interaction with 
the reporting format. They conclude that assurance of integrated information positively 
affects the professional investors’ evaluation of a firm’s performance. This improves 
the financial and non-financial information and leads to higher investment-related 
judgments. On the other hand, the assurance level is weakensed in the the case of 
integrated reporting compared to separate reporting. Hence, they interprent this effect 
as a cognitive bias in decision-making when assured financial performance and non 
assured non-financial performance are presented in the same report. 
The existence of IR provides strategic information, which is important in terms of 
acquiring competitive funding. This benefits the not-for-profit sector (Adams and 
Simnett, 2011). The lack of a globally accepted standard for measuring and reporting 
non-financial information and the variability of the relevance, applicability and 
adoption of IR across jurisdictions comes to deal with the IR advent (Adams and 
Simnett, 2011; Eccles and Saltzman, 2011; Eccles and Serafeim, 2011). Therefore, 
integrated reports are not always comparable, potentially reducing their usefulness to 
investment analysts. Nevertheless, Eccles and Serafeim (2011) argue that IR is urgently 
needed to address issues such as natural resource limitations and financial stability and 
encourage regulatory bodies to mandate IR. 
2.7. Prior research classified by country 
The need for the continuous publishing of reports to inform stakeholders has generated 
the advent of IR, in which both financial information and non-financial information are 
illustrated in one single report. An integrated report not only focuses on illustrating 
accounting information but also attempts to explain how the firm rethinks and integrates 
its strategies (Abeysekera, 2013). In 2000, GRI guidelines firstly introduced and linked 
with sustainability reporting. Its target is to create a widely accepted reporting system 
which includes economic, environmental and social information. GRI standard 
disclosures guide included major topics related to strategy and analysis, organizational 
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profile, report parameters (e.g. scope and content), governance, commitments and 
engagements, management approach and performance indicators. Also, GRI standard 
disclosures guide covered detailed disclosures on how and what economic, 
environmental and social data should be reported (GRI, 2011).  Moreover, 
the International Corporate Governance Network, which is set up and financed by the 
world’s largest investment funds, has provided non-financial information to investors. 
In 2014 it stated that “the Board should provide an integrated report that puts historical 
performance into context and portrays the risks, opportunities and prospects for the 
company in the future, helping shareholders understand a company’s strategic 
objectives and its progress toward meeting them.” (KPMG and Rerolle, 2015). 
During 2010, new books and reports were released, analyzing the new integrated 
reporting framework. The most known and the first introduced was the e-book 
“Landscape of Integrated Reporting edited by Eccles R., Cheng B. and Saltzman D., in 
which was included articles that analyzed, discussed and set different perspectives on 
integrated reporting. It was developed the ways in which ESG information and financial 
performance could be aligned and how synergies could be created between them 
(Eccles et al., 2010). This book did not provide any empirical implementations. The 
book “One Report: Integrated Reporting for a Sustainable Strategy”, edited by Eccles 
R. and Krzus M., focused on the emerging trend of integrated reporting as a top priority 
for companies, investors, regulators, auditors and civil society. It provided compelling 
case studies from some of the world's leading companies, applying IR and addressing 
how companies should move toward One Report and how it could become a keystone 
of a sustainable strategy for both the company and society. Finally Big 4 auditing firms 
such as KPMG and PwC created reports on integrated reporting, mentioning a number 
of arguments, challenges, implementation problems and opinions for improvement. 
Since IR is a new notion that illustrates financial and non financial information in a 
single report, individual reporting organazations are not developed yet satisfactorily. 
Nevertheless, in some countries IR has been developed. South Africa is the first 
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pioneering nation which applies IR. In the next section, some key developments in some 
other countries such as the United Kingdom, Netherlands, France, Spain, Germany, 
Australia, Singapore, Japan and the USA will be analysed. 
South Africa is the first country to make IR mandatory. Firms listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange are required to adopt IR principles based on the IIRC 
framework, which focuses on ESG issues and on King III report’s principles. Listed 
firms should issue an integrated report or explain the reasons why they have not 
published such a report. Hence, the most listed firms choose to issue an integrated 
report.  
 
   Figure 1: Evolution of corporate reporting  
 
  Source: Adapted from IIRC, Towards Integrated Reporting: Communicating Value in the 
21st Century, September 2011 
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In 2011, IIRC of South Africa published a discussion paper titled “The Framework for 
Integrated Reporting and the Integrate Report” (IIRC, 2013b). This paper investigated 
a sample of approximately 100 firms from different sectors and countries all over the 
world and published integrated reports from the financial year in 2010. These firms, 
considering the draft framework as a rule, created their own integrated report and 
provided feedback for revising the framework (IIRC, 2011). In 2014, IRCSA was 
endorsed the IIRC’s investor value creation highlighted IIRC Framework (IIRC, 2015). 
The implementation of IR is not mandatory in all the other countries. Other countries 
such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Spain, Germany, Australia, 
Singapore, Japan and the USA apply IR voluntarily. However, the compliance level 
with IR principles between the countries is different. Some countries conform more to 
sustainability reporting practices and regulations that define King III report and IIRC 
framework (ACCA, 2016; Eccles et al., 2010). 
The United Kingdom was one of the first countries that applied volunatry IR and can 
be regarded as one of the global leaders in corporate reporting (KPMG, 2013). 
Moreover, PWC (2013a) making a survey of the annual reports of FTSE 100 firms 
exibites the opportunites which are generated by the demands of integration between 
strategic focus, accountability and reporting in light of recent developments in 
regulatory changes, that arise from the Sustainability Guidelines of GRI S4, King III 
report and IIRC framework. The results of the KPMG survey concluded that the 
majority of FTSE 100 firms have begun to address some of the fundamental issues of 
IR, but this is at broad level. For example, almost all of the firms analyze their aims, 
strategy, priority and progress and about 40% provide information about the actions 
taken to deliver on these strategies. Moreover, fewer firms disclose information about 
social and enviromental impacts that may be provoked by each production procedure. 
More specifically, 31% of firms make predictions  about how the future avalaibility of 
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natural, material and manufactured resources can create value and the pollution of 
nature which may be created (PWC, 2013a).  
However, there is a misunderstanding in the way that the critical elements of reporting 
are related to each other. Specifically, there is lack of available information about the 
business model and its relationship to other reporting areas, such as sustainability, risks 
and strategy, which was limited (PWC, 2013a). The Institute of Chartered Accountants 
of England and Wales presented IR as having “the potential to act as a catalyst for major 
improvements in business reporting” (ICAEW, 2013), adding that in the United 
Kingdom many firms are already illustarting the principles of IR into their existing 
reporting documents and mainly in their annual reports (ICAEW, 2013).  
In the Netherlands, PWC’s (2013c) survey of the top 50 listed non financial firms and 
researched their annual reports and found that their IR disclosure quality was low. They 
focused on specific categories. These catergories relate to the main risks and 
opportunities, and the ways in which resourses are allocated in order to implement their 
strategic goals and the definition and measurement of performance (PWC, 2013c). 
First, the results indicate that only 3% of the top 50 listed non financial firms include 
in their reports IR information about the the impact and probability of the identified 
risks. As a result these firms provide little insight into the dynamics of their risk profiles. 
Second, it concludes that while firms mention the level of importance of IR in their 
strategy (almost 90% of the firms disclose information about their strategic plans and 
54 % of the survey sample analyse their strategic plans and document the ways how 
these strategic priorities were aligned to overall goals) the level of discloure quality is 
low and is not clear about how resources are going to be allocated to implement the 
stated strategic plans. Finally, the PWC (2013c) survey concludes that the mixure of 
financial and non financial information in a consise report helps investors because the 
level of information provided is increased. It is observed that Dutch top 50 listed firms 
tend to avoid reporting in their reports the financial, enviromental and social impact 
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and other important performance indicators, such as customer satisfaction with their 
strategic choices (PWC, 2013c). 
PWC reviewed Spanish IBEX 35 firms to test the characteristics of IR. They focused 
on the IR content, quality and the level of integration. They investigated whether the 
econonic profile of the Spanish IBEX 35 firms improved from the day of 
implementation to the next, updating their economic, enviromental and social dislosure 
level of information (PWC, 2013b). The results of this study concluded that 80% of 
IBEX 35 firms disclose a sistisfactory degree of information about the growth prospects 
of the markets in which they operated. Moreover, all of the IBEX 35 firms reported on 
key business risks. 94% of the firms gave information relating to the business model. 
Spesifically, they provided references to key capabilities and the key resources they 
depended upon to give a competitive advantage. Finally, 11% of IBEX 35 firms 
appeared an intergated strategy and sustainability. Another study of PWC compared the 
reporting practices between IBEX 35 firms and UK FTSE 250 and FTSE 100 and 
concluded that IR practices of Spanish- and Uninted Kingdom –listed firms were 
broadly similar (PWC, 2014).  
In Australia, ACCA and Net Balance Foundation measured the level of public reporting 
of firms within the ASX 50, to investigate how these firms have conformed with IR 
practices (ACCA, 2012). The technique was applied based on six key categories that 
are contained in the integration agenda. Analytically, these categories are the mission 
and strategy, management approach, performance tracking, risk management, 
stakeholder engagement and the format of public reporting. The results of their survey 
found that some of ASX 50 firms made progress and disclose non financial information 
related to their strategy, management processes and public reporting. Moreover, these 
firms appear to have a relatively transparent and comprehensive approach to 
stakeholder management and used a variety of reporting formats (including CSR 
reports, integrated reports and annual reports) and a mixure of communication 
platforms, such as web sites and newsletters, in order to satisfy the various information 
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needs of stakeholders. However, most ASX 50 firms preferred not to disclose non-
financial risks or to mention the financial implications of these risks. Their study found 
that, in Australia, there was low interest in non-financial matters among investors 
(except climate change risk). On the other hand, there was high interest in terms of 
environmental disclosure. Individual investors wanted extensive information about 
enviromental disclosure, with many of them voicing the need for the introduction of 
manading corporate environmental disclosures (De Villiers and Van Staden, 2010). 
Higgins et al. (2014) surveyed Australian business organisations which voluntarily 
adopted IR from the first moment of IR implementation. They carried out an in depth 
analysis of the institutionalization of IR. They conducted interviews in 15 Australian 
firms that were  first to adopt IR  and concluded that the basic reason for the existence 
of 15 different integrated reports is because each firm involves different materiality 
judgements and has different implications for the manager’s responsibilities.  
The Singapore Accountancy Commission (SAC) was in favor of the Integrated 
Reporting Framework, arguing that IR would create a more stabile, comprehensive and 
cohesive picture of firms with greater information transparecy. The increasment of 
information transparency and the balanced interests among stakeholders would create 
a beneficial way of providing information to stakeholders because it discloses finanacial 
and non financial information in a single report. The SAC the IR adoption with the 
development of Singapore’s business environment, by attracting overseas investors 
(institutional investors in particular) (SAC, 2016). The SAC undertook severals 
projects. In 2013, it undertook a project which had a goal to promoting integrated 
reporting in Singapore and the Southeast Asian region. This project presented IR as an 
educational document, the basic goal of which was to raise the awareness of 
stakeholders and firms about the advantages of IR. Moreover, it aimed to provide 
instructions about IR adoption and gave solutions about the merging of annual and 
intergrated reports. It cited information about issues such as integrated reporting 
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assurance. At the end of 2014, the SAC published its own annual report based on the 
principles of the IIRC framework (SAC, 2016). 
Japan  has created a mixure of corporate governance and accouning practices over the 
years, which includes specific cultural and environmental factors (Yamagami and 
Kokubu, 1991). The Japanese corporate governance model emphasizes on stakeholders 
rather than shareholders (Yonekura et al., 2012). As a result stakeholders, and 
particularly employees, are an important part of the Japanese model and promote the 
firm’s purpose for long term value creation (Yonekura et al., 2012). This proved after 
the Great East Japan Earthquake 2011 that forced firms to make social and 
environmental activities in order to bring the communities back to the previous normal 
situation (Mizobata et al., 2014). In July 2012, the Japan Ministry of the Economy, 
Trade and Industry set up a Corporate Reporting laboratory, whose basic role was to 
emphasize long-term investment and to create a frame in order to generate corporate 
value, and to encourage dialogue between organizations and shareholders. Some of the 
several research projects created by the laboratory were Task Force on IR, Corporate 
value a Working Group on Corporate Governance Dialogue and a Task Force on 
Corporate Awareness of Corporate Governance (The Ministry of Economy Trade and 
Industry of Japan, 2013). The transition from Corporate reporting to IR was analysed 
in the research paper titled Expert Committee on Desirable Market Economy System, 
which was developed by the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy of Japan. The 
Committee tried to highlight the shape of a market economy system under which 
sustainable growth with an environmental footprint can be implemented, not with a  
short-term horizon but with medium and long term horizons (Expert Committee on 
Desirable Market Economy System, 2013, p. 1). On the first page of the expert 
committee report it states that the aim of IR is to diversify information in a single report 
in order to help investors to analyze and evaluate firms. Such information contains 
environmental activities, relationships with local communities, long-term business 
plans and financial information. IR describes in an effective way the entire firm’s 
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activities and strategies. If investors understand the value created by the firm, as a result 
of IR implementation, they can contribute to the medium- and long-term growth of a 
firm (Expert Committee on Desirable Market Economy System, 2013, p. 17). In 2013 
another survey in Japan carried out by the Japan Investor Relations Association, found 
that a significant number of Japanese firms have already created an integrated report or 
are planning to create an integrated report (JSIF, 2013).  
In Germany, in 2016, PWC carried out a study titled “Integrated reporting in Germany: 
The DAX 30 Benchmark Survey 2015”. It was a survey of firms reporting in terms of 
the IIRC framework. The results of this analysis showed a decrease of the pace with 
which DAX 30 firms were adopting IR, as compared to the first years of implantationsp 
of IR. This analysis pointed out that the implementation of the IIRC framework, by the 
DAX 30 firms, was at a “tipping point” and observed that firms had difficulties  in 
finding out what information should appear, in order to improve their reporting and 
hence to pass this tipping point. However, there were some firms which made 
substantial efforts to conform to IIRC principles and integrated thinking. These firms 
tried to show how non-financial topics had directly affected their strategy, the 
management of their firm and their performance and value creation. In 2014 a 
mandatory German Accounting Standard 20 (GAS 20) was introduced and boosted the 
non financial reporting in the German market. Significant efforts and progress were 
made bythe DAX 30 firms with regard to the appearance of non-financial information, 
to report on key performance indicators, risks, strategies, and forecasts. This leaded to 
an overall of up to 10%, in 2014, compared to the reporting period in 2013. However, 
in 2015 the reporting level of non-financial information of DAX 30 firms remained 
constant at the levels of 2014, presenting a slightly positive shift in the range of 1%. 
(PWC, 2015) 
Moreover, PWC (2015) found several new trends which embody IIRC elements in the 
DAX 30 firm’s reports. First, they did not notice or noticed merely marginal 
developments relevant to the content elements “organizational overview and external 
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environment”, “governance” and “outlook”. While individual components were subject 
to variations, these balanced each other out to yield little change overall. Second it 
observed a positive attitude to the content elements of “business model”, “risk and 
opportunities” and “strategy and recourse allocation”. The developments in reporting 
on risk and opportunities were a result of the compliance efforts regarding GAS 20. 
DAX 30 firms observed a slightly increased quality in reporting on business model and 
strategy, which suggested continued trials on the part of individual firms with the IR 
agenda. Finally, it concluded that there was a slight decrease in the firm’s performance. 
This was proved because slightly fewer reports were classified as effective 
“communication” as compared to 2014 (PWC, 2015). The general message that 
concluded the PWC (2015) survey was that the current flattering trend in the quality of 
reporting developments in corporate reporting, may only be implemented if IR does not 
focus basically on the “report” as such, but goes beyond “reporting”. Firms, should start 
thinking about what is proper to create value. Reporting will then follow the value 
creation narrative of the firm (PWC, 2015). 
In 2012, France adopted the Grenelle II Act, which requires the reporting of ESG issues 
by all firms (IIRC, 2013b). An article was written by Jean-Florent Rerolle, a Partner of 
KPMG, in 2015, which illustrates the situation of IR in France. It mentioned that the 
majority of French firms had known about IR and were at least considering what it 
could mean for them over the next few years (KPMG, 2015). However, France is still 
lagging behind with only few IR reports in 2015. Only three firms prepared their reports 
(Engie, Vivendi and Eurazeo) according to IR principles. These three reports were 
diversified reflecting the rage of possible approaches to IR French firms have the goal 
of attracting foreign investors and especially Anglo-Saxon funds. They should consider 
aligning their share price with their intrinsic value, depending on their ability to inform 
shareholders about their financial position, short-, medium-, and long-term value 
creation strategy. 
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French firms make three basic mistakes.The first is related to the basic objective of IR. 
The title of the original IIRC Framework in France was “Communicating value in the 
21st century”. Investors found the word “value” ambiguous and misleading. Some 
ideologists see IR as a way to denounce “shareholder value”, which they illustrate 
different to the “true” value supposed to be distributed to the firm’s investors. This 
generates two sides. On one side the good shareholders concern with a long-term value 
creation strategy, and on the other hand, the other side, the greedy shareholders, who 
look for short-term profits (IIRC, 2015a). 
Actually, if it is focused on real facts, it is considered that this is a highly prejudiced 
aspect. Contrary to the financial literature, the share price represents the long term firm 
value. Traders focus on short-term goals and strategies which affect daily share prices. 
They collect information based on timeliness and try to predict how the market can 
react on a short-term basis. When share prices deviate from the fundamental value of 
the firm, long- term investors show up. They invest less than traders but when they 
decide to build a position after a careful due diligence review, they earn 7 to 30 times 
more than traders in a period of 10 to 15 days. Thus, the profile or these investors is 
based on long-term expectations (IIRC, 2015a; KPMG, 2015) 
The second mistake considers IR as the result of merging the sustainability report and 
the annual report. Sustainability reporting using CSR function during the time tried to 
be cited in a chapter of an annual report. The trial to create a merged document, based 
on the idea that the “true” value is not shareholder value and extra non-financial 
characteristics, should be developed and applied. This approach reflects a 
misunderstanding of the mechanisms of value creation. Long-term financial value is 
consists of a complex mix of tangible and intangible resources, which are created by 
the firm in order to properly allocate its strategies and goals. For example, the goal is 
not to estimate and apply the classical CSR indicators, which for the most part have no 
real relationship with shareholder value, but to identify soft information representative 
of financial value creation, alongside hard information (KPMG, 2015). 
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The final mistake is based on the belief that a standardized approach should be put into 
place. It is true that value creation derives from the firm’s transient competitive 
advantages, which are by definition unique. This uniqueness can be standardized, based 
on an assurance given by an independent auditor. The IIRC framework and King III 
report is an inspiration for firms. These three mistakes should be clarified by French 
firms, in order to give way to a more positive and realistic view of the integrated report. 
Firms must consider that IR is a new accounting method, which is intended primarily 
for investors and meets an essential need in terms of financial market information. They 
must understand that this is a matter of investor’s relations, not sustainable 
development. The objective is to create and promote a more rigorous “equity story” 
(KPMG, 2015). 
In France, IR can operate with success. First, the French financial community has 
considered that IR favors the alignment of the fundamental value and the share price. 
The results of French studies shows that IR adoption by French  firms has changed their 
shareholders’ ecology,  creating a growing number of long-term investors and replacing 
short-term investors. This gives greater influence to the fundamental component of the 
share price. This is not related to the reduction of its short-term volatility, but in the 
medium and long term, the likelihood of a gap between fundamental value and the share 
price reduces. Moreover, IR reduces the information asymmetry when the weight of  
“soft information” is increased relative to that of the “hard information” (the latter 
explains only 10% of the price changes after the announcement of results). This results 
in a more reliable and concise analyst’s forecasts. However, between soft information 
and hard information a balance should exist in order to give credibility to the IR process. 
When managers decide to replace hard information by soft information this can create 
a reaction of distrust in a financial community. This is occurs because the financial 
community ensures that the firm regularly meets its anticipated milestones. (IIRC, 
2015a). 
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French firms have benefited from IR implementation. The results of the KPMG survey, 
in 2015, show that integrated thinking is not trivial and can change firms’ culture by 
building bridges between the firms, identifying the relationship between non-financial 
performance and shareholder value and instilling the perspective of the investor in key 
decisions of the firm. To sum up, IR using integrated thinking improves the process of 
strategic thinking and helps better capital allocation. Moreover, the cultural change 
gives a positive impact on shareholder value, and if it is interpreted by the markets, it 
will be highly integrated into the expectations of investors. This is not such a simple 
approach. First, it requires the existence of a clear plan of how the firm can create value 
on a short-, medium and long-term horizon, identifying the basic parameters to measure 
the execution progress, and setting up an organization and tools to integrate shareholder 
perspective in basic capital allocation decisions and risk management (KPMG, 2015). 
In the USA, sustainability reporting has been a much less widely developed practice 
than in Europe, South Africa or Australia. The US Environmental Protection Agency3 
published an extra report to analyze value drivers in firms related to ESG capital. This 
report is published supplementary to annual reports (IEC, 2008). The basic goal was to 
present to stakeholders information related to environmental and social practices. In 
these reports not only the positive contribution of ESG practices are presented, such as 
job creation, community development and cures for diseases. It also includesd and 
negative practices, such as the level of pollution of the environment, natural resource 
depletion and human rights abuses (IRRC, 2013). From the beginning of 1970s, the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission4 (SEC) began setting up regulations for 
                                                 
 
3 The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or sometimes USEPA) is an agency of the 
federal government of the United States which was created for the purpose of protecting human health 
and the environment by writing and enforcing regulations based on laws passed by Congress. (EPA,2017)  
4 The SEC is an independent agency of the United States federal government. The SEC holds primary 
responsibility for enforcing the federal securities laws, proposing securities rules, and regulating the 
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disclosing environmental liabilities and contingencies, as well as material impacts of 
environmental laws and regulations for US firms (IEC, 2008). Moreover, in 2010, the 
SEC cited key factors in order to determine the materiality of information related to the 
environment and specifically to climate change. These key factors contain, first, the 
heightened public interest in recent years (including academic, government, business, 
investors, analysts, or the public at large), second, the international accords and other 
efforts to address a topic of concern on a global basis, third, the federal regulations or 
state and local laws in the US and finally the business leaders’ voluntary recognition of 
the current and potential effect of the category of information on firms’ performance 
and operations (SEC, 2010). Furthermore, the SEC addressed instructions on many 
sustainability topics, in order to guide firms to disclose information relevant to board 
construction and diversity, safety rules in the mining sector, payments to the US 
government by the amount of the natural recourses extracted by firms (SEC, 2008). 
Due to concerns around potential litigation, US firms have traditionally been reluctant 
to disclose future related information, one of the basic elements of IR. In the near future, 
it will be interesting to see how US firms deal with this issue as IR develops and 
becomes more widespread (IEC, 2008). 
 At a cross-national level, IR is receiving strong support from a series of market 
intermediaries, including the big 4 auditor firms (e.g. Deloitte and Touche, 2011; Ernst 
and Young, 2014; KPMG, 2013; PWC, 2013a), national and international professional 
organizations (e.g. ACCA, 2012; Frost et al., 2012; CIMA et al., 2013; ICAEW, 2013) 
and international regulatory bodies, such as the Sustainability Accounting Standards 
Board and International Accounting Standards Board (e.g. IIRC and IFRS, 2013; IIRC 
and SASB, 2013). These insights present recent developments in IR and provide an 
                                                 
 
securities industry, the nation's stock and options exchanges, and other activities and organizations, 
including the electronic securities markets in the United States. (SEC, 2013)  
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indication of the complexity involved in implementing integrated reporting practices at 
an international level.  
The IRRC (2013) conducted a survey in the United States and found that in a sample 
of S&P 500 firms, nearly all produced at least one sustainability report and only seven 
of these firms produced an integrated report. In the same year, the IIRC published the 
International Integrated Reporting Framework (IIRF) to improve corporate reporting 
and to better integrate financial and non-financial information (IIRC, 2013a; Lee and 
Yeo, 2016; De Villiers et al., 2017). The IIRF is a principle-based document, does not 
set standards for integrated reporting or integrated thinking and will help long-term 
investors (IIRC, 2013a; Stent and Dowler, 2015). It provides broad and long-term 
horizon information relevant to ESG and financial factors. Moreover, it uses the 
Internet to provide more detailed results to all stakeholders to improve their level of 
dialogue and engagement (Eccles and Saltzman, 2011). This allows investors to make 
more secure investment decisions and to determine and link sustainability and 
economic value. It does not give undue emphasis to short-term financial performance. 
By aligning financial and non-financial information, it makes management responsible 
for supervising the business on a day-to-day basis. This shows how IR adds tremendous 
value to the company and all of its stakeholders, including shareholders, and ultimately 
contributes to a sustainable society (Eccles and Krzus, 2010, p.252; IIRC, 2013a; Potter 
and Soderstrom, 2014). Atkins et al. (2015) suggest that private, social and 
environmental reporting is beginning to merge with private financial reporting. They 
believe that ESG information should be used as financial material. In a sample of 19 
FTSE100 companies and 20 UK institutional investors, evidence, showing that IR 
implementation is emerging and is useful to both the corporate and institutional 
investment communities, is provided. Stent and Dowler (2015) examine the extent of 
differences between the disclosures of New Zealand’s best reporting entities and IR 
principles and conclude that there is a slight difference.  
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The IIRC statement notes that the existing financial reporting framework focuses on 
the wrong elements over the wrong time frame. Its short-term structure does not help 
managers make long-term predictions and organize their decisions about future 
strategies. Management often omits structural data, particularly those related to ESG 
information (KPMG, 2013). Based on IIRC statements, Atkins and Maroun (2015) 
explore the initial reactions of the South African institutional investment community to 
the first sets of integrated reports being prepared by companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange. They focus on a shift in attitude toward ESG and 
integrated reporting, the initial views on the first sets of integrated reports and the 
obstacles to the preparation of high-quality reports. They conclude that IR is an 
improvement on the traditional annual report of listed South African companies. They 
emphasize non-financial measures and document efforts to integrate financial, 
environmental, social and governance metrics to provide a better understanding of 
organizational sustainability.  
In the future, integrated reporting can eventually replace existing corporate reports. 
Organizations should be able to decide the manner in which it will be presented - for 
instance, as an overarching document to various other reports or as a single stand-alone 
document covering all material aspects (Ernst and Young, 2014). However, there are 
some gaps in connecting information reporting on uncertainties in the future outlook 
and information reporting against industrial or regional benchmarks. Hence, in their 
study, Stent and Dowler (2015) call for improvements in the fields above. 
2.8. The business model 
IASB (2010) mentioned that though the term ‘business model’ is not referenced 
explicitly, the following related aspects such as the firms’ objectives and strategies, the 
firms’ resources, risks and relationships, the firms’ performance measures and 
indicators and  critical financial/non-financial resources. Rajala (2011) concludes that 
an entity’s resources/relationships (i.e., capitals) and revenue model are key 
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components of the business model. Business Model Community (2012) in their article 
titled “The business model – the missing link for twenty-first century companies?” 
illustrated the several approaches of business model reporting. They stated that the basic 
goal of a business model is to analyze the way the organization and firms that use IR 
are structured and how they deliver their products or services. It makes a link with 
business model strategy and is mentionsed that the business model often uses two terms 
interchangeably. The first strategy is related to the way money is generated. The model 
for selling products underpins the business model description. The second strategy is 
related to value creation. Usually presented as a value chain, this approach shows how 
an organization or firm adds value during its operational process. Business Model 
Community (2012) in their article “Special Issue on Business Models” concludes that 
the business model provides the methodology of how an organization operates to ensure 
its sustainability and is associated to the value proposition of the firm, the internal and 
external organization and the firm’s resources and competencies. Leisenring et al. 
(2012) analyze how basing financial reporting on an entity's business model is, in effect, 
basing financial reporting on management's intent with respect to the use, transfer or 
other disposition of an asset or liability. Their study uses several examples of existing 
IFRS and US GAAP that allow or require intent-based accounting. Then, they interpret 
the meaning and consequences of basing the accounting for financial assets on 
management's purposes for realizing value from those assets. They examined the 
positive and negative features of intent-based accounting in the context of the FASB's 
and IASB’s conceptual frameworks, specifically, the qualitative characteristics 
relevance and comparability and the objective of financial reporting, and apply that 
analysis to existing and proposed guidance for measuring financial assets. ICAEW 
(2010) in their study mention that the business model has the goal improving users’ 
understanding of the firm and how it makes money. The business model approach to 
financial reporting includes three considerations. First, financial reporting should 
provide a reality check on a firm’s business model and its execution. Second, the firm’s 
business model tries to transform inputs so as to create new assets or services as outputs. 
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It generated the expectation that historical cost would generally be the most useful basis 
of measurement. Third, the firm’s business model is to buy and sell assets in the same 
market, with the intention of profiting from market price changes. It is expected that 
fair value would generally be the most useful basis of measurement. 
Figure 2 analyses the business model and brings together all of the elements to be 
considered when preparing an integrated report. Capital markets are likely to reward 
firms that adopt the International Framework. It helps firms rethink and integrate their 
strategies and business models in line with stakeholder expectations.  Furthermore, it 
leads to better engagement between the financial investment community and company 
management around material issues and the drivers for performance and value creation, 
making clearer linkages between strategy, financial performance and ESG factors 
(IIRC, 2015). 
Figure 2: The business model, sitting at the heart of the firm , within the context of 
the external environment (CGMA,2013, p.6)  
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There are four same-centered circles. The circle in the middle is that of the business 
model. It is the heart of the firm. The firm needs information about its performance, 
which involves setting up measurement and monitoring systems to provide information 
for decision making. The next circle, which is the value creation, depicts the mission 
and vision of IR, the firm’s strategies and the corporate governance techniques. It 
identifies the opportunities and risks relevant to the firm that applies IR. Also, firm’s 
strategy identifies how it intends to maximize opportunities and mitigate or mange 
risks. Its sets out strategic objectives and strategies to achieve them, which are 
implemented through resource allocation plans. 
The third circle consists of the six capitals which are natural capital, social and 
relationship capital, intellectual capital, human capital, financial capital, and 
manufactured capital. Fund managers suggested could lead to better decisions about 
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how they allocate capital. This can be helpful for understanding stocks and flows of 
capital, leading to better capital allocation decisions (IIRC, 2015). The external and the 
last circle is that of the external environment. This circle is not static. It makes a regular 
review of each element and its interactions with other elements, leads to revision and 
improves all the elements. These interactions relate the external environment and the 
new capitals to create value over the short, medium and long term. This representation 
applies to both public and private sectors. The emphasis on different elements may be 
different but are still relevant to a profit or not for profit scenario (McCaffry and 
Topazio , 2015) 
2.8.1 The new capital analysis 
In this section the concept of multiple capitals adopted by IIRC is explored and how 
these elements relate to each other. The basic reason of developing insights, according 
to Alvesson and Deetz (2000) is to investigate local forms of phenomena. New capitals 
are six specific capitals that consists the business model and create the IR core. All of 
these six capitals create value.These capitals are financial capital, manufactured capital, 
intellectual capital, human capital, social and relationship capital, and natural capital. 
When these capitals are connected, they represent stores of value that are the basis of 
an organization’s value creation. (De Villiers and Sharma, 2017) 
All of the firms that apply IR are based on the new capital analysis with the goal of 
increasinge the available information which is provided by them. These capitals can be 
increased, decreased or transformed as a result of its value-adding activities. The direct 
or indirect link and interdependence among these capitals should be mentioned in an 
integrated report because they influence the firms long term financial performance. 
Furthermore, there are and others external factors interacting with capitals. These are 
the economic climate, technological progress, social changes and environmental issues. 
Considering this perspective, a firm’s ability to mitigate risks, adapt to change and 
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interact with its shifting surroundings is key. What’s more, the capitals can become an 
internally generated intangible asset (Ernst and Young, 2014; IIRC, 2013b). 
2.8.1.1 Natural capital 
Natural capital operates as the basis for the entire economic and social system. It 
provides resources that often cannot be replaced, and which are essential for the 
functioning of the economy, as a whole. The resources are water or fossil fuels, 
renewable natural resources, such as solar energy or agricultural crops, and the capacity 
of the world’s carbon sinks - i.e., the air, forests and oceans - to neutralize or isolate the 
waste created by economic activity. When it is determined whether a natural capital is 
material to an organization or firm, the relevant factors that affect this capital should be 
pointed out. These consist of the reliance on natural resources, the environmental 
impact of its productive process, and what the organization has to do to operate within 
the limits imposed by the environment (Ernst and Young, 2014; IIRC, 2013b). 
2.8.1.2 Financial reporting on Intangibles (Social and relationship capital) 
Social and Relationship Capital is comprised of intangibles (shared values, 
commitments and knowledge) that create the basis of the reputation and trust that each 
firm has developed. The relationships each firm has established through its engagement 
with its tenants, suppliers, employees, government and business partners are central to 
each firm, as are the contributions which are made to the long-term sustainability of the 
communities in which it operates (Ernst and Young, 2014; KPMG, 2015; IIRC, 2013b). 
A problem faced by the accounting profession and makes it difficult to respond to the 
criticism of the way in which intellectual capital and other capital is measured (Power, 
2001; Siegel and Borgia, 2007). The measurement and recognition of intangible assets 
are specific and unsual and often makes the development of a comprehensive 
accounting standard challenging. IAS 38 illustrates the methology of this set of assets 
and attempts to impose a uniform set of rules on what had become an increasingly 
contentious issue. Form IAS 38 excludes internally generated intangibles by rules. 
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However, it permits the recognition of intangibles in other situations, like business 
combinations (De Villiers and Sharma, 2017). 
In their study, Lev and Zambon (2003) state that the increasement of intangibles assets 
show two limits. First the limit of traditional external accounting’s theoretical approach, 
which is based on transactions (the historical cost principle) and second the limit of the 
corresponding measurement tools, which operates as the firm’s ‘black box’. Power 
(2001) and Caddy (2000) reach similar conclusions.  
Gowthorpe (2009) states that many of the solutions proposed to solve intellectual 
capital problems are related to the extended disclosures for inclusion in the annual 
report. As a result, intellectual capital models have based on intellectual assets in order 
to create the potential impact of intellectual liabilities. However, there has been limited 
recognition of the potential importance of intellectual liabilities of value creation in 
intellectual capital literature (Abeysekera, 2003; Caddy, 2000; De Santis and Giuliani, 
2013; Stam, 2009; De Villiers and Sharma, 2017). Abeysekera (2003) in his analysis 
categorizes intellectual assets and liabilities in three categories, which are human 
competence, external assets/liabilities and internal assets/liabilities. 
The IFRS has created management commentary guidelines that contains and analyses 
all manner of narrative reporting, which includes GRI, IR and intellectual capitals. 
Firms should indentify an entity’s significant relationship with stakeholders, how these 
relationships are likely to affect the firm’s performance and to create value, and how 
these relationships are managed (IFRS Practice Statement, 2010). Complulsory to this 
point, financial analysts should not wait for the latest narrative report (integrated or GRI 
report) before making a recommendation to buy or sell shares. The timeliness and value 
of these reports are not relevant to active investors (Dumay, 2016). 
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2.8.1.3 Intellectual capital 
“Intellectual capital is the group of knowledge assets that are attributed to an 
organization and most significantly contribute to an improved competitive position of 
this organization by adding value to defined key stakeholders” (Marr and Schiuma, 
2001). It includes the intangible assets which related to brand and reputation. It also 
contains resources such as patents, copyrights, intellectual property and organizational 
systems, procedures and protocols, which give firm significant competitive advantages. 
On the other hand, a negative brand equity attributed to major polluters or ill-reputed 
shareholder create significant disadvantage to firm (Ernst and Young, 2014). 
Petty and Guthrie (2000) make a first step to study the intellectual capital literature. 
Their research tested how the level of interest in a new knowledge economy affects 
organizations and how intellectual capital reporting and accounting practices are 
developed (Guthrie et al., 2012). They separate the research field of intellectual capital 
reporting to two stages. The first stage focuses on raising awareness as to why it is 
important that intellectual capital be recognized and understood and to estimate by how 
competitive advantage is essential. The conclusion of the early studies argues that 
intellectual capital reporting is something significant and must be measured and 
reported (Chiucchi and Dumay, 2015). The second stage sets up intellectual capital 
reporting as a legitimate undertaking and gathers evidence to support its further 
research. In this stage, researchers investigate how the interaction between capital and 
labour markets reflects intellectual capital reporting and creates value at an 
organizational level (Guthrie et al., 2012; De Villiers and Sharma, 2017). 
 
Guthrie et al. (2012) mention that intellectual capital reporting forms in the first and 
second stages of development because of a growing volume of published research in 
journals. There is a need to be created a third stage of intellectual capital reporting, 
characterized by research that takes a critical stance on intellectual capital reporting, in 
practice. To this third stage, Mouritsen and Roslender (2009), Roslender and Stevenson 
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(2009) and Guthrie et al. (2012) contribute a gobal bibliography. Moreover, Dumay 
(2014, p. 8) states that intellectual capital will most likely remain an accounting issue 
with the goal of making the intangible tangible. 
Wealth creation is continually used to illustrate non-financial information in the form 
of intellectual and other capitals under the umbrella of IR (Dumay, 2016; Flower, 2015; 
De Villiers and Sharma, 2017). Dumay (2016), however, states that while reporting of 
intellectual capital may seem to be losing popularity with investors, managers are 
observing the advantages of managing intellectual capital internally. According to Tee 
Jeok Inn et al., (2015) and De Villiers and Sharma (2017) in their analysis of intellectual 
capital reporting, the basic reason for developing intellectual capital is to create value 
inside the firm, rather than to report it. The two most common used theories of 
intellectual capital and value creation are that of the market-to-book ratio theory in 
which intellectual capital is apllied, and that of disclosing intellectual capital in which 
the firm’s profitability is increased (Dumay, 2012).  
 
Bismuth and Tojo (2008, p.242) develop the theory behind greater profitability. They 
mention that when the market is provided with adequate and appropriate information  
about intellectual assets, it leads investors to make better decisions and helps discipline 
management and boards, with positive economic consequences. When the non- 
financial information is consistent, material, reliable and comparable across firms, it 
informs investors so that they are able to forecast better future earnings and estimate 
better the risks associated with different investment opportunities. As a result, it is 
observed that there is a reduction in information asymmetry, in biased or unfounded 
earnings estimates, in unrealistic valuations and in unjustified share price volatility. On 
the other hand, it provokes an increasement in market liquidity. There is evidence that 
improved information about intellectual assets and firms strategy improves the ability 
of firms to secure funding at a lower cost of capital.  
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Intellectual capital operates not only as an accounting instrument but also as a 
management issue, which is linked with long term success. Intellectual capital 
contributes better to human resource management by investing greater amount in the 
education and training of employees (Brennan and Connell, 2000). In Dumay’s (2016, 
p. 174) analysis, it is mentioned that after the introduction of intellectual capital 
reporting, it was substituted by CSR reporting and other sustainability-focused 
frameworks, such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2013). 
Now IR has classified wealth creation as a necessary pilon of IR’s core (IIRC, 2011b; 
Dumay, 2015; De Villiers and Sharma, 2017). For example, according to the IIRC “the 
view that communication about value creation should be the next step in the evolution 
of corporate reporting” (IIRC, 2013, p. 1) and “the primary purpose of an integrated 
report is to explain to providers of financial capital how an organization creates value 
over time” (IIRC, 2013, p.7). 
 
2.8.1.4 Human capital 
Human capital is a mix of chracteristics, such as the knowledge, talents, skills, abilities, 
experience, intelligence, training, judgment, and wisdom an individual and collective, 
and all the labor capital in a firm or in an organization have. Particularly, human capital 
is related to the skills and know-how of a firm’s professionals, their ability to lead, 
cooperate or innovate. The correct management of the firm’s teams and care for 
motivation, create a healthy and successful firm and helps it to create value. On the 
other hand, a high level of employee turnover or inadequate remuneration policies can 
harm reputations and impair a firm’s ability to increase their value (Ernst and Young, 
2014; IIRC, 2013b). 
2.8.1.5 Financial capital 
Financial capital is the basic criterion of firm’s performance. It includes funds such as 
money and credit used through financing or generated by means of the firm’s 
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productivity, in order to be invested. These funds can’t be used to increase dividends 
or to give raises to management wages, but is used to create higher profits in the future. 
Financial capital is related extensively to the other capitals. Firms need to understand, 
estimate and show this interdependence in their integrated reports. Firms should clearly 
state how financial capital is converted into other forms of capital, how value is created 
and how these other forms of capital will generate financial returns over the short, 
medium and long term horizon (Ernst and Young, 2014; IIRC, 2013b). 
There are three sources of financial capital. The first is debt capital. A firm can increase 
its capital through the assumption of debt. Debt capital is created through financial 
institutions (i.e. bank loans) and insurance companies, or through public sources, such 
as federal loan programs. Firm’s obligation is to pay back the interest, and eventually 
the principal. They don't have to share the profits (or losses). The second source of 
financial capital is equity. Equity capital focuses on investments that, unlike debt 
capital, do not need to be repaid. This can include private investment by the business 
owners. Most firms use their own cash in order to get started. Cash can be obtained by 
the sale of stock. Moreover, other sources of funds can be found from partners, venture 
capitalists, or angel investors5. This can decrease the level of some control, and 
ownership in exchange for sharing the profits. The most common example is that of 
Initial Public Offering (IPO), where a firm becomes really large and can acquire 
additional capital from issuing stocks, so that any stock investor can buy stocks from 
this firm. The last type of financial capital is specialty capital, which is the extra cash 
flow that derives from managing the firm’s operation more efficiently. Vendor 
                                                 
 
5 An angel investor (also known as a business angel, informal investor, angel funder, private investor, or 
seed investor) is an affluent individual who provides capital for a business start-up, usually in exchange 
for convertible debt or ownership equity. A small but increasing number of angel investors invest online 
through equity crowdfunding or organize themselves into angel groups or angel networks to share 
research and pool their investment capital, as well as to provide advice to their portfolio companies 
(Lee,2006). 
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financing exists when the suppliers of a firm confirm a delayed payment for their goods 
or services. Supply chain financing operates like a pay-day loan for businesses. Banks 
lend the firm the amount of an invoice (minus a fee), and confirm payment when the 
invoice is paid. The financial managers of the firm can also create extra capital through 
investing wisely (Spillane et al., 2003; IIRC, 2013b). 
2.8.1.6 Manufactured capital 
Manufactured Capital comprises material goods or fixed assets, which contribute to the 
production process rather than being the output itself, such as buildings or technology 
equipment and tools. It may be owned by third parties such as firms, ports and other 
public infrastructure. When managers decide on efficient strategies, they reduce the use 
of resources and drive innovation. All infrastructure, technologies and processes make 
less use of natural resources and the maximum use of human innovation and skills. This 
can conclude with greater flexibility and sustainability (Ernst and Young, 2014; IIRC, 
2013b). 
2.9. Financial and non-financial reporting principles and characteristics 
Company annual reports have traditionally and primarily been forced to report 
information related to financial performance, to better inform investors and 
shareholders of the company's financial performance. To assure the accounting quality 
and reliability of financial reports, some GAAP has been created. Since 2004, IFRS 
developed by the IASB has become a widely accepted reporting framework (Deloitte, 
2014). Today, 90 countries have fully conformed to IFRS requirements for domestic 
listed companies. The adoption of IFRS as an international standard can allow a 
uniform framework for environmental and sustainability accounting to emerge, typing 
information on environmental costs and benefits and sustainability to financial 
statements (IFAC,2011). 
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Recent studies relate IFRS to IR. To achieve the concept of IR (in terms of economic 
globalization over) countries should be prepared to take advantage of the next capital 
market integration (Mishkin, 2006). Before integrated reporting was generated, Kaplan 
and Norton in 1996 and 2004 created an integrated framework and enriched it with 
financial and non-financial indicators. They introduced a number of variables, such as 
the level of knowledge and training of staff, customer service, financial performance 
and internal firm control, as the basic indicators for the estimation of the non-financial 
firms’ performance. They threw light on the relation between intangible assets and 
process and value creation, proving that non-financial indicators can link a firm’s short-
term actions to its long-term strategic objectives. For instance, Lajili and Z´eghal (2005) 
illustrated that abnormal returns can be affected by human capital productivity, while 
Lin et al. (2006) focused on how the employees skill level, training and teamwork can 
increase the value of the firm. Lastly, customer satisfaction and customer retention are 
indicators that related positively to the firms’ profitability and its value (Ittner and 
Larcker, 1998; Anderson et al., 2004).  
In contrast to rational views, Mishkin, Stulz (2005) argues that there are limits to the 
profits arising from financial integration and notes that in every country there are 
significant risks to diversifying internationally. In other words, profits cannot be 
unlimited. The evidence that is presented and related to the adoption of IFRS are short-
term. The long-term effects of integration are unclear.The way in which the company 
shares its profits also remains unclear, which are the existing types of risks and how 
they can be calculated. The current research on IFRS rarely attempts to unravel the 
paradoxes of integration (Anderson et al., 2004). 
Considering the integration of financial markets in the period of financial crisis and in 
the light of IFRS, it is remarked that the adoption of IFRS ignores the IR, the firm’s 
harmonization with the commercial law, global connectivity and the state accounting 
system databases (Daske et al., 2008) . Recent studies investigating the adoption of 
IFRS concluded that although there may be benefits from adopting them, their 
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implementation is very closely linked with the institutional arrangements of their 
countries, especially at the level of enforcement (Daske et al., 2008; Byard et al., 2011). 
Differences between countries are significant enough to restrict the benefits resulting 
from the application of IFRS (Ball, 2006; Barth et al., 2012; Brown et al., 2012). 
2.9.1 Financial reporting  
The goal of financial reporting is to provide information about the firm’s financial 
position under the IASB content. There are four key qualitative characteristics of 
financial accounting information, that align with the firm’s financial position, and 
performance and set the way in which it should illustrate accounting information, 
provide guidance for interpretation and help readers of the annual report to detect the 
differences between annual reports (Nandakumar et al., 2010, p.11-12). Shareholders 
can be informed about the firm’s financial numbers which are directly affected by the 
company’s net income. Apart from shareholders, the financial data is studied by 
employees, customers, creditors (banks), competitors etc. It is crucial for these different 
users to derive information quickly and safe (Wahlen et al, 2010, p.18). These four key 
qualitative characteristics of financial accounting information are; Understandability, 
Relevance, Reliability, and Comparability (Eccles et al., 2014). 
2.9.1.1 Understandability 
Financial statements should present and account for transactions and events in an 
understandable manner. This is provided by a user who knows about the firm’s financial 
and accounting information and its business activities. This information should be 
illustrated clearly and understandably, since users may be forced to make decisions 
based on undependable information (Nandakumar et al. 2010, p.13; Elliot and Elliot 
,2011 p.104). 
2.9.1.2 Relevance 
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Relevance is a qualitative characteristic in accounting. The information is relevant 
when the user provides investors with timely and useful information, which has 
predictive value (Wahlen et al, 2010, p.18). Particularly, this implies that information 
should link the past, present and future firm’s activities in order to help investors make 
their economic decisions and evaluate firm’s events correctly. This creates predictive 
and confirmative power to the firm’s accounting information. Finally, it is linked with 
the convention of materiality (Eccles et al., 2014). Under GAAP, materiality 
information is material if its omission or misstatement could influence 
the economic decision of users, taken on the basis of the financial statements 
(Nandakumar et al, 2010, p.13). 
2.9.1.3 Reliability 
Reliability is a qualitative characteristic in accounting. Accounting information should 
be verifiable and accurate. Moreover, a firm ought to provide an accurate picture of its 
financial position, in order to provide objective, true and fair accounting information 
(Wahlen et al, 2010, p.171). 
2.9.1.4 Comparability 
The notion of comparability focuses on the quality of accounting information that is 
results from the comparison between the financial reporting of one company to the 
financial reporting of another company. In order for the reader of financial statements 
to manages this comparison, the accounting information provided between different 
firms should be based on standard accounting rules (Elliot and Elliot, 2011 p.104)  
2.9.2 Non-financial reporting  
The core of non-financial reporting includes the ESG performance (Juravle and Lewis, 
2008). The concept of sustainability reporting contains a wide range of notions 
(Stapleton and Woodward, 2009). Since the GRI framework influences the structure of 
integrated reporting, the most important principles that organizations can use to 
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estimate and report their ESG performance will be briefly analyzed (Eccles and 
Serafeim, 2012). The four main principles of non-financial reporting are; Materiality, 
Stakeholder inclusiveness, Sustainability Context, and Completeness (GRI, 2011)  
2.9.2.1 Materiality 
According to the GRI framework, materiality exists when a firm causes significant 
environmental, social and economic impacts on its surroundings. In contrast to financial 
reporting, materiality is rarely illustrated quantitatively. It is expressed by considering 
internal and external firm’s criteria such as expression of stakeholder interests, risks, 
values and expectations (Elliot and Elliot ,2011 p.201). Materiality is analyzed in the 
IIRC Framework in Guiding Principle in section 3D. It describes the methodology used 
to recognize material issues and indentifies the guidance used in the process, for 
example, Sustainable Value Matrix, Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, or 
GRI (Eccles et al., 2014). Moreover, it examines how the assessment of materiality 
addresses issues across the organization’s entire supply chain and it mentions which 
issues have been given the highest priority and the process used for prioritization (Kruz, 
2017). 
2.9.2.2 Stakeholder inclusiveness 
In order to develop the content and the scope of a report, it is crucial to consider the 
principle of stakeholder inclusiveness. Stakeholder requirements can affect the way that 
a firm makes its decisions and how it develops its services, products and operations. 
The GRI seeks to inform about stakeholders interests and reasonable expectations. 
(Elliot and Elliot, 2011, pp. 841-842). Stakeholder engagement is analyzed in the IIRC 
Framework in Guiding Principle in section 3C. In that section, first the strategy and 
methodology used for stakeholder engagement is analyzed. Second, the methodology 
used to prioritize stakeholders is analyzed. Third, the nature and quality of relationships 
with principal stakeholders is stated.  Finally, how and to what extent the firm responds 
to stakeholder needs and expectations is described (Kruz, 2017). 
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2.9.2.3 Sustainability context 
The principle of sustainability context relates the objectives, strategies and the 
performance of a firm with economic trends, society and environment facts. The IFAC 
framework indicates that the successful management of a sustainable organization 
requires attention to four perspectives. These perspectives are business strategy, 
internal management, financial investors and other stakeholders. As far as accountants 
are concerned, in an organization a business strategy perspective would typically be 
taken by finance directors, an internal management perspective by management 
accountants and financial controllers, and a financial investors’/other stakeholders’ 
perspective by accountants preparing and auditing the published financial statements. 
(Elliot and Elliot, 2011, p.841-842; Eccles et al., 2014). 
In order to create a long-term strategy, firms should disclose some strategic goals that 
are mandatory according to the IIRC framework. First, firms should recognize the 
strategic goals of organizations and which methodology is appropriate to reach to those 
goals and how they will be measured. For example, the indexes of ROIC, organic 
revenue growth, operating income should be estimated (IIRC, 2013a, Framework: 4.28; 
Kruz,2017). Second, firms should adapt strategic goals in the context of macro and 
micro economic conditions, current and future market trends, and competitive 
advantage and recognize the resources which are required in order to implement the 
business strategy. Third, to discuss the ongoing availability of those resources (IIRC, 
2013a, Framework: 4.28; Kruz, 2017). Finally, firms should analyze the extent to which 
material environmental and social considerations, have been inserted into their strategic 
goals (IIRC, 2013a, Framework: 4.29; Kruz, 2017). 
2.9.2.4 Completeness 
Finally, the principle of completeness mentions that the coverage of information 
contained in sustainability reports should be relevant to influence the decisions of 
stakeholders. After reading a report, stakeholders can reap a general picture about the 
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financial and ESG performance (GRI, 2011). An integrated report should provide an 
overview of risks and opportunities, which helps a firm to develop its long term 
strategy. First, it should mention the internal and external sources of critical risks and 
opportunities, including ESG issues. For example, the sector and industry issues 
mentioned in standards issued by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (IIRC, 
2013a, Framework: 4.25). Second, it should examine the organization’s assessment of 
the probability that material risks or opportunities will have positive results, the 
magnitude of their results if they do, and the particular circumstances that might 
accelerate the probability of the risk or opportunity occurring (IIRC, 2013a, 
Framework:4.25). Third, it should mention the way that the organization will reduce 
key risks or create value from opportunities, expanding the identification of the related 
strategic objectives, strategies, policies, targets, and KPIs (IIRC, 2013a, Framework: 
4.25). Fourth, an integrated report should analyze the frame of how the business model 
may be affected by the changes in the external environment or identified risks and 
opportunities. Finally, it should examine how the organization would respond to those 
changes (IIRC, 2013a, Framework:4.16; Kruz, 2017). 
2.10. Basic accounting theories 
IR considers the management’s view of the market and tries to explain management’s 
view of the market. According to the IIRC Framework paragraph 4.5, management 
should identify the principal activities and markets. In the same framework it mentions 
that the management should describe the competitive landscape for the industry and 
sector. It should clarify the relative strengths and weaknesses of competitors, customer 
demand, the threat of new competition, substitute products or services, the bargaining 
power of customers and suppliers, potential for organic growth and acquisitions. 
Moreover according to the IIRC Framework paragraph 4.5, it should mention the macro 
and micro economic conditions affecting the industry and sector. Finally, based on the 
IIRC Framework paragraph 4.5, management should discuss global and local trends 
likely to impact the business and sector, for example, the speed and the effect of 
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technological change, population and demographic changes, human rights, poverty, 
education, carbon emissions, biodiversity, water stress, human health impacts of 
emissions, resource shortages,  the legislative and regulatory environment in which the 
organization operates, and the political environment in countries where the organization 
operates (Kruz, 2017) 
2.10.1 Agency theory  
Much of the research into corporate governance derives from agency theory.  Corporate 
governance is viewed as a subset of a firm’s contracts used to align the expectations of 
shareholders with the choices and strategies of managers. It creates a hierarchy in which 
the shareholders ensure that the board of directors control managers interests and 
choices, which are for the firm’s benefit (Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Core 
et al., 1999, 2003). Agency theory approximates corporate governance as a monitoring 
device, which is used in order to minimize the conflicts that are generated between 
agents and the principal. In this context agents are the managers, the principal are the 
shareholders and the board of directors acts as the monitoring device (Agrawal and 
Knoeber 1996). Problems arise because agents have incentives to fulfill their own 
interests at the expense of shareholders (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 
1976).  
In corporate governance structures there are both formal and informal contracts. Formal 
contracts include corporate charters, exchange-listing requirements, employment 
contracts, board independence regulations, executive stockownership guidelines, bonus 
clawback provisions, blackout windows for executive stock trading, and so on. With 
informal contracts, shareholders and boards retain considerable discretion in carrying 
out many of their monitoring activities. Boards establish reputations regarding their 
independence from management, their expertise in advising management, and their 
work. This reputation develops over time, in part, based on characteristics such as the 
proportion of inside versus outside directors, the size of the board, the expertise of 
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directors, and the number of board meetings, as well as by the consistency of the board’s 
decision-making processes and its stewardship of shareholder value (Anderson et al., 
2004). However, there are two types of agency problems. The first type is created 
between shareholders and the board of directors. The expectations between two groups 
are assumed to be aligned (i.e. the board of directors composition should make the 
correct choices for the interests of shareholders) but many times the interests of 
managers differ from those of shareholders (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Carcello and 
Neal, 2003; Francis and Martin, 2010; La Fond and Roychowdhury, 2008). The second 
type of agency problem is created between the board’s and manager’s interests. Their 
interests are assumed to be aligned with each other (i.e., the board consists of managers 
that are assumed to be beholden to the CEO) but are not completely aligned with the 
interests of shareholders (Klein, 2002; Zhao and Chen, 2008; Duchin et al., 2010).  
When accounting-based standards are violated, principals break down and debts 
contracts are renegotiated (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). Responsibility for this is 
with agents, who have strong incentives to mislead principals in order to benefit. They 
announce basic fault news, most times bad, and provide misleading financial statements 
(Dechow et al., 1995). This behavior creates great concern and instability to the 
principal, violating the reliability and validity of the financial accounting process 
(Anderson et al., 2004). 
Examining agency cost theory from the creditor’s perspective, it is observed that board 
structure is an important oversight element in the financial accounting process. A board 
of directors is a corporate governance tool, which can affect the integrity of the financial 
accounting process, supervising the senior managers decisions and controlling the 
lending agreements (Daley and Vigeland, 1983; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Dichev 
and Skinner, 2002). Their presence reduces the manipulation of accounting numbers 
and hence helps creditors to correctly evaluate the accounting information (Anderson 
et al., 2004). 
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Agency theory advocates the idea that the firm should apply adequate monitoring and 
control mechanisms, in order to protect the shareholders and management from 
conflicts of interest. Managers should pursue the interests of shareholders and not only 
their own interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Kiel and Nicholson 2003). So, the board 
of directors and the ownership structure are the basic governance mechanisms which 
align the interests of the agent and the principal (Daily et al., 2003).  
There is a correlation between earnings management and corporate governance based 
on agency theory. Observing agency theory, it can control the role of boards that affects 
the firms’ management and leads managers to manipulate the firm’s accounting 
numbers (Xie et al., 2003; Kao and Chen, 2004; Goodwin et al, 2009). The use of an 
audit committee can control internally the boards of director’s attitudes (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Furthermore, it has been proved that outside directors are negatively 
related to earnings management (Klein, 2002 ; Xie et al., 2003; Peasnell et al., 2005; 
Davidson et al., 2005; Benkel et al., 2006; Dimitropoulos and Asteriou, 2010). 
Agency theory considers that the CEO-chairman duality increases CEO power, but 
negatively affects CEO independence, hindering the firm’s ability to establish 
supervisory mechanisms (Berle and Means, 1932). From the agency theory perspective, 
duality has a negative effect on performance. Agency theory argues for a separation of 
the two positions, and states that the CEO-chairman cannot perform both functions 
without there being a conflict of interest. Duality generates a powerful CEO who may 
be driven by self-interest, dominating the board of management, and this may result in 
poor performance (Gabrielsson et al., 2007; Ghosh et al., 2010; Valenti et al., 2011; 
Villanueva-Villar et al., 2016). The importance of the monitoring role of the board of 
directors lies in the fact that when directors evaluate manager performance, they 
represent the shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983; He et al., 2009). 
The implication of agency theory, in terms of corporate governance, is that outside 
directors should defend shareholders’ interests through appropriate monitoring 
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mechanisms that protect the shareholders from the self interest of the management. In 
this way, having a large number of outside directors on the board could have a positive 
impact on performance through service monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Arosa et 
al., 2013). 
Agency theory is not the only theoretical perspective that has been relied on to explain 
board roles and board composition. The service role can be related to the resource based 
view and resource dependence theory, where boards are considered to control inter-
organizational dependencies and act as a strategic resource for securing critical 
resources for the firm (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). According to resource dependence 
theory, outsiders are seen as a linking mechanism between the firm and its environment 
that may support the managers in the achievement of the various goals of the 
organization (Johnson et al., 1996; Arosa et al., 2013; Villanueva-Villar et al., 2016). 
2.10.2 Stewardship theory  
Stewardship theory focuses on psychological and sociological approaches and aligns 
the interests of corporate executives (as stewards) with those of owners. This is a 
contrasting view to agency theory. This theory favors the view that managers are 
naturally trustworthy. Investors can trust them. This makes monitoring unnecessary 
(Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Davis, 1994; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Davis et 
al., 1997). Managers are good stewards of the firm and try to maximize the firm’s profits 
and the shareholders returns in order to optimize their interests (Donaldson and Davis 
1994). As the number of executive directors is higher in a board of directors, then the 
firm appears to have better economic performance. The directors can understand the 
business needs better than outside directors and can make better decisions for the firm’s 
welfare (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Davis, 1994; Kesner, 1987).  
According to stewardship theory there is satisfaction for investors, as well as to other 
participants of the firm, which stems from the aspect that the manager’s goal is to 
maximize the firm’s objectives (Clarke, 2004). However, managers will not align their 
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own interests with those of shareholders. Psychologically when there is a lack of non-
executive directors on a board of directors and when the relationship between principals 
and agents is based on the stewardship perspective, then managers are encouraged to 
commit fraud. (Choo and Tan, 2007). 
From the perspective of stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997), however, the 
relationship is the opposite, offering a more humanistic approach. Greater power in the 
hands of the CEO may lead to benefits that are greater than the costs in times of crisis: 
the CEO’s response capacity will be faster when faced with changes, he or she will 
have a greater incentive to lead the firm out of the crisis, and thanks to his or her 
increased power he or she will be able to take extreme but necessary decisions (asset 
restructuring, mass redundancies, and so on) in unstable times, such as the financial 
crisis that began in 2007 (Dowell et al., 2011). Stewardship theory offers support to the 
idea that CEO duality contributes to timely decision-making, effective execution of 
plans and efficient monitoring, leading the firm to better performance (Huang et al., 
2012; Arosa et al., 2013; García-Ramos and García-Olalla, 2014; Villanueva-Villar et 
al., 2016). 
2.10.3 Stakeholder theory  
The main purpose of integrating reporting is to highlight invisible ESG figures, which 
are related to the firm’s prosperity and affects its value (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
However, there are arguments that focus only on shareholders, observing them as single 
users of financial and non-financial information outside of the firm. It is suggested that 
this shareholders view should be broadened (Cheng, 2008).  It is crucial to present the 
basic perspectives of stakeholder theory, since it provides useful information for the 
integrated reporting analysis.   
Stakeholder theory is not restricted to explaining the accountability of the board only 
to shareholders, but also to the other interested parts. It includes those who can affect 
or are affected by the firm’s activities (Freeman, 1984). The board’s goal is to create 
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net gain for all stakeholders (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). In order to implement this 
gain and maximize the total prosperity of the firm, they should consider the effects of 
their decisions on all the stakeholders (Clarke, 2004). Advocates of stakeholder theory 
argue that this theory colors the firms portrait, providing both social and economic 
values and that consideration of ethics and morality which are important for the 
estimation of a firm’s value (Freeman, 1983, p. 248).  
It is important for the firm to be profitable and viable, because the prospective 
stakeholders wish to invest in stable firms with low risk strategies (Jones and Wicks 
1999). Senior managers should apply corporate governance strategies and policies 
which are aligned with the interests of the different stakeholders (Ogden and Watson 
1999; Bird et al., 2007). Firms that ignore the stakeholders opinions are exposing 
themselves to business risks, such as losing competent staff or negative media exposure 
(Eccles and Krzus, 2010, p.30). 
One relevant part of the IIRC Framework is that of capital and non-capital investments, 
which analyze the long-term strategy and interpret the way capital and non-capital 
investments create value and yield competitive advantage. Stakeholders need to be 
informed about the relationship between critical issues, such as trends, risks and 
opportunities. Moreover, they should be informed about capital and non-capital 
investments, for example, expenditures for property, plant, and equipment, intellectual 
property, and people, as examined in 3.5 part of the IIRC Framework. The IIRC 
Framework in 4.14 explains to stakeholders how investments create a competitive 
advantage for the firms and organizations to the elasticity of the business model. Parts 
4.15 and 4.56 mention the nature and magnitude of trade-offs made when making 
capital allocation decisions. The most common links are those between R&D vs. 
acquisitions vs. dividends vs. repurchase of shares. Finally, stakeholders should be 
informed analytically of the positive and negative impacts on financial capital (funds 
available through operations, debt or equity financing), manufactured capital (plant, 
property, equipment), intellectual capital  (patents, copyrights, licenses), human capital 
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(the organization’s people-their capabilities, experience, drive to innovate), social 
capital (shared organizational values, relationships with customers, suppliers, 
communities), and natural capital (air, water, land), including significant effects on the 
capitals up and down the value chain (IIRC, 2013a, Framework: 2.14 and 4.31; Kruz, 
2017). 
2.11. IR monitory systems: corporate governance mechanisms, earning 
management, agency cost, firm’s performance index, value relevance, 
multiple –based valuation indexes. 
IR is a new accounting sector and given the developments in this area, there is a lack 
of research papers. A first attempt was made by Dey and Burns (2010) who analyzed 
the Novo Nordisk pioneering experience with IR. There are a few studies which have 
tested the relation between IR and other accounting issues, such as an XBRL taxonomy 
for IR (Gonzalbez and Rodriguez, 2012), an opportunity for Australian NGOs (Adams 
and Simnett, 2011), and the accounting curriculum implications of IR (Owen, 2013). 
Parallel to these, the big four auditor firms have written several short articles that 
introduce the IR notion and its implementation. However, there is no deep survey in 
this sector. 
Cheng et al., (2014) study the core issues and challenges of IR. They do not only explain 
the concept of IR and how the IIRC framework operates, but also focus on the key 
issues on which the IIRC framework is based. They mention that IR “ indentified and 
reported to the IIRC by a subcommittee of the International Association for Accounting 
Education and Research comprised of international accounting academics” (p. 90). 
They conclude with three main issues. They study the behavior of the providers of 
financial capital, the meaning of and trade-offs between different capitals, and the 
assurance of integrated reports. These subjects remain contentious, even after the 
application of the IIRC framework in 2013. However, Cheng et al. (2014) in their study 
mention several potential integrated reporting research issues. 
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This thesis uses articles published in the AAAJ special issue. Although there are 
definitional problems, which have been cited previously, a useful perspective to 
measure the impact of IR practice is to examine its potential to bring about change. IR 
is an innovative accounting method, which can be stimulated by innovative disclosure 
accounting implementation and by shaping the ways in which IR is enacted. There are 
three papers (Brown and Dillard, 2014; Higgins et al., 2014; Stubbs and Higgins, 2014) 
which discuss the potential IR reporting practices applied by early IR adopters to launch 
transitions to more integrated business practices.  
First, Stubbs and Higgins (2014) examine and criticize the extent to which IR is aligned 
with innovative disclosure techniques. Studying the internal mechanisms used by early 
adopters of IR in Australia, they conclude that the approaches and the techniques that 
were used by early adopters, in order to implement IR, should be considered carefully 
at this early stage. A peak point which generated new challenges created by IR 
compared to sustainability reporting, is that IR recognizes better the way an 
organization creates value and focuses on each business strategy. They explain that the 
procedure of IR fits better with financial reports, enriching them with non-financial 
information. They question whether IR can increase the level of accounting disclosures 
and offer opportunities to reconceptualise the culture of a firm towards more ESG 
outcomes, as suggested by Eccles and Krzus (2010).  
Stubbs and Higgins (2014) mention that finance managers use more the innovative IR 
disclosure mechanisms than sustainability managers. Parallel to Stubbs and Higgins 
(2014) and Higgins et al. (2014), Brown and Dillard (2014) analyze theoretically the 
value of IR as a change initiative that can contribute to sustainability. They based their 
work on science and technology studies with literature on dialogic and polylogic 
accountings to document the conflict between whether and how IR might promote 
sustainability goals. The basic point of their article is to critically assess IR and pull the 
trigger to “broaden out” and “open up” dialogue and debate about how the non financial 
practices, such as sustainability business practices, can incorporate in financial 
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reporting statements. They answer crucial questions, such as whether ESG reporting 
empowers stakeholders, how the firm’s business model creates long-term value by 
identifying key value drivers at the reporting unit level, enhance accountability and 
foster sustainability transitions (Brown and Dillard, 2014; Kruz 2017).  
Kruz (2017) lists the most important elements of IR long term strategy. First, firms that 
use IR should mention clearly their purpose, mission and vision and explain how the 
firm’s business model creates long-term value by identifying key value drivers at the 
reporting unit level. Second, it is important for the firm to mention the management’s 
view of the market, to inform investors about major trends impacting the market, to 
explain its growth strategy, the firm’s relative positioning, and underlying assumptions 
(e.g., macroeconomic factors). Third, firms should emphasize the sources of their 
competitive advantage in the market. Talents, patents, and other intangible assets 
diversify and empower their position on the market. Fourth, firms should disclose their 
strategic goals which are important for value creation (e.g., returns on invested capital, 
organic revenue growth) in the context of current and future market trends, and the 
firm’s competitive advantage. Fifth, the creation of a layout with a detailed plan of 
short-, medium-, and long-term actions, which is connected to the firm’s goals and 
value creation. Sixth, firms should promote a strategy which is relevant to customer 
satisfaction and the brand name strength and the protection of the environment. Firms 
should relate how the selected metrics will be estimated and tracked consistently. They 
should explain how capital and non- capital investments will yield and produce 
competitive advantage and create long term value. Seventh, firms should inform 
investors about the risks and their mitigation plans, including sustainability (ESG) 
issues. 
In this analysis six monitory systems test the validity power of the quality of accounting 
information that is provided by IR. The disclosure of financial and non-financial 
information is a daily practice, which is used by organizations and firms to inform 
shareholders. Managers make decisions based on these disclosures. Information 
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disclosure can be explained from an information asymmetry and can reduce the second 
(Palepu et al., 2004)6. This practice provides less uncertainty to shareholders decisions 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986)  
2.11.1 IR and corporate governance  
The first monitoring system is corporate governance. An effective corporate 
governance framework is necessary, in each country, to ensure a strong and healthy 
operation of the stock market and strengthen the role of supervisory authorities. 
International organizations such as the OECD, the World Bank and the IMF have 
stressed the importance of corporate governance. The recent scandals and the crisis in 
the financial sector have brought the issue of corporate governance to the heart of 
academic and supervisory attention. Recent studies have shown that companies with 
high corporate governance managed to survive in times of crisis (Villanueva-Villar et 
al, 2016). Internal corporate governance mechanisms (eg, independent directors, 
internal control, audit committees, remuneration committees) are presented as the most 
popular mechanisms to discipline management and reduce risk (Beasley, 1996; Xie et 
al., 2003).  
The IIRC Framework, focusing on Content Element in section B, analyzes the 
governance information package. First, firms and organizations should illustrate their 
leadership structure, containing the characteristics, the skills and the diversity (range of 
academic background, gender, competence and working experience) of the board and 
the extent to which regulatory requirements affect the composition of the governance 
hierarchy (IIRC, 2013a, Framework: 4.9). Second, it should analyze the procedure used 
to make strategic decisions, build and monitor the culture of the organization and firm, 
its access to risk management, and mechanisms for directing ethical issues (IIRC, 
                                                 
 
6 Definition Palepu et al. (2004, p. 12-17): “managers have better information about their firm’s future 
performance than outside investors”. 
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2013a, Framework: 4.9). Third, firms should explain the particular actions that the 
board has considered to affect and check the strategic direction of the organization and 
should analyze all the governance practices that exceed local or regional legal 
requirements (IIRC, 2013a, Framework: 4.9). Fourth, firms should give information 
about the role of the board in promoting and enabling innovation and should describe 
the board’s process to approve the integrated report and the procedure to issue “The 
Statement of Significant Audiences and Materiality”(Eccles et al., 2014). 
Corporate governance can be used as an effective monitoring system (Gul and Tsui, 
2001) increasing the reliability of financial information and the integrity of the financial 
reporting process (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). In 2003, the Corporate Governance 
Council of the Australian Stock Exchange recommended that a part of good governance 
is to provide disclosures in their annual reports related to social and environmental 
responsibility (Gibson and O 'Donovan, 2007). In 2010, the Canadian Securities 
Administration issued Staff Notice 51-333: Environmental Reporting Guidelines. The 
guidance defines the management's role of oversight and management of general risks, 
and particularly environmental risks. The GRI supports the role of management of 
sustainability, the viability and IR, designing guidelines on how to create reports and 
what should be the role of corporate governance. The level of disclosure should specify 
how the Board addresses supervision and risk management. (IIRC, 2011).  
There are many studies that investigate the relation between the quality of accounting 
information and board characteristics. Many conclude that there is a negative relation 
between the percentage of outside directors and the likelihood of fraud (Beasley, 1996; 
Dechow et al., 1995; Farber, 2005) and to earnings management (Peasnell et al., 2000; 
Klein, 2002 ; Xie et al., 2003; and Bowen et al., 2005). Other studies advocate a higher 
percentage of outside directors is positively related to the analyst ratings of financial 
reporting quality (Wright and Wright, 1997).  
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A CEO has superior knowledge of the private information concerning a firm‟s 
competitive advantages and its internal environment. Therefore, duality may reduce the 
complete transfer of private information between CEO and board members, resulting 
in less voluntary disclosure (Kim et al., 2008; Samaha et al., 2015). Nevertheless, 
Anderson and Anthony (1986) argue that CEO duality establishes a clear-cut leadership 
in the formulation and the implementation of a firm‟s strategy. As a result, this leads to 
higher efficiency. They support the view that a unified leadership structure can limit 
information sharing costs and minimize the conflict of interests between the CEO and 
non-CEO chairman. Supporters of duality also highlight the importance of clear lines 
of authority and unity of command to restrict conflicts and improve decision making 
(Rhoades et al., 2001). Therefore, CEO duality may lead to higher levels of accounting 
disclosure. The results of previous studies that investigate the relationship between 
disclosure quality and CEO duality are mixed. While Allegrini and Greco (2013) and 
Li et al. (2008) document a significantly negative association between CEO duality and 
voluntary disclosure, other empirical investigations report an insignificant or a positive 
association between the variables (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002).   
Good corporate governance practices affect firm performance. There is extensive 
reference in the literature investigating the role and importance of corporate governance 
on a firm‟s performance. Corporate governance theory has attracted many researchers 
who argue that a firm should contribute positively to society (Carroll, 1999; Fisher, 
2004), examining its non-financial information. For example, a firm can give some 
information about its regulatory and legal obligations and philanthropic opportunities 
(Iatridis, 2015). These social obligations integrate the idea that firms and society should 
operate together (Wood, 1991; Rezaee, 2009).  
The basic reasons for including the ESG information in the corporate board agenda are 
the increasing social impacts of corporate scandals and the call for greater stakeholder 
orientation (Spitzeck, 2009; Jensen and Berg, 2011; Boiral, 2013). Moreover, European 
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Union law obligates firms to include information on both corporate governance and 
ESG information in their annual reports. This is a step towards IR since the non-
financial performance of each firm should be stated comprehensively in annual reports 
(KPMG, 2010). IR is going to be the future for the ESG and corporate governance 
(Kolk and Pinkse, 2010). This is encouraged by the European Union Commission’s 
ongoing discussions about the harmonization of the Transparency Directive, which 
contains the EU‟s disclosure rules for listed companies. The use of an integrated way 
in narrative reporting rules seems to be an important topic (EU Commission, 2011). 
2.11.2. IR, earnings management and discretionary accruals  
The second monitoring system is earnings management. Earnings quality is an 
important indicator of financial performance and influences firms’ disclosure decisions. 
When managers are under pressure, they exploit the flexibility of them afforded under 
Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP) to manage earnings and to reach 
their goals. Under the ethical perspective, firms that disclose ESG information would 
be less inclined to manage their earnings, and hence their earnings disclosures are more 
honest and sincere (Francis et al., 2008).  
“Integrated thinking” is introduced to explain the relation between IR and earnings 
quality. It is an attempt to find an optimal balance between managing short-term 
business imperatives and ongoing value creation (Churet and Eccles, 2014). 
Management actions that reduce the quality accounting information of the financial 
statements consist in the notion of earning management (Kinney et. al., 2004). Earning 
management appears when managers manipulate the accounting numbers (Fields et al., 
2001). Managers apply this practice when they believe that the users of accounting 
information cannot understand and estimate the effect of earnings management. 
Earnings management provides lower quality of earnings. This results in the lower 
predictive ability of forecasted earnings and cash flows (Lev, 2003) and misleads 
investors into creating unethical practices (Kaplan, 2001). 
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Earnings management is a phenomenon which has been considered by academic 
researchers, financial markets regulators, operators and investors as one of the main 
indicators of financial performance of a firm. There are many crumples where managers 
manipulate accounting earnings. The most important reasons are related to the creation 
of compensation contracts (Guidry et. al., 1999; Healy, 1985; Holthausen, et. al., 1995), 
the reduction of political costs (Key, 1997; Watts and  Zimmerman, 1986), loss 
avoidance (Burgstaher and Bichev, 1997), avoidance of debt covenant violations 
(DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994), management buyouts (DeAngelo, 1986; Perry and 
Williams, 1994) and stock-financed acquisitions (Erickson and Wang, 1999).  
2.11.2.1 Earnings smoothing 
Earning management appears when managers manipulate the accounting numbers 
(Fields et al., 2001) smoothing them. Managers apply this practice when they believe 
that the users of accounting information cannot understand and estimate the effect of 
earnings management. Stable earnings stream is capable of supporting a higher level of 
dividends than a more variable earnings prospect. Earnings variability is interpreted as 
an important measure of the overall riskiness of the firm and has a direct effect on 
investors' capitalization rates and thus has an adverse effect on the value of a firm's 
shares and investors’ subjective expectations for possible outcomes of future earnings 
and dividends (Burgstahler and Eames, 2003). Earnings management provides lower 
quality of earnings. This results in lower predictive ability of forecasted earnings and 
cash flows (Lev, 2003) and misleads investors to create unethical practices (Kaplan, 
2001). 
In addition, the theory of market equilibrium under conditions of uncertainty, agrees 
that smoothing represents an overt attempt to counter the cyclical nature of reported 
earnings, thereby tends to reduce the covariance of a firm's expected returns with 
returns on the market portfolio (Sharpe, 1970). Some researchers are not convinced by 
managers’ motives of wanting to manage earnings and have advanced alternative 
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reasons, other than those advanced about why managers manage earnings. These 
include influencing potential managerial motivations/incentives, (Healy, 1985) and 
taking pressure off affiliated parties. 
2.11.2.2. Earning management and ESG 
There are few studies that test the association between ESG performance and earning 
management. Earning management can be related negatively, positively or not related 
with ESG performance. Firms with high ESG performance and better financial 
transparency should associated negatively with earning management practices. There 
are many studies that focus on the positive association between ESG performance and 
financial performance (Waddock and Graves, 1997, p. 305; Griffin and Mahon, 1997; 
Roman et al., 1999). A firm experiencing economic development can make investments 
related to ESG performance policy, which can improve the firm’s performance. This 
economic slack pushes the firm to abominate aggressive earnings management policies. 
Ethical obligation, reputation, and financial performance motivations for ESG 
performance predict a negative relation between ESG performance and earnings 
management (Waddock and Graves, 1997, p.312) 
The negative association between ESG performance and earnings management can be 
explained by two factors.  The first focuses on the effects of ethical implications of ESG 
performance on financial reporting. The other is related to the positive impact of the 
firms’ reputation, which is created by ESG performance (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; 
Linthicum et al., 2010). When a firm aims to value and to protect its reputation, its 
management should be inhibited from creating socially unacceptable activities. 
Managers ensure the previous goals by using ESG, maintaining the reputation of a firm 
at a high level. They also avoid earning management practices, which can damage the 
firm’s profile (Linthicum et al., 2010). 
However, there are some studies that predict a positive association between ESG 
performance and earnings management. This relies on opportunistic use of ESG 
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performance that is made by managers in order to be benefited (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Carroll, 1979). Moreover, when firms with high ESG performance try to 
implement the shareholders’ demands, theirs financial performance can be affected 
negatively, leading firms’ managers to manage the reported earnings. There is no 
relation between earning management and ESG performance, when earning 
management is affected by institutional factors unrelated to ESG performance (Chih et 
al., 2008). Firms with high disclosure scores of ESG performance had more 
discretionary accruals (Belkaoui-Riahi, 2004). 
To solve this situation the role of external auditors is crucial. Earnings quality and 
external audit assist investors by aligning the objectives of management with the 
objectives of shareholders, thereby enhancing the reliability of financial information 
and the integrity of the financial reporting process (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
Parallel to this, previous empirical studies investigated the effect of the presence of the 
audit committee on financial reporting (Beasley, 1996; Forker, 1992; Peasnell, et al., 
2001; Li et al., 2015) and earnings management (Peasnell, et al., 2005). High-quality 
control protects investors and improves the value of the firm (Black et al., 2006). The 
input of sustainable value creation gives the firm the ability to remain competitive in a 
fast-changing business environment. This gives power to managers to create a 
competitive infrastructure in a fast-changing business environment and manage new 
types of risks and opportunities associated with ESG issues (Churet and Eccles, 2014). 
Managers with a high proportion of equity do not tend to manipulate the accounting 
numbers (Warfield et al., 1995). Firms with a large proportion of block-holders of 
shares, appear to have more credibility in their financial statements and provide higher 
scrutiny over management activities (Dechow et al., 1995). Moreover, the existence of 
non-institutional investors reduces earnings management practices because of the 
advantage of more access to timely and relevant information (Balsam et al., 2003). 
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2.11.3. IR and agency costs 
According to agency theory, firms should implement adequate monitoring or control 
mechanisms to protect the shareholders and management from conflicts of interest. 
Managers should pursue the interests of shareholders and not only their own interests 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). The basic governance mechanisms 
which align the interests of the agent and the principal are the board of directors and an 
ownership structure (Daily et al., 2003). Board size, board independence, and the 
separation of CEO and chair positions with the aim of improving the effectiveness of 
the overall oversight are the basic issues that report the board of directors (Dalton et al., 
1998; Coles and Hesterly, 2000; Daily et al., 2003). A higher number of non-executive 
directors on the board can improve the firms‟ performance. A board should consist of 
a large number of outside independent directors and have a separate position of 
chairman and CEO to increase shareholder value (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This presence of independent members 
on boards of directors will enhance the board’s ability to monitor management (Young, 
2008). Atkins et al. (2015) concluded that specialist socially responsible investment 
managers are starting to attend private financial reporting meetings, while mainstream 
fund managers are starting to attend private meetings on ESG issues. Institutional 
investors play an active role in controlling managerial discretion and improving the 
efficiency of information in capital markets, as investors are more sophisticated due to 
advantages in processing information (Gonzalez and Garcia – Meca, 2014; Balsam et 
al., 2003; Koh, 2003; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Ferreira et al., 2010). Hence, 
opportunism and agency costs are reduced (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). It is also 
important to resolve agency problems by aligning management’s interests with the 
objectives of shareholders (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Moreover, the opportunistic 
behavior of managers can be limited by the existence and contribution of external 
auditing. External auditors can be used as another important monitoring system. 
Auditors have the responsibility to provide reliable accounting information. It can lead 
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to the effective questioning of management (Cohen et al., 2008). When a firm is audited 
by independent and high quality external auditors, it shows low earnings management 
and hence better accounting information (Frankel et al., 2002; Krishnan, 2003). As 
Iatridis (2012b) argues, the domination of company boards by non-executive and 
independent directors, the presence of nomination and internal audit committees, as 
well as the firm‟s size, leverage, managerial and institutional ownership reduce agency 
costs (Singh and Davidson, 2003; Weir et al., 2002).Finally, according to many studies 
it also shows the magnitude of earnings management associated with agency costs 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989; Liang, 2004; Goldman and Slezak, 
2006; Drymiotes and Hemmer, 2013).   
2.11.4. IR and firm’s performance  
Agency theory examines the effects of boards of directors and managerial share 
ownership on firm’s performance (Jermias and Gani, 2014). According to this theory, 
the firm should implement adequate monitoring or control mechanisms to protect the 
shareholders and management from conflicts of interest. Managers should pursue the 
interests of shareholders and not only their own interests (Fama and Jensen 1983; Kiel 
and Nicholson 2003). The firm’s performance is not improved by the simple existence 
of good governance. The creation of managerial incentives alone is not sufficient for 
superior performance and should be supported by boards which capably perform their 
duties (Jermias and Gani, 2014). The basic governance mechanisms which align the 
interests of the agent and the principal are the board of directors and an ownership 
structure. (Daily et al., 2003).  
Board size, board independence, and the separation of CEO and chair positions with 
the aim of improving the effectiveness of oversight are the basic issues that report the 
board of directors (Dalton et al., 1998; Coles and Hesterly, 2000; Daily et al., 2003). A 
higher number of non-executive directors on the board can improve the firm’s’ 
performance. A board should consist of a large number of outside independent directors 
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and have a separate position of chairman and CEO to increase shareholder value (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). But, a 
disproportionately high number of inside directors has a negative association with firm 
performance. This presence of independent members on boards of directors will 
enhance the board’s' ability to monitor management (Jermias and Gani, 2014). 
As Iatridis (2012a) argues, the domination of company boards by non-executive and 
independent directors, the presence of nomination and internal audit committees, as 
well as the firm’s size, leverage, managerial and institutional ownership, improves the 
firm’s performance (Singh and Davidson, 2003; Weir et al., 2002). This presence of 
independent members on boards of directors will enhance the board’s' ability to monitor 
management. Institutional investors plays an active role in controlling managerial 
discretion and improving the efficiency of information in capital markets, as investors 
are more sophisticated with advantages in processing information (Gonzalez and Garcia 
– Meca, 2014; Balsam et al., 2003; Koh, 2003; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Ferreira et al. 
2010).  
It is also important to resolve agency problems by aligning management’s interests with 
the objectives of shareholders (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).  Moreover, the opportunistic 
behavior of managers can be aligned with the contribution of external auditing. External 
auditors can be used as another important monitoring system. Auditors have the 
responsibility to provide reliable accounting information. They lead to effective 
questioning of management (Cohen et al., 2008). When a firm is audited by independent 
and high quality external auditor it shows low earnings management and hence better 
accounting information and improvement performance (Frankel et al., 2002; Krishnan, 
2003). 
The concept of “integrated thinking” has been introduced to explain the relation 
between IR and firm performance. This concept attempts to find an optimal balance 
between managing short-term business imperatives and ongoing value creation (Churet 
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and Eccles, 2014).It is also important to resolve agency problems by aligning 
management’s interests with the objectives of shareholders (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). 
Moreover, the opportunistic behavior of managers can be aligned through the 
contribution of external auditing. External auditors can be used as another important 
monitoring system. Auditors have the responsibility to provide reliable accounting 
information and to effectively question management (Cohen et al., 2008). A firm that 
is audited by independent, high-quality external auditors indicates low earnings 
management, better accounting information and improved performance (Frankel et al., 
2002; Krishnan, 2003). 
2.11.5. IR and value relevance of summary accounting information (i.e. book value 
of equity and earnings) 
Before the use of IR, accounting mechanisms did not consider non-financial 
information and corporate financial information faced similar shortfalls, which failed 
to consider all the necessary factors that may have a significant impact on value creation 
(Ernst and Young, 2014). Value relevance has been examined by researchers for many 
years (Beaver, 2002). The fundamental notion generates an accounting value as value-
relevant when it is significantly associated with the dependent variable (Carnevale et 
al., 2012). The fact that there was no convergence between the market value of firm’ 
shares and their book value created the need for many researchers to explore the value 
relevance of non-financial information (Lourenco et al. 2014). 
Previous studies concluded that there was a significant relation between the market 
value of equity and non-financial information. There is a great number of studies 
applying value relevance test the firms’ environmental (Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004; Barth 
and McNichols, 1994; Clarkson et al., 2011; Cormier and Magnan, 1997, 2007; Moneva 
and Cuellar, 2009). Cormier and Magnan (2007) found a positive relation between 
firms’ earnings valuation multiples and environmental reporting in firms from Canada, 
France and Germany. Other studies focus on the corporate environmental reputation 
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effects to the current annual stock returns and current and future annual earnings 
(Hussainey and Salama, 2010). Parallel to this, another study of Australian firms 
concluded in a negative relation between a firm’s value and its carbon intensity profile 
(Chapple et al., 2011).  
Baboukardos (2017) in his study, using a sample of 692 firm-year observations of 
French listed firms, tries to broaden investors understanding of the value relevance of 
environmental performance, by providing empirical evidence on the role of IR. He finds 
that firms with recognized environmental provisions on their balance sheets enable 
investors to estimate a strong future financial performance. He concludes that capital 
market participants place a positive and significantly higher value on the environmental 
performance ratings of firms with recognized environmental provisions, than on the 
ratings of firms without environmental provisions. 
On the contrary, there have been studies that have shown the opposite relation between 
sustainability reporting and value relevance. The results were derived from a sample of 
European banks, in which the disclosure level of sustainability information exhibit an 
opposite behavior of value relevance of their net assets. Banks that don’t apply 
sustainability reporting perform better view of value relevance (Carnevale et al., 2012; 
Lourenco et al. 2014).  
2.11.6. IR and multiple-based valuation models 
One of the seven guiding principles of IR is materiality (IIRC, 2015). In this part 
highlighted the importance of evaluation. ESG issues may present new risks and 
opportunities which affect the firms performance and valuation (GRI, 2013). Multiple-
based valuation models (relative valuation models) evaluate the firm’s intrinsic value 
implementing only accounting numbers. In this study the multiple-based screening 
method is used, which is the most common used multiples valuation technique. It is 
separated into two sub-categories; in technical screens, where it defines the investment 
strategies based on trading indicators, and in fundamental screens, where it compares 
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the stock’s price to specific accounting items of a company’s financial reports, such as 
P/E ratios (Penman, 2007)  
Tasker (1998) shed light on multiple’s academic research, indicating that industry does 
matter in the choice of the appropriate multiple. She examined cross-industry 
accounting-based valuation models and analyzed how these patterns were used by 
investment bankers when the correct offer price of target firms in takeover transactions 
was estimated. Since her analysis and results derived from small sample, these results 
could not be generalized for each industry population but it could be noted that for each 
industry there was a “preferred multiple”. Furthermore, when the selection of the set of 
comparable firms was based on similar historical earnings growth and not on randomly 
selected firms of this industry, then a smaller valuation error could be implemented 
(Boastman and Baskin, 1998). 
 Demirakos et al., (2003) examining a sample of “104 sell side analyst’s equity research 
reports covering 26 companies” conclude that the single-period comparative, especially 
the P/E ratio, is the dominant valuation methods in the assessed analyst’s reports.  This 
ratio appears to be more popular in sectors with many tangible assets and characterized 
by stability, such as the beverage sector rather than more fast-growing with less 
intangible assets sectors, such as electronics and pharmaceutical. 
Following Burgstahler et al. (2006) and based on prior accounting research (e.g., Healy 
and Wahlen, 1999; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Leuz et al., 2003), two different proxies 
can be comput capturing a range of earnings management activities, such as the 
magnitude of total accruals, the smoothness of earnings relative to cash flows and the 
association between accounting accruals and operating cash flows (e.g., Lang et al., 
2003; Wysocki, 2004; Lang et al., 2006). These two proxies are used as an important 
indicator of financial performance and influence firms’ disclosure decisions (Francis et 
al., 2008). IR can be a useful proxy to control the behavior of discretionary accruals, 
recognizing social trends which are likely to affect positive business developments and 
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creating appropriate internal incentives that encourage a long term-view (Churet and 
Eccles, 2014). 
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3. Hypotheses Development   
A number of hypotheses are developed to examine the effects on IR disclosure quality 
of firm performance, corporate governance, agency costs, earnings quality, value 
relevance of summary accounting information (i.e., the book value of equity and 
earnings) and multiple-based valuation models. The hypotheses presented in this study 
will create expectations for a higher degree of economic integration through IR 
implementation and provide more complete information to shareholders and investors. 
3.1. IR, disclosure quality and corporate governance 
The mission of the IIRC is “to create a globally accepted IR Framework, 2013 which 
brings together ESG information in a clear, concise, consistent and comparable 
format”7 to “help business to make more sustainable decisions and enable investors and 
other stakeholders to understand how an organization is really performing”8. Equation 
(1) is created to investigate whether the level of IR disclosure quality is positively 
associated with effective corporate governance techniques. Researchers have predicted 
that there is a significant relation between corporate transparency and accountability 
and disclosure quality (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). Corporate governance is an 
effective monitoring system (Gul and Tsui, 2001). 
Although the directors are ultimately accountable for adherence to appropriate best 
practice principles, the direct responsibility of the Board is focused on the design and 
adoption of adequate policies, inculcating the required culture to adhere to such 
policies, and the subsequent oversight of the implementation of such policies. 
Management bears responsibility for the implementation of policies, strategy, business 
plans and the like. In order to ensure the effective functioning of the Board, King III 
                                                 
 
7http://www.theiirc.org/the-iirc/, accessed 07 January 2018 
8http://www.theiirc.org/about/, accessed 07 January 2018 
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proposes a unitary board structure comprising executive, non-executive and 
independent non-executive members. The majority should be non-executives, of whom 
the majority should be independent. The Board should be chaired by an independent 
non-executive director. The CEO of the company should not also fulfil the role of the 
Chair of the Board. King III further proposes a formal election and induction process 
for new Board members, ongoing director development, and emphasizes the 
importance of effective Board performance. It also provides guidance on remuneration 
of directors and executives, and the composition and responsibility of Board 
committees. King III proposes that the Boards of all companies establish audit, risk, 
remuneration and nominations committees, and be assisted by a competent company 
secretary (Deloitte, 2009) 
A board should consist of a large number of outside independent directors and have a 
separate position for the chairman and CEO to increase shareholder value (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This presence 
of independent members on boards of directors enhances the board’s ability to monitor 
management (Young et al., 2008). Effective corporate governance mechanisms, such 
as the existence of an audit committee and a nomination committee and the presence of 
independent directors, board of directors and management, can act as monitors of 
managers (La Fond and Watts, 2008). Therefore, independent directors affect a range 
of board decisions, such as the firing of nonperforming CEOs (Weisbach, 1988), 
resistance to greenmail payments (Kosnik, 1987) and the negotiation of tender offers 
(Byrd and Hickman, 1992). 
Hypothesis 1: Firms that enrich their annual reports with IR components provide high-
quality accounting disclosure and therefore exhibit more effective corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
King III emphasises the fact that risk management should be seen as an integral part of 
the company’s strategic and business processes. The Board’s responsibility for 
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governance of risk should be set out in a risk management policy and plan. The Board 
should consider the risk policy and plan, and should monitor the whole risk 
management process. While the Board remains responsible for the risk management 
policy and the determination of the company’s risk appetite and risk tolerance, 
management is responsible for the design, implementation and effectiveness of risk 
management. The Board should receive combined assurance regarding the 
effectiveness of the risk management process. The Board may assign its responsibility 
for risk management to the risk committee. Membership of this committee should 
include executive and non-executive directors. Where the company decides to assign 
this function to the audit committee, careful consideration should be given to the 
resources available to the audit committee to adequately deal with governance of risk 
in addition to its audit responsibilities (IoD, 2009). 
3.2. IR and earnings quality and discretionary accruals 
In the question of how managers behavior to manipulate their firm’s accounting 
numbers can be controlled and estimated, and under what conditions earnings 
management can be applied, many empirical accounting studies have supported the 
view that accruals provide management with the opportunity to alter earnings 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2012). Discretionary accruals are used as a proxy for earnings 
management, since they can be used as surrogates for earnings quality and earnings 
management (Jones 1991; DeFond and Subramanyam 1998; Kothari et al. 2004). 
The opportunistic earnings management literature, largely based on Healy (1985) 
research, found that managers use accruals to strategically increase or decrease bonus 
income.9 For example, the most common manipulation strategy of managers is based 
                                                 
 
9 Schipper (1989) identifies both internal and external incentives for earnings management. We focus 
our attention on internal incentives. 
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on earnings smoothing. They defer income through accruals when profit target for a 
bonus plan cannot be achieved or when bonuses have already reached maximum levels, 
and can accelerate income in other periods. Guidry et al. (1999) in their study use data 
from businesses' unit level rather than firm level. They conclude with the same results 
as Healey's bonus manipulation effects. Gaver et al. (1995) study discretionary accruals 
instead of total accruals and find that earnings are manipulated, but to smooth income 
rather than manipulate bonuses. 
Goel and Thakor (2003) interpret the theoretical background upon which earnings 
management (in the form of earnings smoothing) generates value for shareholders. 
They observe in their model, that the higher level of the volatility of the underlying 
stock, the greater the incentive informed investors have to collect information and 
reported profit at the expense of liquidity traders. Thus, earnings smoothing by 
managers reduces volatility, in an effort to protect investors with no information.  
Holthausen et al. (1995) also conclude that managers may use accruals to defer earnings 
for current use and shift them in next use with the goal of maximizing long-term bonus 
income. However, when earnings are in the middle of the upper and lower bounds, 
defined by performance based contracts and performance based compensation, it is 
more varied to reported earnings. Executive managers may persistently manipulate 
earnings upward rather than smoothing earnings over time (Cornett et al., 2009). 
On the other hand, some recent studies focus on the relation between earnings quality, 
stock prices and managers’ wealth. This is done using two different ways. Option and 
restricted stock compensation are the direct managers’ choices, which can increase its 
wealth by inflating stock prices. Indeed there are studies that conclude with the fact that 
such compensation is related to where higher degrees of earnings management are 
dominant (Cornett et al., 2009). 
For example, in their study Teoh et al. (1998 a,b) conclude that firms which use more 
aggressive accrual policies, prior to IPOs and SEOs, tend to have poorer post-issue 
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stock price performance than firms with less aggressive accounting policies. Their 
results suggest that earnings management inflates stock prices prior to the IPO or SEO. 
The study of DuCharme et al. (2004) aligned with those of Teoh et al. (1998a,b) and 
find that managers appear artificially reported earnings prior to stock offers. They have 
as a goal to maximize the net benefit of a stock offering to existing shareholders at the 
expense of new shareholders and conclude that there is a negative association between 
returns and abnormal accruals. Finally, Beneish and Vargus (2002) focus on periods of 
abnormally high accruals, which inflate earnings and observe a positive relation 
between abnormally high accruals and inside sales of shares and that after the “event 
period” stock returns have the tendency to be poor. 
Gao and Shrieves (2002), Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Cohen et al. (2004), and 
Cheng and Warfield (2005) in their studies conclude that the use of discretionary 
accruals and manipulation of reported earning is more common at firms where top 
management compensation is more closely tied to the value of stock in general and 
options more particularly. Burns and Kedia (2003) illustrate that firms whose CEOs 
have large option positions have the tendency to rasp earnings restatements. 
Accruals are the best instrument for earning management rather than cash earnings. 
This occurs because accruals can be difficulty to managed and cannot be manipulated 
easily (Schipper, 1989; Burilovich and Kattelus, 1997). Using accruals it is reduced 
timing and mismatching problems in the underlying cash flows. When estimated future 
cash flows are used to measure accruals, estimation errors or noise are included. As the 
estimation error is increased, the accruals quality is decreased (Dechow and Dichev, 
2002).   
Following Burgstahler et al. (2006) and based on prior accounting research (e.g., Healy 
and Wahlen, 1999; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Leuz et al., 2003), two different proxies 
are computed capturing a range of earnings management activities, such as the 
magnitude of total accruals, the smoothness of earnings relative to cash flows and the 
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association between accounting accruals and operating cash flows. These proxies may 
be not perfect and indicate earnings management only in a relative sense, but relative 
measures meet the demands of the design of this thesis (Lang et al. 2003; Lang et al. 
2006). The claims that are set out above are listed in the hypothesis below. 
Hypothesis 2a: Firms that enrich their annuals reports with IR components provide a 
high quality of accounting disclosure and therefore exhibit higher earnings quality. 
Hypothesis 2b: Firms that provide IR disclosures are likely to apply low discretionary 
accruals. 
Earnings quality is an important indicator of financial performance and influences 
firms’ disclosure decisions (Francis et al., 2008). IR can be a useful proxy to control 
the behavior of discretionary accruals. It recognizes social trends which are likely to 
affect positive business developments, creating appropriate internal incentives that 
encourage a long term-view (Churet and Eccles, 2014) 
3.3. IR and agency costs 
Observing agency theory can control the role of boards that affects the firms’ 
management and leads managers to manipulate the firm’s accounting numbers (Xie et 
al., 2003; Kao and Chen, 2004; Goodwin et al., 2009). It is proven that outside directors 
are negatively related to earnings management (Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Peasnell 
et al., 2005; Davidson et al., 2005; Benkel et al., 2006; Dimitropoulos and Asteriou, 
2010). Effective corporate governance mechanisms, such as the existence of 
independent directors, can act as monitors of managers (La Fond and Watts, 2008). The 
existence of independent directors on the board improves accounting disclosures and 
illustrates the impact of board composition on corporate disclosures (Donnelly and 
Mulcahy, 2008; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Core et al., 1999). The presence of 
independent directors on the board controls management behavior, reduces the ability 
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of managers to make decisions that maximize their private benefits, and minimizes the 
adverse effects of the agency problem (Renders and Gaeremynck, 2007). 
Hypothesis 3: Firms that enrich their annual reports with IR components provide high-
quality accounting disclosure and therefore exhibit lower agency costs. 
King III proposes integrated reporting to ensure that all stakeholders are able to assess 
the economic value of the company. This entails the integration of the company’s 
financial reporting with sustainability reporting and disclosure. The Board should 
ensure that the positive and negative impacts of the company’s operations, as well as 
plans to improve the positives and eradicate the negatives, are conveyed in the 
integrated report. King III suggests that the Board may delegate oversight of the 
integrated report to an appropriate committee (either the audit committee or a 
sustainability committee). The audit committee should oversee the provision of 
independent assurance over sustainability issues and should assist the Board by 
reviewing the integrated reporting and disclosure to ensure that it does not contradict 
financial reporting (Deloitte, 2009) 
3.4. IR and firms performance  
Studies vary in their assessment of which value driver (cash flows and accruals) 
performed better. Sloan (1996) suggests that it is better for financial analyses to be 
based on the cash flow component of profitability than on accruals. However, Ohlson 
(1995) and Felthman and Ohlson (1995) note that current profitability (return on assets) 
and growth in net operating assets better explained future profitability and provided a 
more accurate and less biased estimate of the intrinsic value of a firm. Growth in net 
operating assets is split into accruals and growth in long-run net operating assets. 
Accruals better indicate the quality of earnings because the GAAP reported that net 
income ignored information that was provided by accruals (Chan et al., 2006). 
However, in this analysis both value drivers of cash flows and accruals are used. 
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Hypothesis 4: There is a positive association between firm performance and the level 
of IR disclosure quality. 
3.5. IR and value relevance of summary accounting information (i.e. book 
value of equity and earnings) 
Signaling theory is based on the idea of information asymmetry between the insiders 
and outsiders in a firm (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973).When this condition exists, the 
basic premise of signaling theory is that the managers of a high-quality firm want to 
signal the firm’s value to its stakeholders (Magness, 2009). This theory is useful to 
clarify the importance of information regarding the ESG of a firm to other parties, both 
in the case of information disclosed by the firm itself (Hasseldine et al., 2005; Magness, 
2009; Toms, 2002) and in the case of information provided by external 
parties(Hussainey and Salama, 2010). Following signaling theory, firms are considered 
to provide more ESG principles to inform stakeholders. Hence, firms provide value-
relevant information to investors about the firm’s organizational effectiveness 
compared to that of competing firms (Hussainey and Salama, 2010). Non-financial 
information reduces investor uncertainty and influences the firm’s share price 
(Ramchander et al., 2012; Lourenco et al., 2014). 
Empirical studies suggest that firms which applied King III report principles, 
particularly those from South Africa, illustrated sufficient information about risks, 
challenges (Marx and Mohammadali-Haji, 2014) and uncertainties, and suggested ways 
for improvement (Ernst and Young, 2014; Baboukardos and Rimmel, 2016). De Klerk 
and De Villiers (2012) examined the value relevance of ESG disclosures and concluded 
that their results supported the business case for high-quality integrated reports, 
advanced by the IRCSA (2011) and the IIRC (2013c) .Moreover, after IR adoption, the 
valuation coefficients of earnings remained steadily higher than they were before. The 
improvement signals in the value relevance of earnings became visible after the first 
year of the King III report adoption and became relevant regarding the book value of 
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equity after the second year (Baboukardos and Rimmel, 2016).The abovementioned 
assertions can be formally stated in the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5: Firms with high IR disclosure quality tend to exhibit a higher value 
relevance of summary accounting information (i.e., the book value of equity and 
earnings).  
3.6. IR and multiple-based valuation models 
When price-to-value driver multiples are used, problems arise regarding how analysts 
should estimate the numerator and the denominator in a pricing multiple on a 
comparable basis. The normal situation is to apply an equity or entity perspective 
method both in numerator and denominator. If an equity value item, such as share price, 
is located in the numerator, then the denominator should use an equity perspective value 
driver, such as net income or profit from continuous operations. The same approach 
should apply if analysts prefer to estimate a price-to-value driver multiple using the 
entity perspective. An entity perspective multiple/can put the value of the entity (debt 
plus equity) in the numerator, whereas sales or earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) can be placed in the denominator. However, in many situations analysts prefer 
to marry entity and equity perspectives to create a suitable multiple. For example, 
internet and high tech firms use an equity value item, such as share price, as the 
numerator. However, because the equity perspective value driver (i.e., net income) 
usually has a negative value, analysts prefer to substitute an equity perspective value 
driver with an entity perspective value driver (i.e., sales or EBIT) in the denominator 
(Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002). The claims outlined above are listed in the hypothesis 
below. 
Hypothesis 6: Firms with a high IR disclosure quality tend to exhibit a higher valuation 
index compared to firms with a lower IR disclosure quality.  
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4. Research Design 
In this chapter the econometric methodology used in this thesis is analyzed, the 
methodology of accounting models, the procedure of checklist creation, the design of 
sample selection and the models specification. First, in section 4.1, the methodology of 
Logit Probit Models (LPM) is analyzed, then the Maximum Likelihood Estimation of 
LPM. Panel data methodology is illustrated in section 4.2. It highlights the fixed effects 
methodology and the Heckman correction method. Second, in section 4.4, the most 
used accrual-based models are analyzed (e.g Modified Jones model (Dechow et al 
(1995); Jones model (1991); DeAngelo model (1986); Event Period Model (McNichols 
and Wilson (1988)). Third, in section 4.5, the procedure for creating the IR checklist is 
presented. Fourth, in section 4.6, the design of sample selection is analyzed. In the last 
section of this chapter, six model specifications are analyzed. In section 4.7 six models 
based on previous accounting methodology are created and discussed.  
4.1. Logit and Probit Models for Binary Response 
There are two most important disadvantages in which the fitted probabilities can be 
take a value less than zero or greater than one, and the partial effect of any explanatory 
variable (appearing in level form) is constant. In order to overcome these limitations of 
the LPM, more sophisticated binary response models can be used (Woolddridge, 2013, 
p. 576). In a binary response model, interest lies primarily in the response probability 
P(y = 1 |x) = P(y = 1 |x1, x2, … , xk)                                                               (M-1) 
where x is used to indicate the full set of explanatory variables. For example, when as 
variable y is set as an employment indicator, then variable x might be contained various 
individual characteristics. Some individual characteristics can be education, age, 
marital status, and any other factors which can affect employment status, including a 
binary indicator variable for participation in a recent job training program 
(Woolddridge, 2013, p. 576). 
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4.1.1. Specifying Logit and Probit Models  
In the LPM, it is assumed that the response probability is linear in a set of parameters, 
𝛽𝑗. In order to avoid the LPM limitations, a class of binary response models should be 
considered, which have the formation of equation (M-2), 
𝑃(𝑦 = 1 |𝑥) = 𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘) =  𝐺(𝛽0 +  𝑥𝛽),                                 (M-2) 
Where the function G(z) takes values between zero and one: 0< G(z) < 1 for all real 
number z. This confirms that the estimated response probabilities take values between 
zero and one. Then, the equation (M-2) is formulated as: 𝛽 = 𝛽1𝑥1 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘 . There 
are many nonlinear functions which can be included in the function G(z) in order to 
confirm that the probabilities take values between zero and one. In this section two 
cases which enhance the most cases of LPM are analyzed (Woolddridge, 2013, p. 576). 
In the logit model, G(z), the logistic function is: 
 𝐺(𝑧) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑧)
[1+𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑧)]
= 𝛬(𝑧),                                                                                     (M-3) 
which is illustrated in (M-3) equation. G(z) takes values between zero and one for all 
real numbers z. This is the cumulative distribution function for a standard logistic 
random variable. In the probit model, the function G(z) takes the standard normal 
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF), which is illustrated as an integral: 
 𝐺(𝑧) = 𝛷(𝑧) = ∫ 𝜑(𝜈)𝑑𝜈
𝑧
−∞
                                                                                 (M-4) 
where φ (z) is the standard normal density 
𝜑(𝑧) = (2𝜋)−1/2𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑧2/2)                                                                                          (M-5) 
The decision to choose G(z) again ensures that (M-2) highly takes values between zero 
and one of all the parameters and the xj. The G(z) functions in formulas (M-3) and (M-
4) are both increasing functions. Each increases most quickly at z= 0, G(z) → 0 as z 
→−∞ , and G(z) → 1 as z → ∞. Logit and probit models can be created from an 
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underlying latent variable model (Woolddridge, 2013, p. 576). Let y* be an unobserved, 
or latent, variable, determined by 
𝑦∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝑥𝛽 + 𝑒       𝑦 = 1[𝑦
∗ > 0],                                                                 (M-6) 
where it is introduced the notation 1[∙] to create a binary result. The function 1[∙] is 
called the indicator function, which takes on the value one when the event in brackets 
is true, and zero otherwise. Therefore, y is one if y* >0, and y is zero if y* ≤ 0. It is 
assumed that e is an independent variable of x. The variable e presents either a standard 
logistic distribution or a standard normal distribution. In either case, the variable e is 
symmetrically distributed about zero, which means that 1 - G(-z) = G(z) for all real 
numbers z.(Woolddridge, 2013, p. 576). 
From (M-6) and the assumptions given, the response probability for y can be derived: 
𝑃(𝑦 = 1 |𝑥) = 𝑃(𝑦∗ > 0 |𝑥) =  𝑃[𝑒 > −(𝛽0 + 𝑥𝛽|𝑥] = 1 − 𝐺[−(𝛽0 + 𝑥𝛽)] =
𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝑥𝛽)   
which is exactly the same as (M-2). 
In most uses of binary response models, the basic goal is to explain the effects of the xj 
on the response probability 𝑃(𝑦 = 1 |𝑥). The latent variable formulation tends to give 
the impression that it is primarily interested in the effects of each xj on y*. As it is proved 
for logit and probit models, the direction of the effect of xj on 𝐸(𝑦∗|𝑥) = 𝛽0 + 𝑥𝛽 and 
on 𝐸(𝑦|𝑥) = 𝑃(𝑦 = 1|𝑥) = 𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝑥𝛽) is always the same. But the latent variable y* 
rarely has a well-defined unit of measurement. (For example, y* might be the difference 
in utility levels from two different actions.) Thus, the magnitudes of each j are not, by 
themselves, especially useful (in contrast to the linear probability model). For most 
purposes, it is required to estimate the effect of xj on the probability of 
success 𝑃(𝑦 = 1 |𝑥), but this is complicated by the nonlinear nature of G(∙) function 
(Woolddridge, 2013, p. 577).  
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To find the partial effect of roughly continuous variables on the response probability, it 
should rely on calculus. If xj is a roughly continuous variable, its partial effect on  
𝑝(𝑥) = 𝑃(𝑦 = 1 |𝑥) is obtained from the partial derivative: 
𝜕𝑝(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥𝑗
= 𝑔(𝛽0 + 𝑥𝛽)𝛽𝑗, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑔(𝑧) ≡
𝑑𝐺
𝑑𝑧
(𝑧)                                                                (M-7) 
Because G(∙) function is the CDF of a continuous random variable, g is a probability 
density function. In the logit and probit cases, G(∙) is a strictly increasing CDF, and so 
g(z) >0 for all z. Hence, the partial effect of xj on p(x) depends on x through the positive 
quantityg(𝛽0 + 𝑥𝛽). This can be interpreted that the partial effect always has the same 
sign as βj.  
Equation (M-7) illustrates that the relative effects of any two continuous explanatory 
variables do not depend on x: the ratio of the partial effects for xj and xh is βj /βh. 
Focusing on the typical paradigm, in which g is a symmetric density about zero, with a 
unique mode at zero, it is observed that the largest effect occurs when β0+xβ=0. For 
example, when a probit case is applied with g(z)=φ(z), g(0)=φ(0)=1/√2𝜋 =0.40. When 
a logit case is applied to g(z) = 
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑧)
[1+𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑧)]2
 , and so g(0)=0.25. If x1 is a binary 
explanatory variable, then the partial effect from goes x1 from zero to one, holding all 
other variables fixed, is simply illustrated as 
 𝐵(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘) − 𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘)                          (M-8) 
It is confirmed that this depends on all the values of the other xj. For example, if the 
variable y is an employment indicator and the variable x1 is a dummy variable, 
indicating participation in a job training program, then the function (M-8) can be 
interpreted as the change in the probability of employment, due to the job training 
program. This originates from other factors that affect employability, such as education 
and experience. It should be cautioned that knowing the sign of 1 is sufficient in order 
to decide whether the program had a positive or negative effect. But if it required 
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estimating the magnitude of the effect, it should find it by using the quantity in (M-8). 
Moreover, the difference in (M-8) can also be used for other kinds of discrete variables 
(such as number of children) (Woolddridge, 2013, p. 577). If xk denotes this variable, 
then the effect on the probability of xk going from ck to ck + 1 is simply illustrated as 
𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑘(𝑐𝑘 + 1)) − 𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑘𝑐𝑘)      (M-9) 
It is straightforward to analyze the standard functional forms among the explanatory 
variables. For example, in the model 
𝑃(𝑦 = 1 |𝑧) = 𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑧1 + 𝛽2𝑧1
2 + 𝛽3 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑧2) + 𝛽4𝑧3) 
the partial effect of 𝑧1 on 𝑃(𝑦 = 1 |𝑧) is 𝑃(𝑦 = 1 |𝑧)/𝜕𝑧1  = 𝑔(𝛽0 + 𝑥𝛽)(𝛽1 +
2𝛽2𝑧1), and the partial effect of z2 on the response probability is 𝑃(𝑦 = 1 |𝑧)/𝜕𝑧2  =
𝑔(𝛽0 + 𝑥𝛽)(𝛽3/𝑧2)  where 𝑥𝛽 = 𝛽1𝑧1 + 𝛽2𝑧1
2 + 𝛽3 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑧2) + 𝛽4𝑧3. 
Therefore, 𝑔(𝛽0 + 𝑥𝛽)(𝛽3/100) is the approximate change in the response probability 
when z2 increases by 1%. (Woolddridge, 2013, p. 578). 
There is the case when it is required to estimate the elasticity of the response probability 
with respect to an explanatory variable. In that case care must be taken in interpreting 
the percentage changes in probabilities. This is explained using an example. When a 
change occurs in a probability from 0.04 to 0.06 represents a 2-percentage-point 
increase in the probability, but a 50% increase relative to the initial value. Using 
calculus, in the preceding model the elasticity of 𝑃(𝑦 = 1 |𝑧) with respect to 𝑧2 can be 
illustrated as 𝛽3[𝑔(𝛽0 + 𝑥𝛽)/𝐺((𝛽0 + 𝑥𝛽)]. In the first case, the elasticity appears 
always the same sign as β3, but it generally depends on all parameters and all values of 
the explanatory variables. If  𝑧3>0, the second elasticity always has the same sign as 
the parameter  𝛽4(Woolddridge, 2013, p. 576).  
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4.1.2. Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Logit and Probit Models 
The estimation method of the LPM can be based on the use of the ordinary least squares, 
or, in some cases, weighted least squares. Since of the nonlinear nature of 𝐸(𝑦 |𝑥), OLS 
and WLS are not applicable. Nonlinear versions of these methods can be used and more 
specifically the use of Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). In this section, the 
MLE methodology is analyzed. When the classical linear model assumptions occur, the 
OLS estimator is the maximum likelihood estimator (conditional on the explanatory 
variables). When it is focused on limited dependent variable models, maximum 
likelihood methods are indispensable. Because MLE is based on the distribution of y 
given x, the heteroskedasticity in Var (𝑦 |𝑥), is automatically accounted for 
(Woolddridge, 2013, p. 579). 
It is assumed that a random sample of size n. In order to obtain the maximum likelihood 
estimator, conditional on the explanatory variables, it should define the density of yi 
given xi the formula which can be written as  
𝑓(𝑦 |𝑥; 𝛽) = [𝐺(𝑥𝑖𝛽)]
𝑦[1 − 𝐺(𝑥𝑖𝛽)]
1−𝑦                  𝑦 = 0,1,                                   (M-10) 
where, for simplicity, it absorbs the intercept into the vector 𝑥𝑖. When y =1 it is 
observed that the formula forms as G(xi) and when y =0, the formula forms as 1-G(𝑥𝑖𝛽). 
The log-likelihood function for observation i is a function of the parameters and the 
data (xi, yi) and is obtained by taking the log of (M-10): 
𝑙𝑖(𝛽) = 𝑦𝑖 𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝐺(𝑥𝑖𝛽)] + (1 − 𝑦𝑖) 𝑙𝑜𝑔[1 − 𝐺(𝑥𝑖𝛽)]                                               (M-11) 
Because G(∙) takes values between zero and one for logit and probit, 𝑙𝑖(𝛽) is well 
defined for all values of β. The log-likelihood for a sample with size of n observation, 
the formula is illustrated in (M-11) across all observations: 𝐿(𝛽) = ∑ 𝑙𝑖(𝛽)
𝑛
𝑖=1 . The 
MLE of β denoted by β⏞ maximizes this log- likelihood. If G(∙) is the standard logit 
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CDF, then  β⏞ the logit estimator; if G(∙) is the standard normal CDF, then  𝛽⏞ is the 
probit estimator (Woolddridge, 2013, p. 576). 
4.2. Methodology of panel data analysis 
4.2.1. Methodology of Econometric Estimations 
In this chapter, the most commonly used techniques for time-series cross-section data 
analyses in single equation models will be surveyed. It is applied univariate analysis 
and created both Pearson and Spearman correlations matrixes to test the six hypotheses 
of this thesis. In the subsequent multivariate analysis the fixed-effects OLS method is 
used10. In all the estimations, the Newey and West (1987) method modified for use in 
a panel data set is implemented. Through this method, robust standard errors are created 
(Liang and Zeger, 1986; Moulton, 1986; Andrews, 1991; Rogers, 1993; Williams, 
2000). The Newey-West approach was suitable for panel data, and the estimation 
results were consistent regarding heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Cecchetti et 
al., 1997; Sun and Cui, 2014). Finally, the independent variables were standardized to 
mitigate multicollinearity issues (Kim and Park, 2010). 
4.2.2. Panel data models 
A panel data (or longitudinal data) set consists of a time series for each cross-sectional 
member in the data set (Wooldridge, 2013, p.10). There are studies which use panel, or 
longitudinal, data sets (Greene, 2002, p. 284). 
The key feature of panel data that distinguishes them from a pooled cross section is that 
the same cross-sectional units (individuals, firms, or counties in the preceding 
examples) are followed over a given time period (Wooldridge, 2013,p.10). In the 
                                                 
 
10Fixed-year effects and two-digit SIC industry fixed effects were included.  
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typical panel, however, there are a large number of cross-sectional units and only a few 
periods. Thus, the time-series methods discussed there may be somewhat problematic. 
Recent work has generally concentrated on models better suited to these short and wide 
data sets. The techniques are focused on cross-sectional variation, or heterogeneity. The 
fundamental advantage of a panel data set over a cross section is that it will allow the 
researcher greater flexibility in modeling differences in behavior across individuals 
(Greene, 2002,p. 285). 
The basic framework for this discussion is a regression model of the form  
yit =x’itβ +z’iα+εit.                                                                                                  (M-12) 
 As Greene (2002) and Baltagi (2005) and analyzes that there are K regressors in xit, not 
including a constant term.The heterogeneity, or individual effect is z’iα where zi 
contains a constant term and a set of individual or group specific variables, which may 
be observed, such as race, sex, location, and so on or unobserved, such as family 
specific characteristics, individual heterogeneity in skill or preferences, and soon, all of 
which are taken to be constant over time t. As it stands, this model is a classical 
regression model. If zi is observed for all individuals, then the entire model can be 
treated as an ordinary linear model and fit by least squares. Various cases it will be 
considered. The first case is  the pooled regression. If zi contains only a constant term, 
then ordinary least squares provides consistent and efficient estimates of the common 
α and the slope vector β (Greene, 2002, p.284). The second case is that of fixed effects: 
this case explains that if zi is unobserved, but correlated with xit, then the least squares 
estimator of β is biased and inconsistent as a consequence of an omitted variable. 
However, in this instance, the model 
 yit =x’itβ +αi+εit.  
where αi = z’iα embodies all the observable effects and specifies an estimable 
conditional mean. This fixed effects approach takes αi to be a group-specific constant 
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term in the regression model. It should be noted that the term “fixed”, as used here, 
indicates that the term does not vary over time, not that it is non stochastic, which need 
not be the case (Baltagi, 2005, p.135; Greene, 2002, p. 285; Wooldridge, 2009, pp.484-
485). The third case is that of random effects. This case explains that if the unobserved 
individual heterogeneity, however formulated, can be assumed to be uncorrelated with 
the included variables, then the model may be formulated as  
yit = x’itβ + E[z’iα]+ {z’iα− E[z’iα]} +εit  = x’itβ + α+ ui +εit, 
 that is, as a linear regression model with a compound disturbance that may be 
consistently, albeit inefficiently, estimated by least squares. This random effects 
approach specifies that ui is a group specific random element, similar to εit except that 
for each group, there is but a single draw that enters the regression identically in each 
period. Again, the crucial distinction between these two cases is whether the 
unobserved individual effect embodies elements that are correlated with the regressors 
in the model, not whether these effects are stochastic or not. This basic formulation will 
be examined, then consideration of an extension to a dynamic model (Baltagi, 2005, 
p.176; Greene, 2002, p. 285; Wooldridge, 2009, p.492-495). The fourth case is that of 
random parameters. The random effects model can be viewed as a regression model 
with a random constant term. With a sufficiently rich data set, this idea may be extended 
to a model in which the other coefficients vary randomly across individuals as well. 
The extension of the model might appear as  
                                         yit =x’it(β +hi)+(α+ui)+εit,  
where hi is a random vector which induces the variation of the parameters across 
individuals. This random parameters model was proposed quite early in this literature, 
but has only fairly recently enjoyed widespread attention in several fields. It represents 
a natural extension, in which researchers broaden the amount of heterogeneity across 
individuals, while retaining some commonalities- the parameter vectors still share a 
common mean (Greene, 2002, p. 285). Some recent applications/have extended this yet 
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another step by allowing the mean value of the parameter distribution to be person-
specific, as in  
yit =x’it(β +Δzi +hi)+(α+ui)+εit, 
where zi is a set of observable, person specific variables, and Δ is a matrix of parameters 
to be estimated. Finally the fifth case is that of covariance structures. It will be 
reconsidered the source of the heterogeneity in the model. In some settings, researchers 
have concluded that a preferable approach to modeling heterogeneity in the regression 
model is to layer it into the variation around the conditional mean, rather than in the 
placement of the mean(Greene, 2002, p. 286). In a cross-country comparison of 
economic performance over time, Alvarez et al. (1991) estimated a model of the form  
yit = f(labor organizationit, political organizationit)+εit 
in which the regression function was fully specified by the linear part, x’itβ + α, but the 
variance of εit differed across countries. Beck et al. (1993) found evidence that the 
substantive conclusions of the study were dependent on the stochastic specification and 
on the methods used for estimation. 
4.2.3. Fixed effects 
This formulation of the model assumes that differences across units can be captured in 
differences in the constant term. Each αi is treated as an unknown parameter to be 
estimated. Let yi and Xi be the T observations for the ith unit, i be a T×1 column of ones, 
and let εi be associated T×1 vector of disturbances (Greene, 2002, p. 287). Then,  
yi =Xiβ +iαi +εi. 
Collecting these terms gives 
[
𝑦1
𝑦2
⋮
𝑦𝑛
] = [
𝑋1
𝑋2
⋮
𝑋𝑛
] 𝛽 + [
𝑖 0 0 … 0
0 𝑖 0
0 0 𝑖
0 0 0
…
⋮
… .
0
0
𝑖
] [
𝑎1
𝑎2
⋮
𝑎𝑛
] + [
𝜀1
𝜀2
⋮
𝜀𝑛
] 
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y = [X d1 d2 ...dn] [
𝛽
𝑎
] +εt                                                                                                                                   (M-13) 
where di is a dummy variable indicating the ith unit. Let the nT × n matrix  D= [d1 d2 
...dn]. Then, assembling all nT rows gives  
y=Xβ +Dα+ε ,                                                                                                       (M-14) 
This model is usually referred to as the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model 
(although the “least squares” part of the name refers to the technique usually used to 
estimate it, not to the model, itself). This model is a classical regression model, so no 
new results are needed to analyze it. If n is small enough, then the model can be 
estimated by ordinary least squares with K regressors in X and n columns in D, as a 
multiple regression with K+n parameters. Of course, if n is thousands, as is typical, 
then this model is likely to exceed the storage capacity of any computer. But, by using 
familiar results for a partitioned regression, the size of the computation it can be reduced 
(Baltagi, 2005, p.175; Greene, 2002, p. 287; Wooldridge, 2009, p.488-489). 
The least squares estimator of β is written as 
b=[X’MDX]−1[X’MDy],                                                                                         (M-15) 
Where, MD =I−D(D’D)−1D’. 
This amounts to a least squares regression using the transformed data X∗ =MDX and 
y∗ =MDy.The structure of D is particularly convenient; its columns are orthogonal, so 
𝑀𝐷 =
[
 
 
 
 𝑀
0 0 0 … 0
0 𝑀0 0
0 0 𝑀0
0 0 0
…
⋮
… .
0
0
𝑀0 ]
 
 
 
 
  Each matrix on the diagonal is 𝑀0 = 1𝑟 − 
1
𝑇
 𝑖𝑖′ 
Premultiplying any T×1 vector zi by M0 creates M0zi =zi −¯zi (Note that the mean is 
taken over only the T observations for unit i).Therefore, the least squares regression of 
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MDy on MDX is equivalent to a regression of [yit− ¯yi] on [xit−¯xi], where ¯yi and ¯xi. 
are the scalar and K×1 vector of means of yit and xit over the T observations for group 
i. (Greene, 2002, p. 288; Wooldridge, 2009, p.488-489) The dummy variable 
coefficients can be recovered from the other normal equation in the partitioned 
regression:  
D’Da+ D’Xb= D’y  or  a=[D’D]−1 D’(y−Xb). This implies that for each i, 
𝑎𝑖= ?̅?𝑖. . –b’ ?̅?𝑖.                                                                                                                (M-16) 
The appropriate estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix for b is  
Est.Asy.Var [b] =s2[X’MDX]−1,                                                                            (M-17) 
which uses the second moment matrix with x’s now expressed as deviations from their 
respective group means. The disturbance variance estimator is 
𝑠2 =
𝛴𝑖=1
𝑛 𝛴𝑡=1
𝑇 (𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝑏−𝑎𝑖)
2
𝑛𝑇−𝑛−𝐾
=
(𝑦 −𝑀𝐷𝑋𝑏)′(𝑦 −𝑀𝐷𝑋𝑏)
(𝑛𝑇−𝑛−𝐾)
                                    (M-18) 
The ith residual used in this computation is 
𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝑏 − 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝑏 − (𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝑏) =  (𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖
′) − (𝑥𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖
′)′𝑏 
Thus, the numerator in s2 is exactly the sum of squared residuals using the least squares 
slopes and the data in group mean deviation form. But, done in this fashion, one might 
then use nT − K instead of nT − n− K for the denominator in computing s2, so a 
correction would be necessary (Greene, 2002, p. 288). For the individual effects, 
𝐴𝑠𝑦. 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑖 =
𝜎2
𝑇
+ ?̅?′𝑖  {𝐴𝑠𝑦. 𝑉𝑎𝑟 [𝑏]} ?̅?𝑖.,so a simple estimator based on s
2 can be 
computed. 
4.2.3.1. Testing the significance of the group effects  
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The t ratio for ai can be used for a test of the hypothesis that αi equals zero. This 
hypothesis about one specific group, however, is typically not useful for testing in this 
regression context. If it is interested in differences across groups, then the hypothesis  
that the constant terms are all equal with an F test can be tested. Under the null 
hypothesis of equality, the efficient estimator is pooled least squares (Greene, 2002, p. 
289). The F ratio used for this test is 
𝐹(𝑛 − 1, 𝑛𝑇 − 𝑛 − 𝐾) =
(𝑅𝐿𝑆𝐷𝑉
2 −𝑅𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑑
2 )/(𝑛−1)
(1−𝑅𝐿𝑆𝐷𝑉
2 )/(𝑛𝑇−𝑛−𝐾)
                                                 (M-19) 
where LSDV indicates the dummy variable model and pooled indicates the pooled or 
restricted model with only a single overall constant term. Alternatively, the model may 
have been estimated with an overall constant and n−1 dummy variables instead. All 
other results (i.e., the least squares slopes, s2, R2) will be unchanged, but rather than 
estimate αi, each dummy variable coefficient will now be an estimate of αi −α1 where 
group “1” is the omitted group. The F test that the coefficients on these n−1 dummy 
variables are zero is identical to the one above. It is important to keep in mind, however, 
that although the statistical results are the same, the interpretation of the dummy 
variable coefficients in the two formulations is different (Greene, 2002, p. 289; 
Wooldridge, 2009, p.487). 
4.2.3.2. The within- and between-groups estimators 
A pooled regression model can be formulated in three ways. First, the original 
formulation is 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛼 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                         (M-20a) 
In terms of deviations from the group means, 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦?̅? = (𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥?̅?)′𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀?̅?                                                                  (M-20b) 
while in terms of the group means,  
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 𝑦?̅? = 𝑥?̅?
′𝛽 + 𝑎 + 𝜀?̅?                                                                                            (M-20c) 
All three are classical regression models, and in principle, all three could be estimated, 
at least consistently if not efficiently, by ordinary least squares. [ Note that (M-20c) 
involves only n observations, the group means.] Consider then the matrices of sums of 
squares and cross products that would be used in each case, where the  focus goes only 
on estimation of β (Greene, 2002, p. 289) . In (M-20a), the moments would accumulate 
variation about the overall means, ?̿? and ?̿? and the total sums of squares and cross 
products can be used, 
𝑺𝒙𝒙
𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 = ∑𝒏𝒊=𝟏 ∑ (𝒙𝒊𝒕
𝑻
𝒕=𝟏 − ?̿? )(𝒙𝒊𝒕 − ?̿? )′ and 
𝑺𝒙𝒚
𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 = ∑
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
∑(𝒙𝒊𝒕
𝑻
𝒕=𝟏
− ?̿? )(𝒚𝒊𝒕 − ?̿? )′ 
For (M-20b), since the data are in deviations already, the means of 
(𝒚𝒊𝒕 − ?̅?𝒊 ) and (𝒙𝒊𝒕 − ?̅?𝒊 ) are zero. The moment matrices are within-groups (i.e., 
variation around group means sums of squares and cross products) (Greene, 2002, p. 
289). 
𝑺𝒙𝒙
𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏 = ∑𝒏𝒊=𝟏 ∑ (𝒙𝒊𝒕
𝑻
𝒕=𝟏 − 𝒙?̅? )(𝒙𝒊𝒕 − 𝒙?̅? )′ and 
𝑺𝒙𝒚
𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏 = ∑
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
∑(𝒙𝒊𝒕
𝑻
𝒕=𝟏
− 𝒙?̅? )(𝒚𝒊𝒕 − 𝒚?̅?)′ 
Finally, for (M-10c), the mean of group means is the overall mean. The moment 
matrices are the between-groups sums of squares and cross products-that is, the 
variation of the group means around the overall means (Greene, 2002, p. 289; 
Wooldridge, 2009, p.496). 
Sxx
between = ∑ (xit
T
t=1 − x̿ )(xit − x̿ )′ and 
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Sxy
total = ∑
n
i=1
∑(xit
T
t=1
− x̿ )(yit − y̿ )′ 
It is easy to verify that, 
𝑆𝑥𝑥
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝑆𝑥𝑥
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 + 𝑆𝑥𝑥
𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛and  𝑆𝑥𝑦
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝑆𝑥𝑦
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 + 𝑆𝑥𝑦
𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 
Therefore, there are three possible least squares estimators of β corresponding to the 
decomposition. The least squares estimator is, 
𝑏𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = [𝑆𝑥𝑥
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙]−1 𝑆𝑥𝑦
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  = [𝑆𝑥𝑥
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 + 𝑆𝑥𝑥
𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛]
−1
 [𝑆𝑥𝑦
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 + 𝑆𝑥𝑦
𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛]          (M-
21) 
The within-groups estimator is, 
𝑏𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 = [𝑆𝑥𝑥
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛]
−1
 𝑆𝑥𝑦
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛                                                                               (M-22) 
This is the LSDV estimator computed earlier. [See (M-15).] An alternative estimator 
would be the between-groups estimator, 
𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 = [𝑆𝑥𝑥
𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛]−1 𝑆𝑥𝑦
𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛                                                                       (M-23) 
(sometimes called the group means estimator).This least squares estimator of (M-20c) 
is based on the n sets of groups means. (Note that it is assuming that n is at least as large 
as K) (Greene, 2002, p. 289; Wooldridge, 2009, p.496). From the preceding expressions 
(and familiar previous results), 
𝑆𝑥𝑦
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 = 𝑆𝑥𝑥
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 𝑏𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛and  𝑆𝑥𝑦
𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 = 𝑆𝑥𝑥
𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 
Inserting these in (M-21), it is observed that the least squares estimator is a matrix 
weighted average of the within- and between-groups estimators, 
𝑏𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝐹𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 𝑏𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 + 𝐹𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛                                                     (M-24) 
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Where, 
𝐹𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 =  [𝑆𝑥𝑥
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 + 𝑆𝑥𝑥
𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛]
−1
 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 = 𝐼 − 𝐹𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 
The form of this result resembles the Bayesian estimator  and  it can be shown that, 
𝐹𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 = {[𝐴𝑠𝑦. 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑏𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛)]
−1
+ [𝐴𝑠𝑦. 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛)]−1}−1 [𝐴𝑠𝑦. 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑏𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛)]
−1
 
which is essentially the same mixing result with that of the Bayesian estimator. In the 
weighted average, the estimator with the smaller variance receives the greater weight 
(Greene, 2002, p. 289; Wooldridge, 2009, p.496). 
4.2.3.3. Fixed time and group effects 
 The least squares dummy variable approach can be extended to include a time-specific 
effect as well. One way to formulate the extended model is simply to add the time effect, 
as in, 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                    (M-25) 
This model is obtained from the preceding one by the inclusion of an additional T − 1 
dummy variables. (One of the time effects must be dropped to avoid perfect collinearity 
-the group effects and time effects both sum to one.) If the number of variables is too 
large to handle by ordinary regression, then this model can also be estimated by using 
the partitioned regression11. There is an asymmetry in this formulation, however, since 
                                                 
 
11 The matrix algebra and the theoretical development of two-way effects in panel data models are 
complex. See, for example, Baltagi (2005). Fortunately, the practical application is much simpler. The 
number of periods analyzed in most panel data sets is rarely more than a handful. Since modern computer 
programs, even those written strictly for microcomputers, uniformly allow dozens (or even hundreds) of 
regressors, almost any application involving a second fixed effect can be handled just by literally 
including the second effect as a set of actual dummy variables. 
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each of the group effects is a group-specific intercept, whereas the time effects are 
contrasts-that is, comparisons to a base period (the one that is excluded) (Greene, 2002, 
p. 290; Baltagi, 2005, p.175). A symmetric form of the model is, 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜇 + 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                          (M-25’) 
where a full n and T effects are included, but the restrictions ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝛾𝑡𝑡 = 0 
are imposed. Least squares estimates of the slopes in this model are obtained by 
regression of 𝑦∗𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 − ?̅?𝑡 + ?̿? on 𝑥∗𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 − ?̅?𝑡 + ?̿? 
where the period-specific and overall means are, 
?̅?𝑡 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1  𝑎𝑛𝑑  ?̿? =
1
𝑛𝑇
∑𝑛𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡 ,
𝑇
𝑡=1  and likewise for and ?̅?𝒕 and ?̿?. The 
overall constant and the dummy variable coefficients can then be recovered from the 
normal equations as ?̂? = 𝑚 = ?̿? − 𝑥′̿𝑏, 
?̂?𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 = (?̅?𝑖 − ?̿?) − (?̅?𝑖 − 𝑥 ̿)′𝑏,                                                                       (M-27) 
𝛾𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 = (?̅?𝑡 − ?̿?) − (?̅?𝑡 − 𝑥 ̿)
′𝑏. 
The estimated asymptotic covariance matrix for b is computed using the sums of 
squares and cross products of 𝒙∗𝒊𝒕 computed in (M-26) and 
𝒔𝟐 =
𝛴𝑖=1
𝑛 𝛴𝑡=1
𝑇 (𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝑏 − 𝑚 − 𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐𝑡)
2
𝑛𝑇 − (𝑛 − 1) − (𝑇 − 1) − 𝐾 − 1
  
If one of n or T is small and the other is large, then it may be simpler just to treat the 
smaller set as an ordinary set of variables and apply the previous results to the one way 
fixed effects model defined by the larger set. Although more general, this model is 
infrequently used in practice. There are two reasons. First, the cost in terms of degrees 
of freedom is often not justified. Second, in those instances in which a model of the 
time wise evolution of the disturbance is desired, a more general model than this simple 
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dummy variable formulation is usually used (Greene, 2002, p. 292; Baltagi, 1995, 
p.175). 
4.2.4 Durbin, Wu, Hausman test 
The Durbin, Wu, Hausman test or Hausman specification test is a statistical hypothesis 
test which is used in econometrics (James, 1954; Wu, 1953; Hausman, 1978; Nakamura 
and Nakamura, 1981). This test is used to measure the consistency of an estimator 
(which is already the consistent) when compared to an alternative less efficient 
estimator, (Greene, 2012, pp.234-237). The application of this test helps one evaluate 
if a statistical model corresponds to the data. 
In panel data analysis, the Hausman test can be applied to differentiate between fixed 
effects model and random effects. When b1 (fixed effects estimator) is consistent 
efficient, then H0 is true. On the other hand, when b0 (random effects estimator) is 
consistent efficient, then H1 is true. In this situation, fixed effects is preferred under the 
null hypothesis due to higher efficiency, while under the alternative random effects is 
at least as consistent and thus preferred (Greene, 2012, pp. 379-380,420). 
4.2.4.1 Method 
It is taken the linear regression model y =bX + e 
Consider the linear model y =bX + e, where y is the dependent variable and X is vector 
of independent variables, b is a vector of coefficients of independent variables and e is 
the error term. The b estimator takes two values, b0 and b1. Examining the null 
hypothesis, both of these estimators are consistent, but b1 is efficient and has the 
smallest asymptotic variance, at least in the class of estimators containing b0, which is 
not consistent. Under the alternative hypothesis, b0 is consistent, whereas b1 isn’t 
(Greene, 2012, pp. 379-380). 
Then the Wu, Hausman statistic is 
H = ( b1 − b0)
′(Var(b0) − Var(b1))
†
( b1 − b0),                                   
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Where † denotes the Moore–Penrose pseudoinverse12. Considering the null hypothesis, 
this statistic has asymptotically the chi-squared distribution with the number of degrees 
of freedom equal to the rank of matrix Var(b0) − Var(b1) (Greene, 2012, pp. 379-380). 
If the null hypothesis is rejected, this means that b1 estimator is inconsistent. The 
Hausman specification test is used to check for the endogeneity of a variable (by 
comparing instrumental variable estimates to OLS estimates). Moreover, this test 
checks the validity of extra instruments by comparing the estimate of instrumental 
variable using a full set of instruments Z to the estimate of instrumental variable that 
use a proper subset of Z. Note that in order for the test to work in the latter case, the 
validity of the subset of Z should be checked, and should consist of enough instruments 
in order to identify the parameters of the equation. Furthermore, The Hausman test 
proved that the covariance between an efficient estimator and the difference of an 
efficient and inefficient estimator is zero (Greene, 2012, pp. 379-380). The estimation 
of the Hausman test develops below. 
√N(q − 0)
d
→  N(0, [1 −1] [
Var(b1) Cov(b1, b0)
Cov(b1, b0) Var(b0)
] 
Consider the function: q = b0 − b1 ⇒ plim q = 0 
√N(q − 0)
d
→  N(0, [1 −1] [
Var(b1) Cov(b1, b0)
Cov(b1, b0) Var(b0)
] [
1
−1
] 
Var(q) = Varb1 + Varb0 − 2Cov(b1, b0) 
                                                 
 
12 In mathematics, and in particular linear algebra, a pseudoinverse A+ of a matrix A is a generalization 
of the inverse matrix (Ben-Israel and Thomas, 2003). The most widely known type of matrix 
pseudoinverse is the Moore-Penrose inverse (Ben-Israel and Thomas, 2003; Campbell and Mayer, 1991; 
Nakamura, 1991; Rao and Mitra,1971), which was independently described by Moore in 1920 (Moore, 
1920), Bjerhammar in 1951 (Bjerhammar, 1951), and Penrose in 1955 (Penrose, 1955). When referring 
to a matrix, the term pseudoinverse, without further specification, is often used to indicate the Moore–
Penrose inverse. The term generalized inverse is sometimes used as a synonym for pseudoinverse. 
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Based on the commonly used result, proved by Hausman, the covariance of an efficient 
estimator with its difference from an inefficient estimator is zero yields,  
Var(q) = Varb0 − Varb1 
The chi-squared test is based on the Wald criterion 
H = χ2 [Κ − 1] = ( b1 − b0)
′(Var(b0) − Var(b1))
†
( b1 − b0),                                   
Where † denotes the Moore–Penrose pseudoinverse 
4.3. Heckman correction 
4.3.1. Introduction  
The Heckman correction (the two-stage method, Heckman's lambda or the Heckit 
method) is any of a number of related statistical methods developed by James Heckman 
at the University of Chicago in 1976 to 1979, which allows the researcher to correct for 
selection bias. Selection bias problems are endemic to applied econometric problems, 
which makes Heckman’s original technique and subsequent refinements by both 
himself and others, indispensable to applied econometricians (Baltagi, 2005, p. 213) 
4.3.2. Method 
Statistical analyses based on non-randomly selected samples can lead to erroneous 
conclusions and poor policy. The Heckman correction, a two-step statistical approach, 
offers a means of correcting for non-randomly selected samples. Heckman discussed 
bias from using nonrandom selected samples to estimate behavioral relationships as a 
specification error. He suggests a two-stage estimation method to correct the bias. The 
correction uses a control function idea and is easy to implement. Heckman’s correction 
involves a normality assumption, provides a test for sample selection bias and formula 
for bias corrected model .Suppose that a researcher wants to estimate the determinants 
of wage offers, but has access to wage observations for only those who work. Since 
people who work are selected non-randomly from the population, estimating the 
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determinants of wages from the subpopulation who work may introduce bias 
(Heckman, 1979; Lee, 2001, p.403; Baltagi, 2005, pp. 216-217,p.220,p.225).  
The Heckman correction takes place in two stages. In the first stage, the researcher 
formulates a model, based on economic theory, for the probability of working. The 
canonical specification for this relationship is a probit regression of the form, 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐷 =
1
𝑍
) = 𝛷(𝛧𝛾) where D indicates employment (D = 1 if the respondent is 
employed and D = 0 otherwise), Z is a vector of explanatory variables, γ is a vector of 
unknown parameters, and Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard 
normal distribution. Estimation of the model yields results that can be used to predict 
this employment probability for each individual. In the second stage, the researcher 
corrects for self-selection by incorporating a transformation of these predicted 
individual probabilities as an additional explanatory variable. The wage equation may 
be specified as 𝜔∗ = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝑢 where 𝝎∗denotes an underlying wage offer, which is not 
observed if the respondent does not work. The conditional expectation of wages given 
the person works is then  
𝐸[𝜔 ∖ 𝛸,𝐷 = 1] = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝐸[𝑢 ∖ 𝛸, 𝐷 = 1] 
Under the assumption that the error terms are jointly normal, the equation becomes  
𝐸[𝜔 ∖ 𝛸,𝐷 = 1] = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜌𝜎𝑢𝜆(𝛧𝛾), 
Where ρ is the correlation between unobserved determinants of propensity to work ε 
and unobserved determinants of wage offers u, 𝜎𝑢 is the standard deviation of u, and λ 
is the inverse Mills ratio evaluated at 𝛧𝛾. This equation demonstrates Heckman's insight 
that sample selection can be viewed as a form of omitted-variables bias, as conditional 
on both X and on λ it is as if the sample is randomly selected. The wage equation can 
be estimated by replacing γ with Probit estimates from the first stage, constructing the 
λ term, and including it as an additional explanatory variable in linear regression 
estimation of the wage equation. Since 𝜎𝑢>0, the coefficient on λ can only be zero if 
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ρ=0, so testing the null that the coefficient on λ is zero is equivalent to testing for sample 
selectivity. Heckman's achievements have generated a large number of empirical 
applications in economics, as well as in other social sciences. The original method has 
subsequently been generalized, by Heckman and by others (Heckman, 1979; Lee, 2001, 
p403; Baltagi, 2005, pp. 216-217,p.220,p.225). 
4.3.3  Inverse Mills ratio 
Inverse Mills ratio is used when in regression analysis there is a possible selection bias 
problem. This problem can be called as “non-selection hazard”. When the dependent 
variable is censored (for example there is not a positive result for all observations), it 
gathers many observations at zero values. Tobin (1958) was the first who observed this 
problem and showed that when the estimation procedure is not considered, then an 
ordinary least squares estimation will generate biased parameter estimates. Moreover, 
when the dependent variables are censored, it is rejected the null hypothesis of the 
Gauss–Markov assumption that there is no correlation between independent variables 
and the error term (Takeshi, 1985, pp.366-368). As used in this thesis, James Heckman 
implemented a two-stage estimation procedure using the inverse Mills ratio to test for 
the selection bias (Heckman, 1979, pp. 153-161; Takeshi, 1985, pp.368-373). In the 
first stage, the inverse Mills ratios are generated from the estimation of probit model. 
Logit cannot be used. The probit model assumes that the error term follows a standard 
normal distribution. (Heckman, 1979, pp. 153-161). Finally, the new inverse Mills ratio 
variable generated from the estimated parameters of first stage, is then used as an extra 
explanatory variable in the OLS estimation (Heckman, 1979, pp. 475-492). The 
computing of inverse Mills ratio follows (Grimmett and Stirzaker, 2001; Mills, 1926; 
Klein and Moeschberger, 2003; Small, 2010). 
The inverse Mills ratio (IMILLS) is the function 
IMILLS(x) = 
𝐺(𝑥)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
ℎ(𝑥)
,  
where h(x) is the probability density function and  
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𝐺(𝑥)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  = Pr[X > x] = ∫ ℎ(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
∞
𝑥
 
is the complementary cumulative distribution function. The Mills ratio is related to 
the hazard rate f(x), which is defined as 
f(x) = lim
𝑑→0
1
𝛿
 Pr[x<X≤x+δ|X>x]  
Thus, the inverse Mills ratio is as follows: 
IMILLS(x) = 
1
𝑓(𝑥)
   
4.4. Jones model methodology 
4.4.1 Introduction  
Researchers have made many attempts to create an accounting and financial model in 
order to detect earnings management. This trial started in 1945 and continues until 
today. Nowadays, most of studies in the area of earnings management focus on recent 
models. Most of the criticisms of prior research work are based on model 
misspecifications. This part examined a review in previous studies and those attempted 
at modeling earnings management behavior (Kighir et al, 2014). In the next chapter 
some paradigms on earnings management detection modeling are presented - graphical 
modeling of specific accruals (Gordon, 1964; Alchibald, 1967).  
Mathematical modeling of specific accruals (Copeland, 1968; Biedleman, 1973),  Total 
Discretionary Accruals modeling with time series data (Healy, 1985; Jones 1991; 
Dechow, et al., 1995), Total Discretionary Accruals modeling with cross sectional data 
(DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Peasnell et al., 2000), use of manipulation scores 
modeling (Beneish, 1997,1999), Distribution of reported earnings and accruals 
modeling (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge, et al., 1999), Real Activity 
Management (Roychowdhury, 2006; Eldenburg, et al 2011), use of Neural networks 
(Hoglund, 2012).  
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4.4.2. Model creation 
In 1953, Hepworth tried to test earnings management behavior, working on ‘smoothing 
periodic income’. He modeled some of the accounting techniques related to earning 
smoothness and to accruals, where changes could be applied to the accounting result in 
successive accounting periods. However, no attempt was made at detecting income 
smoothing (Hepworth, 1953; Kighir et al., 2014).  
4.4.3 Graphs and time series   
The first hypothesis where ‘managers select accounting measurement and reporting 
rules which smooth reported income’ tested by Gordon in 1964. This hypothesis pulled 
the trigger and generated reactions and researches in the field of accounting income 
smoothing. Gordon suggested an operational test of smoothing and made a graphical 
presentation, where for each firm fit a curve to a stream of income calculated two ways, 
(a) excluding the manipulative variable, and (b) including it. "If the variations of the 
observations around the curve are smaller in the latter case, income smoothing has been 
the consequence of transactions in the account" (Gordon, 1964). 
Two years later, Dopuch and Drake made a survey of a sample of twelve firms, in which 
investments in non subsidiary companies occurred over the period 1955 to 1964. They 
made graphs illustrating the total income and income from non subsidiary investment 
activities. Finally they concluded that in their sample there was no serious of income 
smoothing for any firms (Dopuch and Drake, 1966).  
During the same period, Archibald collected a sample of 55 firms and investigated how 
and why these firms changed their depreciation method from accelerated to straight-
line. He concluded that this was made for financial and tax reporting purposes. He used 
tables and graphical illustrations and discovered a median improvement of about 10.18 
percent in net earnings. He noticed that 22 of the 55 switch-back firms had lower profits 
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in the year of the change, but offered no conclusion on whether it was meant for 
smoothing. (Archibald, 1967; Kighir et al., 2014),  
4.4.4. Accruals using mathematical model 
In 1966 the first attempt to apply a mathematical model to test income smoothing was 
made by Gordon, Horwitz, and Meyer GHM. The variable that enhanced the earning 
smoothness was investment credit and tested Gordon's hypothesis. In their hypothesis 
they considered whether their accounting measurement tended to adjust the firm's 
percentage change in earnings per share to the average percentage change in the 
industry or to smooth the firm's earnings per share toward a normal value, or to smooth 
the firm's rate of return on stockholder's equity. For first time the double exponential 
smoothing to measure the first two criteria above creating more error was used. This 
was opposite to their estimations, leaving open to question the validity of their evidence 
(Gordon, Horwitz, and Meyer GHM, 1966; Kighir et al., 2014 ). 
Copeland and Licastro used a sample of firms with unconsolidated subsidiaries (169 
sets of data) and tested the hypothesis whether these firms when reported at cost, did 
not attempt to smooth income by varying their dividend payment. A chi-square 
contingency test was applied, using one smoother variable. They concluded that 
dividend income technique was not used to smooth income (Copeland and Licastro, 
1968; Kighir et al., 2014). 
Copeland attempted to empirically test the existence of income smoothing, using more 
than one smoother variable. He examined the income smoothing in financial statements 
ex post facto. He defined complete smoothed income for any period as an amount equal 
to reported net income for the preceding period with the added stipulation that three or 
more consecutive years were considered. Using a Chi square test, he found no evidence 
of income smoothing. The reason that results were tentative was related to the limited 
size of the sample, and length of the time series. (Copeland, 1968; Kighir et al., 2014). 
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White made alternative tests that used values from a 10-year time trend as a measure of 
normal earnings. He included more accounting variables using regression for the first 
time as a method for detecting smoother firms. He created two different samples, one 
with random observations and one with smoother observations. In smoother samples 
he applied linear and logarithmic least-squares methods, line to the EPS time series, for 
each firm in the two industry groups. He concluded that firms with smoother earnings 
did not manipulate their accounting figures (White, 1970; Kighir et al., 2014) 
Barefield and Comiskey in ten years time series data tested the variability and average 
absolute growth increments for firms that had an opportunity to use remitted earnings 
of unconsolidated subsidiaries to help smooth earnings. They reported that the result of 
the study, with regard to smoothing, was only modest and inconclusive (Barefield and 
Comiskey, 1972). Dascher and Malcom, tested the smoothing hypothesis for a sample 
of chemical firms for two periods. One period had a duration of 6 years and the other 
11 years. They examined the reduction in variability about a semi logarithmic trend 
attributable to discretionary smoothing variables. Their results support the notion that 
uses time series data and all available smoothing devices. (Dascher and Malcom, 1972; 
Kighir et al., 2014) 
Beidleman (1973) tested the existence of smoothing in US firms. He empirically 
surveyed conventional techniques for disaggregating time-series data that may be used 
to separate the time trend of normal earnings from the random and cyclical factors 
which are the objects of the smoothing process. 
 That firms whose normal earnings (Et) are expected to change by a constant amount 
(g) each year can be described by equation (M-28).  
Et = (Eo + gat)                                                                                                        (M-28) 
The normal level of earnings for firms which maintain a geometric progression or 
constant rate of growth (gr) is described by equation (M-29). 
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Et = (Eo + gr)
t                                                                                                        (M-29) 
The difference between observed earnings and normal earnings as defined represents 
random and/or cyclical factors and can be used to test for evidence of smoothing by 
management. He used least-squares linear time trend regression for firms that were 
expected to grow at a constant rate using a sample of firms which reported at least three 
discretionary items out of six, for ten years or more.  
Eit = aei + beit + μeit                                                                                                (M-30)  
A similar linear model was used for discretionary smoothing variables (Dit) 
 Dit = adi + bdit + μdit                                                                                             (M-31) 
Semi logarithmic time trend regression was used for firms that were expected to grow 
at a constant growth rate to test for smoothing using similar models. The test of the 
hypothesis is based on the correlation between the residuals from equations (M-30) and 
(M-31). Correlation coefficients and tests of the significance of the relationship between 
the time-series residuals are obtained by regressing the residuals.  
μdit = asi + bsiμeit + μsit                                                                                                                                        (M-32)  
T tests on bsi provide a measure of the statistical significance of the relationship. The 
test results strongly suggest that firms employ certain devices over which they have 
discretion to normalize reported earnings (Kighir et al., 2014).  
4.4.5. Total discretionary accruals using time series data 
4.4.5.1. Healy model 
Healy (1985) conducted a more holistic research using total accruals (scaled by lagged 
total assets) as proxy for discretionary accruals (DA). 
TAt = DAt                                                                                                                                                                      (M-33)  
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Where TAt = Total Accruals in year t.  and DAt is Discretionary Accruals in year t.  
The model implicitly assumed that there are no non-discretionary accruals in the 
estimation period. He concluded that managers applied accrual policies because they 
had personal incentives relevant to their bonus contracts. So, there are many times when 
managers relate their personal interests to the firms earnings management procedure 
(Healy, 1985). Healy was criticized by Kaplan for his stand on discretionary accrual 
and receivables effect on earnings instead of cash flow, his inability to present an 
expectation model for normal accruals and to clearly separate total accrual into non 
discretionary and discretionary implicitly assumed that in the absence of earnings 
maximization behavior of managers total accruals will be zero. Kaplan also noted that 
changes in several working capital accounts and thereby accruals depend upon the 
economic circumstances of the firm, which should ordinarily affect non discretionary 
accruals (Kaplan, 1985).  
4.4.5.2. DeAngelo model 
DeAngelo improved further on Healy’s model by using prior period accrual (t-k) as a 
measure of ‘normal’ total accruals (NAt-1) (scaled by lagged total assets) as proxy for 
non discretionary accruals in year t. According to the researcher, ‘abnormal’ total 
accrual (DAt) is the difference between ‘current’ total accruals (ACt) and prior period 
normal total accruals (NAt-1), but failed to empirically partition normal total accruals 
into discretionary and non discretionary portions (DeAngelo, 1986).  
DAt = ACt - NAt-1                                                                                                 (M-34) 
ACt is current total accruals calculated as current net income minus operating cash 
flows.  
This model assumes that there are no non-discretionary accruals in year t and uses prior 
period non discretionary accruals as proxy for current year non discretionary accruals. 
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McNichols and Wilson improved on DeAngelo’s model by capturing the discretionary 
accruals as a measure of earnings management instead of the total accrual used by 
(Healy, 1985) and (DeAngelo, 1986), however they used specific component of 
discretionary accruals (McNichols and Wilson, 1988).  
4.4.5.3. Jones Model 
Jones investigated earnings management during import relief investigations by the US 
government using two stage models. The researcher used a firm-specific expectation 
model and a minimum of fourteen year time series data as estimation period.  
The research measured ‘normal’ total accruals (Non Discretionary Accruals) in 
estimation period from financial statement data and used it to compute firm specific 
parameters (coefficients) and the same model during the event period (prediction 
period) to measure expected Non Discretionary Accruals (NDAt) using coefficients 
obtained in the estimation period. The Discretionary Accrual (DAt) which is the residue 
or prediction error, is calculated by subtracting expected Non Discretionary Accruals 
(NDAt) from current or actual total accruals (TAt) computed from financial statement 
data (Jones, 1991). 
4.4.5.4. Estimation Period Model 
NDAτ/ T τ-1 = αoi (1/Tτ-1) + α1i (ΔREVτ/ Tτ-1) + α2i(PPEτ/ Tτ-1)                             (M-35)  
Where  
Tτ-1 = Lagged total assets in estimation period (τ-1),  
ΔREVτ = Revenues in years τ less revenue in year τ-1 scaled by total assets in year τ-
1,  
PPE = gross Property Plant and Equipment in year τ scaled by total assets in year τ-1,  
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α0i, α1i and α2i are firm specific parameters or coefficients τ = 1, 2, 3, …..T years index 
for estimation period and i = 1, 2, 3 ….N firm index. 
 4.4.5.5.Event Period Model 
 NDAt/ T t-1 = β0i(1/T t-1) + β1i (ΔREVt/ Tt-1 ) + β2i (PPEt /Tt-1) + εt                       (M-36)  
Where  
NDAt = expected non discretionary accruals in event year,  
Tt-1 = Lagged total assets in event year (t-1),  
ΔREVt = Revenues in years t less revenue in year t-1 scaled by total assets in year t-1, 
PPE = gross Property Plant and Equipment in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1,  
β0i, β1i and β2i are firm specific parameters or coefficients from α0i, α1i and α2i computed 
during estimation period t = 1, 2, 3, …..T years index for event period and i = 1, 2, 
3…..N firm index.  
DAt = TAt – NDAt                                                                                                  (M-37) 
or 
 εt = DAt = {TAt/ T t-1} - {(αoi (1/Tt-1) + α1i (ΔREVt/ Tt-1) + α2i(PPEt/ Tt-1)}         (M-38)  
Where , 
TAt = Actual total accruals from financial statement data = {Δ Current assets – Δ cash 
– Δ current liabilities – Δ Current maturities of long term debt – Δ Income taxes payable 
- Depreciation and amortization expenses}.  
Accruals (DA) derived from firm-specific expectations model is used to measure 
earnings management rather than discretionary component of a single accrual account 
used by (McNichols and Wilson, 1988). 
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According to Jones (1999) total accruals should capture a larger portion of managers' 
manipulations than a single accrual account. The expectation model, according to the 
researcher, should also control for economic conditions on the level of accruals. In this 
case change in revenues is used to control for the economic environment of the firm 
because they are an objective measure of the firms operations before managers’ 
manipulations. The model also included gross Property, Plant and Equipment as control 
for the portion of total accruals related to nondiscretionary depreciation expenses in the 
event period.  
 4.4.5.6. Modified Jones Model 
Dechow et al. (1995), took the profession unaware when the third female led a group 
of researchers in the accrual modeling algebra to propose a modification to (Jones, 
1991) model. According to them the modification is to eliminate an error in the 
measurement of discretionary accruals from the standard Jones model. The Jones model 
implicitly assumed that discretion is not exercised over revenue in either the estimation 
period or the event period. The reasoning of the modified model is that all changes in 
credit sales in the event period result from earnings management. The researchers 
corrected the error by incorporating the changes in credit sales (ΔREC) to the standard 
Jones model in the event period. Event model  
NDAt = β0i(1/T t-1) + β1i (ΔREVt - ΔRECt) + β2i (PPEt) + εt                                 (M-39)  
Event period   NDAt , ΔREVt , ΔRECt , PPEt all scaled by lagged total assets in event 
period (Tt-1)  
and β0i, β1i and β2i are from α0i, α1i, α2i respectively computed during estimation period. 
 DAt = TAt – NDAt                                                                                                                                         (M-40)  
or 
 εt = DAt = {TAt} - {(αoi (1/Tt-1) + α1i (ΔREVt - ΔRECt )+ α2i(PPEt)}                  (M-41) 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
07/06/2020 14:11:01 EEST - 137.108.70.13
131 
 
Where  
DA= Discretionary accruals in year t TAt = Actual total accruals from financial 
statement data = {Δ Current assets – Δ cash – Δ current liabilities – Δ Current 
maturities of long term debt – Δ Income taxes payable - Depreciation and amortization 
expenses}. 
 Estimation model remains the same.  
NDAτ = α0i(1/Tτ-1) + α1i(ΔREVτ) + α2i(PPEτ) Estimation period                         (M-42)  
NDAτ , ΔREVτ , PPEτ all scaled by lagged total assets in event period (Tτ-1)  
Their research also evaluated alternative accrual based models for detecting earnings 
management and concluded that in terms of specification all the models appear well 
specified but the modified Jones model exhibits the most power in detecting earnings 
management.  
The standard Jones model and modified Jones model was criticized by Guay et al., 
(1996) using a market based procedure and concluded that neither procedure generates 
a reliable measure of accrual management, but could not suggest an alternative. 
(Beneish, 1997) and (Young, 1999) queried the inclusion of depreciation charge in the 
measure of total accruals and opined that this can induce substantial measurement error 
in the resulting estimate of managed accruals. 
4.5. Presentation of an integrated report 
4.5.1. The purpose of an integrated report 
The primary purpose of an integrated report is to improve the quality of information 
available to providers of financial capital. This is achieved by communicating broader 
and more relevant information that can assist in effective capital allocation decisions. 
It is recognized that investors consist only a part of this system. However, much of the 
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current research into IR and other relevant material data is focused on investors (IIRC, 
2015). 
4.5.2. Producing an integrated report  
In order to developed an integrated report, it usually needs the existence of management 
and staff. Also, a large number of reporting frameworks is required. Figure 3 depicts 
the interaction of these frameworks, which includes company law, accounting 
standards, requirements for narrative reports contained in company law or guidance 
documents such as the IASB Management Commentary Guidance Statement (IIRC and 
IFRS, 2013), the GRI Framework (GRI, 2013), the International Integrated Reporting 
Framework (IIRC, 2013b) and the AA 1000 Account Ability Principles Standard (IIRC 
and SASB, 2013). The frameworks most commonly used to compose an integrated 
report are the International Integrated Reporting Framework and the GRI Framework. 
(ACCA, 2012; IIRC, 2015).  
 
Figure 3. Frameworks influencing evolution of IR(ACCA, 2016,p.25). 
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The platforms of sustainability reporting are composed of reports and portions of 
websites, which are dedicated to sustainability topics. IR tries to offer the proper 
prospects of all firms regarding environmental, social and ethical challenges. Firms are 
consistently at least three times more likely to discuss business opportunities born from 
addressing sustainability challenges in IR mechanisms than in 10‐K filings and at 
minimum twice as likely as in annual reports (GRI, 2013; PWC, 2014). 
Integrated reports are produced by revising the content of another report, such as the 
annual report and constantly evolving it. Other integrated reports are produced by 
combining an annual report and a sustainability report. There are many firms which 
create statutory documents to meet regulatory requirements in their home country and 
in relation to their stock exchange listings (eg in the US) (ACCA, 2012). 
 
Figure 4. Internal and external participants in IR (ACCA, 2016, p.25). 
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Figure 4 depicts the parties who participate in the creation of a report. Within any firm, 
managers and staff from many sections or divisions are likely to be involved in the 
preparation of corporate reports, including an integrated report. Often, the members are 
derived from several areas related to finance, treasury, investor relations, and 
sustainability. These members can be the board of directors, board committees (such as 
the audit committee) and senior executives. Moreover, there are other external members 
who may influence the content of the integrated report, auditors and legal advisers, 
regulatory agencies and government bodies. Other external stakeholders include 
shareholders, investors, customers and employees (ACCA, 2012; IIRC and SASB, 
2013). 
4.5.3 Checklist creation 
The checklist presented in Table 1 assigns weightings to the respective chapters of King 
III and the criteria for awarding grades selected. Each firm was evaluated 
independently. This thesis emphasizes both overall compliance and disclosure quality 
in nine (9) areas. These include: (i) ethical leadership and corporate citizenship, (ii) 
boards and directors, (iii) audit committees, (iv) governance of risk, (v) governance of 
information technology, (vi) compliance with laws, codes, rules and standards, (vii) 
internal audit, (viii) governing shareholder relationships, (ix) IR and disclosure.  
In table 1 the basic checklist information is illustrated analytically. The IR is expected 
to be focused on substance over form and should disclose information that is Complete, 
Timely, Relevant, Accurate, Honest, Accessible and Comparable, with the past 
performance of the company, and should also contain forward-looking information. 
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Table 1. Checklist composition 
 
Chapter Title  Summary 
i. 
Ethical leadership & 
corporate citizenship 
 
This chapter focuses on the corporate governance information. There 
are three questions that analyze the ethical leadership policy and firms' 
management.  
ii. 
Boards & directors 
 
 
This chapter provides information relevant to boards and directors.  
Specifically, it is given information about strategy, risk, performance 
and who  the chairman is. Six questions are answered in this chapter.  
iii. Audit committees  
This chapter collects information about audit committees. It checks if 
the Board has ensured that the Company has an effective and 
independent audit committee. Six questions are answered in this 
chapter. 
iv. The governance of risk  
This chapter checks the governance of risk. The board should take the 
necessary steps to ensure that there are processes in place to ensure 
complete, timely, relevant accurate information/responses. Three 
questions are answered in this chapter.  
v. 
Governance of 
information technology 
 
 
The board should take the necessary steps to ensure that there are 
processes in place to access IT reporting by the board in the integrated 
report. One question is answered in this chapter. 
vi. 
Compliance with laws, 
codes, rules and 
standards 
 
The board should disclose in the integrated report the applicable non 
binding rules, codes and standards to which the company adheres to on 
a voluntary basis. One question is answered in this chapter. 
vii. Internal audit  
If the board in its discretion decides not to establish an internal audit 
function, full reasons should be disclosed in the company’s integrated 
report, with an explanation of how adequate assurance of an effective 
governance, risk management and internal control environment has 
been maintained.  One question is answered in this chapter. 
viii. 
Governing shareholder 
relationship 
 
The board should disclose in its integrated report the nature of its 
dealings with its stakeholders and the outcomes of these dealings. One 
question is answered in this chapter.  
ix. IR and Disclosure  
This chapter checks the financial and the sustainability disclosure. Nine 
questions are answered in this chapter. 
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4.5.4. Categories of checklist   
In table 2 a checklist is created to record the quality of accounting information of firms 
which enrich their annual reports with IR information. Firms are ranked in four different 
categories and classified from A to D. Each checklist contains twenty eight 
observations. The first category is named A and contains a range of top firms which 
showed scores from 86 to 100%.    
Table 2. Categories of checklist 
 
Category  Observations  Percentage 
A Best practice: content & communication    25-28  86%- 100% 
B- Best practice: content  21-24  72%- 85% 
C- Compliant in spirit  17-20  58%- 71% 
D- Compliant but  12-16  42%- 57% 
 
4.5.4.1. Category A- Best practice: content and communication   
Firms in category A have best practice content and demonstrate good communication 
according to the principles for IR. For example, a firm with a full and analytic 
description of IR presented in an easy-to-understand report. They provide extra detailed 
information on their websites. It is important to note, in the scoring scale, that a score 
of 86% to 100% is fully compliant with the IR content and communication practices. 
4.5.4.2. Category B- Best practice: content 
Firms scoring 21 to 24 points (72-85%) are ranked in category B. Firms of this group 
go beyond compliance to provide the type of best practice IR outlined in the King III 
report.  For example, some firms list deals and their outcomes between board and 
stakeholders, which are relevant to IR. These deals illustrate non financial results based 
on improvement of the environment, working conditions, working level, and the social 
image of the firm. 
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4.5.4.3. Category C- Compliant in spirit 
Firms scoring 17 to 20 points (58-71%) are ranked in category C. Information is 
included to a good standard that meets with the spirit of the IR requirements. For 
example, firms give some firm-specific explanation for a list of IR implementations 
that is clearly formulated.   
4.5.4.4. Category D- Compliant but 
Firms scoring 12 to 16 points (42-57%) are ranked in the last category, D. The 
information included in the firm’s report complies technically, but falls short of the 
spirit of the IR requirements.  For example, perhaps the firm to mention that it uses IR 
practices, but doesn’t provide any specific information relevant to the IR action of the 
members of boards and directors. Specifically, it provides poor or no information about 
its strategy, risk, performance and who is the chairman is. Moreover, there is no 
information supplied about audit committees. Firms that scored 42%- 57% presented 
very poor reports. 
4.5.5. Construction of IR score DS and DDS   
This section describes the construction of DS, which is a disclosure score index that 
measures the IR quality of the information provided by of IR firms. Because there is no 
theoretical guidance regarding how to weight each measure in constructing an 
aggregated IR score, DS is created by including all nine content elements in the King 
III report and the King III code that are confirmed by the IR Framework, 2013. DS is 
derived from the scale of the total received scores of each firm to the maximum score 
(28 observations based on the King III checklist). A self-constructed measure is selected 
as the main proxy of the IR disclosure score for two reasons. First, it is aligned with the 
Healy and Palepu (2001) study, which suggests that self-constructed scores have higher 
confidence and focus on the specific characteristics of firms. Second, self-constructed 
scores can be constructed for any firm. There is no limitation regarding the size of the 
firm or whether any firm’s financial and non-financial data are provided by external 
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data providers. Therefore, samples based on self-constructed scores exhibit less 
selection. However, there are two limitations in using self-constructed disclosure scores 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001). First, there is considerable researcher judgment involved in 
data collection and checklist creation. Second, these disclosure scores are constructed 
using data from available documents, such as published annual reports and websites 
(Lee and Yeo, 2016). 
Based on the methodology of  Amiraslani et al. (2013), it is expected that firms with 
high IR disclosure quality are firms whose proportional accounting disclosures (related 
to the level of IR compliance) are greater than or equal to the median value of this 
percentage. Therefore, the variable DDS, which is an independent variable for all 
models of the thesis, takes a value of 1, indicating high IR information quality, if a firm 
has gathered an IR disclosure score equal or greater than the median price notifications 
percentage of all sampled firms. If the accounting disclosure score is less than the 
median price, then the DDS for this firm is 0. 
4.6. Design of sample selection and its limitations  
This thesis covers the sample period 2011 to 2015, since IIRC was established on 2 
August 2010. In the same year, in South Africa, a multi-organization Integrated 
Reporting Committee (IRC) was established. Its goal was to develop guidelines on IR 
and a framework for an integrated report for listed companies in its country (IFAC, 
2015). 
This analysis will be structured at two levels. At the first level, an analysis of balance 
sheet and income statement was implemented to obtain numerical information about 
financial instruments. These data were downloaded from Datastream. A sample of 173 
listed firms was collected from the official website of IIRC. However, from the 173 
firms, 34 did not provide adequate data in Datastream, 57 were firms from the financial, 
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insurance and real estate sector and were removed from the sample13. Finally, the 
sample consisted of 82 listed firms from 25 countries. The second level of analysis 
focuses on annual reports. In this levels, a codification of certain quantitative and 
qualitative information into predefined categories and answers was accomplished 
(Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007). Integrated reports of the firms were used in the research 
survey. They provided details for independent board members and the independent 
directors on the nomination committee, non – executive board members on the 
nomination and audit committee, and whether or not the posts of CEO and chairman 
were separated. From Thomson Reuters database, data for Institutional Ownership were 
obtained. Sample selection distribution development is illustrated in table 3 below. 
Table 3. Sample Selection   
Selection Criteria Number of Firms 
Panel A: Selection of firms:  
Total number of firms listed in IR database 173 
Less:  
Firms in financial, insurance and real estate industries (57) 
Firms without data available in Datastream (34) 
Total Sampled Firms 82 
Panel B: Sample firms according to their primary industry classification: 
Manufacturing 21 
Mineral 15 
Transportation and Communication 12 
Retail 18 
Services 16 
Total Sampled Firms 82 
Panel C: Sampled firms across years:   
2011 69 
2012 74 
2013 76 
2014 81 
2015 82 
Total firm-year observation 382 
 
                                                 
 
13 These firms use accounting methods that are not comparable with those of industrial firms (Iatridis, 
2012a). 
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Histograms 5 to 10 depict the improvement of firms over time, which disclose more IR 
information. Parallel to this, in table 4, the IR checklist distribution per year is 
illustrated. Table 4 shows, that firms have a tendency over time to conform better with 
IR requirements. 2013 reveals an increase in IR disclosure quality. Either histograms 5 
to 10 and in table 4, it was observed that in the first two years of IR adoption, firms 
tend to provide basic IR information. In 2011 (2012) only 25 (27) firms scored more 
than 20 observations in checklist scores. Moreover, in 2015, firms seemed to comply 
with the IR notion. 41 firms had checklist scores of more than 20 observations. This 
improvement is also depicted in the linear regression graph in figure 11, where an 
incensement in average disclosure score is observed during that time. In the last year a 
high level of IR compliance occurred, 72.43%. This shows a trend of firms employing 
IR with a higher level of compliance.  
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Figures 5-10: Histograms and linear regression graph 
 Figures 5 to 10 summarize the results of the checklist scores in four distributed categories. Each 
checklist records the level of IR quality accounting information according to King III Report. Firms 
ranked in four different categories as are illustrated in the horizontal axis of each histogram. Each 
checklist contains twenty eight observations. Graph 11 illustratesd the timeless development of the 
average disclosure score in the sample. 
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Table 4. IR Checklist Distribution per year 
IR Questions’ 
Classification on 
the Checklist 
Years 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
[12,16) 20 20 14 13 13 
[16,20) 37 35 32 27 27 
[20,24) 12 14 20 26 26 
[24,28] 13 13 16 16 16 
Total 82 82 82 82 82 
 
In panel B of table 3 the sample distribution is presented, classified by primary industry. 
From the total sample of 82 firms, 21 firms come from the manufacturing industry, 15 
firms from the mineral industry, 12 firms from the transportation and communication 
industry, 18 from the retail industry and 16 firms from the services industry. In figure 
12, this classification is interpreted with averages in a pie chart. It is observed that 
25.61% of IR firms came from the manufacturing industry, 21.95% of IR firms from 
the detail industry, 19.51% of IR firms from the services industry, 18.29% of IR firms 
from the mineral industry and 14.63% of IR firms from the transportation and 
communication industry.  
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Figures 12-13: Firms distribution by industry classification and by firm – year observations 
 
In panel C of Table 3, the sample distribution across five years is presented. From the 
total sample of 382 observations, 69 observations are related to 2011, 74 observations 
to 2012, 76 observations to 2013, 81 observations to 2014 and 82 observations to 2015. 
In figure 13 this classification is illustrated in a histogram. 
4.7. Model Specifications  
4.7.1. Model Specification of IR, disclosure quality and corporate governance 
mechanisms 
To test main hypothesis 1, the model below was created: 
DSi,t = a0 + a1IRi,t+ a2PPEi,t + a3AS_TURN i,t + a4DERi,t +  a5DIVPAYi,t+ a6MBRi,t + a7SIZEi,t-
1 + a8LNMVi,t + a9DEBT_RATIOi,t + a10ROEi,t + a11BIG_4i,t + a12PARi,t + a13PERIDNCi,t + 
a14PERINBBi,t + a15PERNEACi,t + a16PERNENCi,t +  a17DUALITYi,t + a18CGCi,t + a19NCi,t + 
a20INSTi,t + {Industry Effects} +  {Year Effects} + ei,t  (1)                      
Where, 
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Variable Explanation of  Equation (1) 
Variable Description 
DS 
IR Disclosure Score Index. DS is derived from the scale of total received score of each firm to the 
maximum score (equals 28 observations based on KING III checklist).  
IR 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for firms that use the name “Integrated annual Report” on their report, 
or 0 otherwise. 
PPE 
Net properties, plant and equipment divided into total assets at the end of fiscal year t (Clarkson et 
al, 2008). 
AS_TURN 
A measure of asset utilization that captures how efficiently the firm’s assets are used and is estimated 
as the ratio of annual sales to total assets at the end of fiscal year t. 
DER 
The logarithm of discretionary operating expenses, which defined as operating expenses incurred at 
the discretion of firm management, including selling, general and administration expenses14.  
DIVPAY The dividend payout ratio equals cash common dividends to net income at the end of fiscal year t.  
MBR 
Market – to – book ratio in fiscal year t. It is calculated as the market value of equity divided by the 
book value of equity at the end of the year.  
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year t.  
LNMV 
Another proxy of  firm’s size. It is calculated as the natural logarithm of the market capitalization at 
the end of fiscal year t. 
DEBT_RATIO A proxy of  leverage equals total liabilities to total assets at the end of fiscal year t. 
ROE 
Return on equity in fiscal year t and calculated as net income during year t scaled by total equity at 
the begging of the year. 
BIG_4 
A dummy variable. When a firm is audited by a Big 4 accounting firm the dummy variable equal to 
1 and 0 otherwise.  
PAR The logarithm of the number of pages in the firm’s annual report. 
PERIDNC The percentage of independent directors on the nomination committee as stipulated by the company. 
PERINBB The percentage of nomination committee members who are independent of the board of directors. 
PERNEAC 
The percentage of non-executive board members on the audit committee as stipulated by the 
company. 
PERNENC The percentage of non-executive board members on the nomination committee. 
DUALITY 
A dummy variable which takes 1 if a firm’s CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors and 0 
otherwise. 
CGC A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a corporate governance committee and 0 otherwise. 
NC A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a nomination committee and 0 otherwise. 
INST 
The ratio of number of shares owned by institutional shareholders to total outstanding common 
shares. 
 
Earnings quality is measured through the degree to which firms engage in earnings 
management practices. Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as the 
alteration of a firm’s economic performance in order to mislead stakeholders and 
                                                 
 
14DER excludes the cost of goods sold, interest expenses, leasing and hiring expenses, depreciation, and 
bad debt expenses. In some cases, there is insufficient information to accurately identify which 
expenses/costs are to be excluded from the estimate of DER, though the information has been 
crosschecked with DataStream, as well as with company websites for verification, thus the expectation 
is that DER is overestimated for some firms in the sample (Clarkson et al, 2008) 
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influence contractual outcome. To measure earnings management discretionary 
accruals15 as used in previous studies. (Rangan, 1998; DeFond and Subramanyam, 
1998; Teoh et al., 1998b, 1998a; DeFond and Park, 2001; Bartov et al., 2001; Alcarria 
Jaime and De Albornoz Noguer, 2004; DuCharme et al., 2004; Kothari et al., 2004; 
Park and Park, 2004; Carey and Simnett, 2006; Garza – Gomerz et al., 2006; Jo and 
Kim, 2007; Jaggi et al, 2009; Rodriguez – Perez and Van Hemmen, 2010; Iatridis, 2010; 
Iatridis, 2012a; Iatridis 2012b; Iatridis and Dimitras, 2013; Ecker et al., 2013; Dimitras 
et al., 2015). 
4.7.2. Model Specification of IR and earnings quality and discretionary accruals 
To test the main hypothesis 2a, the model below was created: 
DACi,t = γ0 + γ1DSi,t + γ2IRi,t +γ3(IR*DS)i,t +  γ4LEVi,t + γ5SIZEi,t+ γ6MBRi,t+ γ7BIG_4i,t + 
γ8ROAi,t + γ9CFOi,t + γ10CASHi,t + γ11DUALITYi,t + γ12CGCi,t + γ13INSTi,t+ {Industry Effects} 
+ {Year Effects} + ui,t   (3)  
Based on Jones (1991), the discretionary accruals were estiamated from the model: 
𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊,𝒕
𝑻𝜜𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
 = β0 + β1 (
𝟏
𝜯𝜜𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
)+ β2 (
𝜟𝑹𝑬𝑽𝒊,𝒕
𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
) + β3(
𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊,𝒕
𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
)+ εi,t (2) [ACCi,t = Earningsi,t – CFOi,t] 
Where, 
Variable Explanation of  Equation  (2) and (3) 
Variable Description 
ACC Are the total accruals equals to the net income minus the operating cash flow at the end of fiscal year t. 
TA Book value of total assets at the begging of year t. 
ΔREV The change in sales revenue from the preceding year. 
PPE 
Net properties, plant and equipment divided into total assets at the end of fiscal year t (Clarkson et al., 
2008). 
                                                 
 
15 In our study we use the term “discretionary accruals” interchangeably with the term “abnormal 
accruals”, even though it is a somewhat loaded term that seems more associated with an active choice 
rather than an outcome of the measurement system or error (Dechow et al., 2010). 
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DAC  
Discretionary accruals, It estimated by the Jones (1991) model. DAC are the residuals that derived 
from the estimation of the equation (2) {DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Bartov et al., 2001; 
Kothari et al., 2004; Garza – Gomez et al., 2006} 
DS 
IR Disclosure Score Index. DS derived from the scale of total received score of each firm to the 
maximum score (equals with 28 observations based on KING III checklist). 
IR 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for firms that use the name “Integrated annual Report” on their report 
and 0 otherwise.  
IR*DS An interaction term between IR and DS 
LEV Leverage in fiscal year t. It Calculated as total debt scaled by total assets at the end of year t. 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year t.  
MBR 
Market – to – book ratio in fiscal year t. Calculated as the market value of equity divided by the book 
value of equity at the end of the year. 
BIG_4 
A dummy variable. When a firm is audited by a Big 4 accounting firm the dummy variable equal to 
1 and 0 otherwise. 
ROA 
Return on Assets in fiscal year t, calculated as net income during year t scaled by total assets at the 
begging of the year. 
CFO Operating cash flow in fiscal year t scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. 
CASH 
Cash and short – term investment at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total assets at the begging of 
the year.  
DUALITY 
A dummy variable which takes 1 when a firm’s CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors 
and 0 otherwise. 
CGC A dummy variable equal to1 if the firm has a corporate governance committee and 0 otherwise. 
INST 
The ratio of number of shares owned by institutional shareholders to total outstanding common 
shares. 
 
To test main hypothesis 2b, the model below was created: 
DACi,t (AAi,t) = γ0 + γ1DSi,t + γ2IRi,t +  γ3(IR*DS)i,t +  γ4LEVi,t + γ5SIZEi,t+ γ6MBRi,t + γ7BIG_4i,t 
+ γ8ROEi,t + γ9CFOi,t + γ10CASHi,t + γ11BSIZEi,t + γ12BOARDINDi,t + γ13DUALITYi,t + 
γ14INSTi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} + ui,t   (5)  
Because it uses two proxies for the DISCLOSURE_QUALITY, DDS and DS, the 
following two sub-models are estimated: 
DACi,t = γ0 + γ1DSi,t + γ2IRi,t +  γ3(IR*DS)i,t +  γ4LEVi,t + γ5SIZEi,t+ γ6MBRi,t + γ7BIG_4i,t + 
γ8ROEi,t + γ9CFOi,t + γ10CASHi,t + γ11BSIZEi,t + γ12BOARDINDi,t + γ13DUALITYi,t + γ14INSTi,t 
+ {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} + ui,t   (5a)  
DACi,t = γ0 + γ1DDSi,t + γ2IRi,t +   γ3LEVi,t + γ4SIZEi,t+ γ5MBRi,t + γ6BIG_4i,t + γ7ROEi,t + 
γ8CFOi,t + γ9CASHi,t + γ10BSIZEi,t + γ11BOARDINDi,t + γ12DUALITYi,t + γ13INSTi,t + {Industry 
Effects} + {Year Effects} + ui,t   (5b)  
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Following Ball and Shivakumar (2006, 2008) normal accruals are estimated using the 
Jones model and a piecewise linear variant to capture the roles of accruals in noise 
reduction and in timely loss recognition: 
𝑨𝑪𝑪𝑹𝑼𝑨𝑳𝑺𝒊,𝒕
𝑻𝜜𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
 = λ0 + λ1 (
𝜟𝑺𝑨𝑳𝑬𝑺𝒊,𝒕
𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
) + λ2 (
𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊,𝒕
𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
) + λ3 (
𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕
𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
) + λ4 (
𝜟𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕
𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
)+  λ5(
𝑫𝑪𝑭𝑶∗𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕
𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
) +   vit  
(4) 
Here, 
 Accruals = {Δ(Current Assets) – Δ(Cash)} – {Δ(Current Liabilities) – Δ(Current 
maturities of long – term debt) – Δ(Income Taxes Payable)} – {Depreciation and 
Amortization Expense} 
Where change (Δ) is computed as the difference in values from year t to year t – 1.  
Further, 
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Variable Explanation of  Equation (4) and (5) 
Variable Description 
ΔSALES Change in revenues during period t.  
PPE Net properties, plant and equipment divided to total assets at the end of year t.  
CFO Cash flow from operations at the end of year t. 
DCFO An indicator variable that takes the value one if CFO < 0 and zero otherwise. 
DCFO An interaction term between DCFO and CFO.   
TA Book value of total assets at the begging of year t. 
DAC 
Discretionary accruals, estimated by the Jones (1991) model. DAC are the residuals that derived 
from the estimation of the equation (2) {DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Bartov et al., 2001; 
Kothari et al., 2004; Garza – Gomez et al., 2006} 
DS 
IR Disclosure Score Index. DS derived from the scale of total received score of each firm to the 
maximum score (equals with 28 observations based on KING III checklist). 
IR 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for firms that use on their report the name “Integrated annual Report” 
and 0 otherwise.  
IR*DS An interaction term between IR and DS 
LEV Leverage in fiscal year t. Calculated as total debt scaled by total assets at the end of year t. 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year t.  
MBR 
Market – to – book ratio in fiscal year t. Calculated as the market value of equity divided by the book 
value of equity at the end of the year. 
BIG_4 
A dummy variable. When a firm is audited by a Big 4 accounting firm the dummy variable equal to 
1 and 0 otherwise. 
ROE 
Return on Equity in fiscal year t, calculated as net income during year t scaled by total equity at the 
begging of the year. 
CFO Operating cash flow in fiscal year t scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. 
CASH 
Cash and short – term investment at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total assets at the begging of 
the year.  
BSIZE The number of directors on the board. 
BOARDIND 
The board independence ratio measured as number of independent directors divided by total board 
size. 
DUALITY 
A dummy variable which takes 1 when a firm’s CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors 
and 0 otherwise. 
CGC A dummy variable equal to1 if the firm has a corporate governance committee and 0 otherwise. 
INST 
The ratio of number of shares owned by institutional shareholders to total outstanding common 
shares. 
 
Big auditors are associated with high reporting quality, e.g., lower absolute values of 
discretionary accruals (Becker, et al., 1998), and higher earnings response coefficients 
(Teoh and Wong, 1993). High quality of accounting disclosures is verified by good 
audit reports. This reduces information asymmetry and leads to lower cost of equity, 
creating better financing terms (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Botosan and Plumlee, 
2002).  
4.7.3. Model Specification of IR and agency costs 
To test main hypothesis 3, the model below was created: 
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AGENCOST = λ0 + λ1DSi,t + λ2REP_IMPROVEi,t + λ3DACi,t + λ4DEBT_RATIOi,t +  λ5ROEi,t + λ6SIZEi,t 
+ λ7LNMVi,t + λ8MBRi,t +  λ9DUALITYi,t + λ10INSTi,t + λ11BETAi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} 
+  vi,t  (6)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Where, 
Variable Explanation of  Equation (6) 
Variable Description 
AGENCOST 
A proxy of agency costs equals with TOBIN’S_ Q*CFO (Lang et al.,1991 and Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
TOBIN’S_Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to the replacement costs of assets (Cheng, 2008 ; 
Jermias and Gani, 2014).CFO is the Operating cash flow in fiscal year t scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of the year. 
DS 
IR Disclosure Score Index. DS derived from the scale of total received score of each firm to the 
maximum score (equals with 28 observations based on KING III checklist). 
REP_IMPROVE 
A dummy variable equal to 1 when a firm improves its IR quality during the period analysis and 0 
otherwise.  
DAC 
Discretionary accruals, estimated by the Jones (1991) model. DAC are the residuals that derived from 
the estimation of the equation (2) {DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Bartov et al., 2001; Kothari et 
al., 2004; Garza – Gomez et al., 2006} 
DEBT_RATIO A proxy for  leverage equals total liabilities to total assets at the end of fiscal year t.  
ROE 
Return on equity in fiscal year t and calculated as net income during year t scaled by total equity at the 
begging of the year. 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year t. 
LNMV 
Another proxy of firm’s size calculated as the natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of 
fiscal year t16. 
MBR 
Market – to – book ratio in fiscal year t, calculated as the market value of equity divided by the book 
value of equity at the end of the year. 
DUALITY 
A dummy variable which takes 1 if a firm’s CEO is also the chair of the board of director and 0 
otherwise. 
INST The ratio of number of shares owned by institutional shareholders to total outstanding common shares. 
BETA The market beta coefficient obtained from Datastream for each firm and for each year 
 
Large audit firms effectively control managers and reduce their opportunistic reporting 
behavior (Amiraslani et al., 2013). There is a correlation between the employment of 
an audit firm and the client’s disclosure quality and compliance (Street and Gray, 2002; 
Brown and Tarca, 2005; Hodgdon et al., 2009; Amiraslani et al., 2013). Big 4 auditors 
are associated with high reporting quality, e.g., lower absolute values of discretionary 
accruals (Becker, et al., 1998), and higher earnings response coefficients (Teoh and 
                                                 
 
16It is argued that the agency relation is affected by firm growth where firms with different levels of 
growth exhibit different levels of free cash flow and/or information asymmetry (McConnell and Servaes 
1995). 
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Wong, 1993). A high quality of accounting disclosures is verified by good audit reports. 
This reduces information asymmetry and leads to a lower cost of equity, creating better 
financing terms (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002).  
4.7.4. Model Specification of IR and firms performance 
Tobin’s Q is used as the dependent variable in this thesis. The main advantage of this 
metric of performance, in comparison with other measures, such as ROA or ROE, is 
that Tobin’s Q captures the effectiveness of the control mechanisms of management. 
Following Cheng (2008), Tobin’s Q ratio is measured as the market value of assets 
divided by the replacement cost of assets. The market value of assets equals  the market 
value of equity, plus the difference between the book value of assets and the book value 
of equity. The book value of assets is used as a proxy for the replacement cost of assets 
(Jermias and Gani, 2014).  
To test the main hypothesis 4, the model below was created: 
TOBIN_Qi,t = a0 + a1DISCLOSURE_QUALITYi,t + a2DUALITYi,t + α3BSIZEi,t + 
α4BOARDINDi,t + a5INSTi,t + a6GROWTHi,t + a7TURNOVERi,t + a8SIZEi,t + a9LEVERAGEi,t 
+ a10STDEVΔOIi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} + vi,t  (7) 
Because it is usesd two proxies for the DISCLOSURE_QUALITY, DDS and DS, the 
following two sub-models are estimated: 
TOBIN_Qi,t = a0 + a1DDSi,t + a2DUALITYi,t + α3BSIZEi,t + α4BOARDINDi,t + a5INSTi,t + a6GROWTHi,t 
+ a7TURNOVERi,t + a8SIZEi,t + a9LEVERAGEi,t + a10STDEVΔOIi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year 
Effects} + vi,t 7(a) 
TOBIN_Qi,t = a0 + a1DSi,t + a2DUALITYi,t + α3BSIZEi,t + α4BOARDINDi,t + a5INSTi,t + a6GROWTHi,t 
+ a7TURNOVERi,t + a8SIZEi,t + a9LEVERAGEi,t + a10STDEVΔOIi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year 
Effects} + vi,t  7(b) 
Variable explanations are provided in the table below. 
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Variable Explanations of Equation (7) 
Variable Description 
Tobins_Q 
The ratio of the market value of assets to the replacement costs of assets. Market value of assets = the 
sum of the market value of equity + (book value of assets – book value of equity). Replacement cost 
of assets = book value of assets (Cheng, 2008) 
DDS 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has gathered an IR disclosure score which is equal or greater 
than the median price notifications percentage of all sampled firms and 0 if otherwise. For more 
details see section 4.3.1 
DS 
IR Disclosure Score Index. DS is derived from the scale of total received score of each firm to the 
maximum score (equals with 28 observations based on KING III checklist).  
DUALITY 
A dummy variable which takes 1 if a firm’s CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors and 0 
if otherwise. 
BSIZE  The number of director on the Board. 
BOARDIND 
The board independence ratio measured as the number of independent directors divided by total board 
size. 
INST 
The ratio of number of shares owned by institutional shareholders to total outstanding common 
shares. 
GROWTH The growth in total assets from the begging to the end of year t. 
TURNOVER 
A measure of asset utilization that captures how efficiently the firm’s assets are used and is estimated 
as the ratio of annual sales to total assets at the end of fiscal year t. 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year t.  
LEVERAGE2 Another proxy for firm’s leverage calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
STDEVΔΟΙ The standard deviation of the annual change in the operating income.  
 
 
4.7.5. Model Specification of IR and value relevance of summary accounting 
information (i.e. book value of equity and earnings) 
The market value per share (MVPS) is used as the dependent variable in this study to 
capture the value relevance of the accounting information. Thus, the following model 
is estimated: 
MVPSi,t = λ0 + λ1DISCLOSURE _QUALITYi,t + λ2BVPSi,t+ λ3EBITPSi,t + λ4LEVERAGEi,t + 
λ5ROE,t  + λ6CASHi,t + + λ7PPEi, + λ8SIZEi,t + λ9DUALITYi,t  + λ10PERIDAUi,t + 
λ11LN_EMPLOYi,t +  {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} + eit  (8)     
Because it uses two proxies for the DISCLOSURE_QUALITY, DDS and DS, the 
following two sub-models are estimated: 
MVPSi,t = λ0 + λ1DDSi,t + λ2BVPSi,t+ λ3EBITPSi,t + λ4LEVERAGEi,t + λ5ROE,t  + λ6CASHi,t + + λ7PPEi, 
+ λ8SIZEi,t + λ9DUALITYi,t  + λ10PERIDAUi,t + λ11LN_EMPLOYi,t +  {Industry Effects} +  {Year 
Effects} + eit  8(a)     
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MVPSi,t = λ0 + λ1DSi,t + λ2BVPSi,t+ λ3EBITPSi,t + λ4LEVERAGEi,t + λ5ROE,t  + λ6CASHi,t + + λ7PPEi, + 
λ8SIZEi,t + λ9DUALITYi,t  + λ10PERIDAUi,t + λ11LN_EMPLOYi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} 
+ eit  8(b)     
Variable explanations are provided in the table below, 
Variable Explanations of Equation (8) 
Variable Description 
MVPS Market Value of Equity scaled by the number of common shares. 
DDS 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has gathered an IR disclosure score which is equal or greater 
than the median price notifications percentage of all sampled firms and 0 if otherwise. For more 
details see section 4.5.5. 
DS 
IR Disclosure Score Index. DS is derived from the scale of total received score of each firm to the 
maximum score (equals with 28 observations based on KING III checklist). For more details see 
section 4.5.5. 
BVPS Book Value of Equity scaled by the number of common shares. 
EBITPS Earnings before interest and taxation scaled by the number of common shares.  
LEVERAGE Leverage in fiscal year t. It calculated as total liabilities scaled by total assets at the end of year t. 
ROE 
Return on Equity in fiscal year t, calculated as net income during year t scaled by total equity at the 
begging of the year. 
CASH 
Cash and short – term investment at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total assets at the beginning of 
the year. 
PPE 
Net properties, plant and equipment divided by total assets at the end of fiscal year t (Clarkson et al., 
2008) 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year t.  
DUALITY 
A dummy variable which takes 1 when firm’s CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors and 
0 if otherwise. 
PERIDAU The percentage of independent auditors on the audit committee.  
LN_EMPLOY The natural logarithm of the number of the employees.  
 
4.7.6. Model Specification of IR and multiple-based valuation models 
Financial analyses are used to select the set of comparable firms based on stock prices 
or flow items. Multiples are based on equity perspectives because numerators use the 
stock price; hence, it is composed of a price-to-value driver multiple. The most popular 
price-to-value driver multiple is the single P/E ratio. The P/E ratio consists of the 
growth rate and the risk of comparable firms’ stock prices; hence, it is widely utilized 
by financial analysts (Bradshaw, 2002; Barker, 1999; Alford, 1992; Boastman and 
Baskin, 1998). Another reason that earnings are a dominant value driver is that 
historical earnings provide more accurate predictions and in short-term periods better 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
07/06/2020 14:11:01 EEST - 137.108.70.13
153 
 
explain the variation in stock prices than flow items (Dechow, 1994). Historical 
earnings are used more frequently to construct P/E ratios (Dechow, 1994). 
It is used the approach of introducing industry and fixed-year effects as a partial 
solution to controlling for the effects of firm and economic characteristics that change 
over time and affect value creation. The impact of IR in the valuation of firms is tested 
by constructing the industry-adjusted price/earnings ratio following Alford (1992) in 
order to match firms to industry growth and risk factors (Francis et al.,2005; Eliwa et 
al., 2016). Considering the implicit assumptions underlying the use of fixed effects, six 
specific variables that have been found to affect value creation in other studies are 
checked: earnings quality, disclosure quality, growth, beta, firm size, and leverage (see 
Glaum et al., 2013; Preiato et al., 2015; Bernardi and Stark, 2016). Therefore the 
following model is estimated: 
P/Ei,t = κ0 + κ1EARNINGS_QUALITYi,t + κ2DISCLOSURE_QUALITYi,t + 
κ3GROWTHi,t + κ4BETAi,t + κ5SIZEi,t + κ6DEBT_RATIOi,t + vi,t  (9) 
Because it uses two proxies for the DISCLOSURE_QUALITY, DDS and DS, and two 
proxies for EARNINGS_QUALITY, the following four sub-models are estimated: 
P/Ei,t = κ0 + κ1DACi,t + κ2DDSi,t + κ3GROWTHi,t + κ4BETAi,t + κ5SIZE,t + 
κ6DEBT_RATIOi,t + vi,t  9(a) 
P/Ei,t = κ0 + κ1SMOOTHNESSi,t + κ2DDSi,t + κ3GROWTHi,t + κ4BETAi,t + κ5SIZEi,t 
+ κ6DEBT_RATIOi,t + vi,t  9(b) 
P/Ei,t = κ0 + κ1DACi,t + κ2DSi,t + κ3GROWTHi,t + κ4BETAi,t + κ5SIZEi,t + 
κ6DEBT_RATIOi,t +  vi,t  9(c) 
P/Ei,t = κ0 + κ1SMOOTHNESSi,t + κ2DSi,t + κ3GROWTHi,t + κ4BETAi,t + κ5SIZEi,t 
+ κ6DEBT_RATIOi,t +  vi,t 9(d) 
Variable explanations are provided in the table below. 
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Variable Explanations of Equation (9) 
Variable Description 
P/E Market value per share divided by the net income per share17.  
DAC 
Discretionary accruals, estimated by the Jones (1991) model. DAC are the residuals that derived from 
the estimation of the equation (2) {DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Bartov et al., 2001; Kothari et 
al., 2004; Garza – Gomez et al., 2006} 
SMOTHNESS 
Standard deviation of the operating income to standard deviation of the operating cash flows18. Both 
measures are standardized with total assets.   
DDS 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has gathered an IR disclosure score which is equal or greater 
than the median price notifications percentage of all sampled firms and 0 if otherwise. For more 
details see section 4.5.5. 
DS 
IR Disclosure Score Index. DS is derived from the scale of total received score of each firm to the 
maximum score (equals with 28 observations based on KING III checklist). For more details see 
section 4.5.5. 
GROWTH The growth in total assets from the beginning to the end of year t. 
BETA The firm’s systemic risk measured by the beta  at the end of year t .  
SIZE The natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization at the end of year t. 
DEBT_RATIO A proxy of leverage equals with total liabilities to total assets at the end of fiscal year t.   
 
Following Ball and Shivakumar (2006, 2008), normal accruals are estimated using the 
Jones model (1991) and a piecewise linear variant to capture the role of accruals in 
noise reduction and in timely loss recognition: 
𝑨𝑪𝑪𝑹𝑼𝑨𝑳𝑺𝒊,𝒕
𝑻𝜜𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
 = λ0 + λ1 (
𝜟𝑺𝑨𝑳𝑬𝑺𝒊,𝒕
𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
) + λ2 (
𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊,𝒕
𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
) + λ3 (
𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕
𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
) + λ4 (
𝜟𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕
𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
)+   
λ5(
𝑫𝑪𝑭𝑶∗𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕
𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
) +   vit (10) 
Here, 
Accruals = {Δ(Current Assets) – Δ(Cash)} – {Δ(Current Liabilities) – Δ(Current 
maturities of long – term debt) – Δ(Income Taxes Payable)} – {Depreciation and 
Amortization Expense}  
where change (Δ) is computed as the difference in values from year t to year t – 1.  
Further, 
                                                 
 
17 Firms which appeal negative price _ to _ earnings ratio excluded from our sample.  
18 Where scaling by the cash flows is a control for differences in the variability of economic performance 
(Dechow et al., 2010).  
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Variable Explanations of Equation (10) 
Variable Description 
ΔSALES Change in revenues during period t.  
PPE Net properties, plant and equipment divided to total assets at the end of year t.  
CFO Cash flow from operations at the end of year t. 
DCFO An indicator variable that takes the value one if CFO < 0 and zero otherwise. 
DCFO*CFO An interaction term between DCFO and CFO.   
TA Book value of total assets at the begging of year t. 
 
4.7.7. Further explanations of the financial variables 
The existence of independent directors operates as an effective corporate governance 
measure. This can be used as a way to control managers. The existence of independent 
directors on the board improves the quality of accounting information and illustrates 
the impact of board composition on corporate disclosures (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 
2008; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Core et al., 1999). Firm’s Size: Firm size is related 
to corporate governance characteristics and affects the performance of a firm. Larger 
companies may have a higher amount of accounting disclosures (Lang and Lundholm, 
1993). Leverage: Leverage is used as a measure to estimate debt covenant violations 
that represent the debt structure of a firm (Elayan et al., 2008). Profitability: The index 
that is used to measure the profitability is the return on assets ratio (ROA) (Lang and 
Ludholm, 1993; Herremans et al., 2011). The lower the index number, the more 
uniform development the firm will present. Therefore, a positive coefficient is 
expected. Firms with better financial performance tend to report more ESG information 
(Clarkson et al., 2008). Discretionary operating expenses to total sales (DER): this 
ratio suggests that the operating expenses of the management can be controlled 
efficiently, limiting their unnecessary or wasteful activities (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997).  
4.7.8. Further explanations of the corporate governance variables 
4.7.8.1.Board size 
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Previous studies reviewing board size, as a corporate governance measure, have 
concluded in non-coincident results. Some authors (Lefort and Urzia, 2008) do not find 
the board size variable significant. On the other hand, some studies have found a 
negative association between the board size and firm performance (Hansson et al., 
2011). Other studies show an inverse relationship between firm value and board size. 
These findings are aligned with the agency theory methodology, which suggests the 
smaller the better (Yermack, 1996). Yermack (1996) presents evidence that small 
boards of directors are more effective and that firms with smaller boards achieve higher 
market value. Arosa et al., (2013, p.129) concluded with the same findings that large 
corporate boards may be less efficient, due to difficulties in solving the agency problem 
among the members of the board and Jensen (1983) suggests that a large board size is 
less effective because the coordination and process problems outweigh the advantages 
of having more people on whom to draw. Parallel to Jensen (1983), Dowell et al., (2011) 
concluded that firms with small board size tend to have greater capacity for making 
decisions quickly (Villanueva-Villar et al., 2016) 
On the other hand, Nicholson and Kiel (2007) and Jackling and Johl (2009) find a 
positive and significant relationship between the board size and firm performance. 
Their studies based on dependence theory, argues that a greater number of directors 
provide more information for appropriate decision-making. Villanueva-Villar et 
al.,(2016) conclude by suggesting a positive association between the board size and 
Tobin’s Q focusing on crisis periods. This is due to the fact that board size, in a crisis 
context, seems, in fact, to contradict agency theory, since many studies (such as those 
by Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) and Mueller and Barker (1997) have found that 
smaller boards are worse, in the sense that they have a higher probability of failure. In 
a situation of financial stress, in which the resource supply becomes essential to a 
company’s survival, large boards offer opportunities for resource capture and 
networking (Dowell et al., 2011; Villanueva-Villar et al., 2016). Pucheta-Martínez 
(2015) concluded that there is a positive relation between the board size and firms 
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performance, but only up to a certain point, after which value decreases as members are 
added to the board. Prior to this study, Hillman et al. (2011) and O’Connell and Cramer 
(2010) analyzed the advantages (supervision and advice) and the disadvantages 
(coordination problems, control, and decision-making) of a large board and concluded 
that a balance in the number of members of the board size should exist (Villanueva-
Villar et al., 2016). 
4.7.8.2.Chief executive officer (CEO) and chairman duality 
The Good Governance Code (2015) states that CEO-chairman duality has both 
advantages and disadvantages. There are advantages such as the reduction in 
information and coordination costs, as well as clear leadership. On the other hand, the 
main disadvantage is the concentration of power in a sole person. Nevertheless, the 
Code does not lay down any recommendations about separating the two roles, but rather 
maintains the same lines as the Codes that were published earlier (Unified Code, 2006). 
In order to carry out this role properly, the board must be independent, both through the 
board structure and through the separation of the roles of chairman and CEO 
(Villanueva-Villar et al., 2016). Other studies conclude that there is a positive 
relationship between CEO duality and performance in high-complexity environments 
(Chen, 2014; Chang et al., 2015). From the approach perspective of the institutional 
investors, it is considered to maintain the separation between CEO and Chairman, 
encouraging the independence of the board (Villanueva-Villar et al., 2016).  
CEO and chairman in the same person, can give outside directors relevant information 
directly regarding the operations of the firm. This reduces the agency problems related 
to CEO duality (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Valenti et al., 2011) and gives the 
power to the CEO to make decisions more quickly (Dowell et al., 2011). It can be 
created a clearer strategic orientation, greater autonomy and better response capacity 
(Cabrera Suárez and Martín-Santana, 2015). 
4.7.8.3.Board independence 
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All the written codes of good governance throughout the world recommend greater 
independence for boards (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). Independent board members are 
understood to be ‘‘those that are able to carry out their roles, having been appointed in 
accordance to their personal and professional conditions, without being influenced by 
relationships with the firm, its significant shareholders or directors’’ (Unified Code, 
2006, p. 52).  
Regarding the number of independent board members, the Good Governance Code 
(2015) recommends that they should make up at least half the total number of members, 
except in cases in which the firm does not have a high capitalization rate or when one 
of the shareholders or several of the shareholders jointly in concert, control more than 
30% of the capital, in which case a third of the total number of members is 
recommended. This code differs from the Unified Code published in 2006 and updated 
in 2013, where the only recommendation was that independent members should 
represent at least a third of the total board. Board participation helps strengthen board 
independence in those countries in which minority shareholders have little protection, 
since it counters the power of majority groups (Villanueva-Villar et al., 2016). 
One of the positive effects of bringing outside directors onto the board is that they can 
help monitor and control senior managers, making sure that their actions take investors’ 
interests into consideration (Osma, 2008).  
Among the reasons why outside directors are considered to be more effective than 
inside directors, when monitoring managers, is the fact that they often have experience 
in decision-making in other companies, as well as a tendency to consider their 
reputation in the managerial work market (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Ghosh et al., 2010). 
Independent directors are also expected to show greater objectivity and to have more 
expertise than affiliated directors. For these reasons, there is a belief that those boards 
with more outside directors are more independent (Villanueva-Villar et al., 2016).  
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Nevertheless, in spite of what the different theories suggest, the empirical studies 
carried out present differing results. The level of board independence, measured in 
terms of the percentage of external members, can create or destroy value in a firm. 
Mínguez and Martin (2003) cite empirical studies that obtained varying results. There 
are studies that found no significant relationship (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; 
Mínguez and Martin, 2003), some that found a positive effect (Barnhart et al., 1994; 
Yermack, 1996), and others that found a significant but negative relationship (Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 1996; Villanueva-Villar et al., 2016). 
Lefort and Urzúa (2008) found that an increase in the proportion of outside directors 
positively affects value creation. However, Carter et al. (2010) found that board 
independence is not significant. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) indicate that there is a 
tendency in times of crisis to reduce the power of the CEO and to increase board 
independence. Chang et al. (2015) also observed a positive and significant relationship 
between board composition and firm performance for the period of the deepest crisis, 
2008 to 2010.  
On the other hand, Francis et al. (2012) found that board independence could enhance 
board efficacy and thereby firm performance during a crisis period; they took the 
percent age of outsiders on the board as a measure of independence (thus looking at 
outside directors, whether they were truly independent or were financial experts). From 
the view of institutional investors, one of the future challenges in the field of corporate 
governance would be to ensure the independence of directors. This would allow 
improvement of the firm’s performance (Villanueva-Villar et al., 2016). 
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5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics  
Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics for all variables used in hypotheses 1 to 3. In 
panel A, the descriptive statistics are exhibited for the dependent variables of equations 
(1), (3) and (5). On average, the disclosure score index for the international firms of the 
sample is 70.2% [standard deviation (st.dev.) 15.1%]. The average size of discretionary 
accruals is approximately 0.1% in total asset terms [st.dev:5.8%]. Furthermore, the 
average ratio of market value * CFO (proxy for agency cost) is approximately 29% (in 
total asset terms) [st.dev.:1.29].  
In panel B, the descriptive statistics for the financial, corporate governance and other 
control variables are reported. In Part 1, indicatively, the average asset turnover 
(AS_TURN) for the sample’s firms is approximately 92.7% in total asset terms 
[st.dev.:72.2%]. The average debt ratio is approximately 59.1% in total asset terms 
[st.dev.: 16.1%]. The average ROA of international firms is 3.8% [st.dev.: 6%], 
indicating satisfactory levels of profitability. Finally, the average proportion of cash in 
total assets is approximately 11.5% [st.dev.: 11.5%], indicating that the sample is 
characterized by firms with appropriate levels of liquidity. In part 2, the descriptive 
statistics for the corporate governance control variables are reported. The average 
percentage of independent board members on the nomination committee (PERIDNC) 
is approximately 47.994% [st. dev.:30.763%]; the average percentage of nomination 
committee members who are independent of the board of directors (PERINBB) is 
approximately 24.485% [st.dev.:97.216%]; and the average percentage of non-
executive board members on the audit committee (PERNEAC) is 40.507% [st.dev.: 
36.997%]. On average, in 54.1% of the international firms, the CEO is also the chair of 
the board [st.dev.:49.9%]. Finally, the average proportion of the number of shares 
owned by institutional shareholders to total outstanding common shares (INST) is 
18.4% [st.dev.:14.4%].  
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics relevant to hypotheses 1 to 3 
The period of interest is 2011-2015. The sample consists of 82 international firms from around the world listed in the IR database 
(http://examples.integratedreporting.org/reporters?start=A).  DS is IR Disclosure Score Index. DS is derived from the scale of total 
received score of each firm to the maximum score (equals with 28 observations based on KING III checklist). DAC is discretionary accruals. 
It is estimated using the Jones (1991) model. DAC are the residuals that derived from the estimation of the equation (2) {DeFond and 
Subramanyam, 1998; Bartov et al., 2001; Kothari et al., 2004; Garza – Gomez et al., 2006}. AG_COST is a proxy of agency costs equals 
to TOBIN’S_ Q*CFO (Lang et al.,1991 and Healy and Palepu, 2001).  TOBIN’S_Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to the 
replacement costs of assets (Cheng, 2008 ; Jermias and Gani, 2014).CFO is the Operating cash flow in fiscal year t scaled by total assets 
at the beginning of the year. PPE is net properties, plant and equipment divided into total assets at the end of fiscal year t (Clarkson et al., 
2008) AS_TURN is a measure of asset utilization that captures how efficiently the firm’s assets are used and is estimated as the ratio of 
annual sales to total assets at the end of fiscal year t.DER is the logarithm of discretionary operating expenses which is defined as operating 
expenses incurred at the discretion of firm management including selling, general and administration expenses. DIVPAY is the dividend 
payout ratio equal to cash common dividends to net income at the end of fiscal year t. MBR is market – to – book ratio in fiscal year t. It is 
calculated as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total 
assets at the end of fiscal year t. LNMV is another proxy of a firm’s size. It is calculated as the natural logarithm of the market capitalization 
at the end of fiscal year t. DEBT_RATIO is a proxy of leverage equal to total liabilities to total assets at the end of fiscal year t. LEV is 
leverage in fiscal year t. It is calculated as total debt scaled by total assets at the end of year t. ROA is the return on assets in fiscal year t 
calculated as net income during year t scaled by total assets at the begging of the year.ROE is the return on equity in fiscal year t calculated 
as net income during year t scaled by total equity at the begging of the year. CASH is the cash and short – term investments at the end of 
fiscal year t scaled by total assets at the begging of the year. PERIDAU is the percentage of independent board members on the audit 
committee. PERIDNC is the percentage of independent directors on the nomination committee. PERINBB is the percentage of nomination 
committee members who are independent of the Board. PERNEAC is the percentage of non – executive board members on the audit 
committee. PERNENC is the percentage on non – executive board members on the nomination committee .DUALITY is a dummy variable 
which takes 1 when a firm’s CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors and 0 otherwise.CGC is a dummy variable equal to1 if the 
firm has a corporate governance committee and 0 otherwise.NC is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a nomination committee and 
0 otherwise. INST is the ratio of number of shares owned by institutional shareholders to total outstanding common shares.BIG_4 is a 
dummy variable. When a firm is audited by a Big 4 accounting firm the dummy variable is equal to 1 and 0 otherwise. PAR is the logarithm 
of the number of pages in the firm’s annual report. BETA is the market beta coefficient obtained from Datastream for each firm and for 
each year. REP_IMPROVE is a dummy variable equal to 1 when a firm improves its IR quality during the period analysis and 0 otherwise. 
Variable Mean Median Std.Dev. Max Min N 
Panel A: Depended Variables  
DS 0.702 0.679 0.151 1.000 0.464 410 
DAC 0.001 -0.002 0.058 0.461 -0.308 388 
AG_COST 0.290 0.079 1.290 9.788 -8.580 389 
Panel B: Control Variables 
1. Financial Variables:       
PPE 0.313 0.260 0.225 0.890 0.002 388 
AS_TURN 0.927 0.677 0.722 3.811 0.044 389 
DER 9.729 9.502 2.442 15.956 2.188 378 
DIVPAY 0.631 0.422 1.317 12.500 -1.524 332 
MBR 10.194 1.607 30.815 305.434 0.002 382 
SIZE 10.266 10.122 2.326 15.963 4.522 389 
LNMV 9.404 9.033 1.686 16.664 6.638 403 
TOBIN’S_Q 4.281 1.254 11.034 85.021 0.072 389 
DEBT_RATIO 0.591 0.598 0.161 0.996 0.069 388 
LEV 0.270 0.250 0.151 0.629 0.000 388 
ROA 0.038 0.037 0.060 0.486 -0.329 389 
ROE 0.055 0.097 1.011 0.877 -19.565 388 
CFO 0.072 0.072 0.060 0.261 -0.288 389 
CASH 0.115 0.089 0.115 0.891 0.000 387 
2. Corporate Governance Variables: 
PERIDAU 50.430 50.000 36.635 100.000 0.000 410 
PERIDNC 47.994 45.500 30.763 100.000 0.000 410 
PERINBB 24.485 17.245 97.216 96.500 0.028 410 
PERNEAC 40.507 35.750 36.997 100.000 0.000 410 
PERNENC 24.225 20.250 20.063 75.250 0.000 410 
DUALITY 0.541 1.000 0.499 1.000 0.000 410 
CGC 0.538 1.000 0.499 1.000 0.000 409 
NC 0.615 1.000 0.487 1.000 0.000 410 
INST 0.184 0.171 0.144 0.632 0.000 410 
3. Other Control Variables 
BIG_4 0.788 1.000 0.409 1.000 0.000 405 
PAR 4.685 4.844 0.651 5.846 2.639 410 
BETA 0.778 0.697 0.483 2.739 -0.397 410 
REP_IMPROVE 0.341 0.000 0.475 1.000 0.000 410 
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In Part 3, the descriptive statistics for the other control variables are reported. A total 
of 78.8% of the international firms in the sample are audited by Big 4 auditors [st.dev.: 
40.9%]. The average logarithm of the number of pages in the IR reports for  
international firms is 4.685 [st.dev.: 65.1%], indicating that the financial departments 
of the firms prepare IR reports with an average size of approximately 131 pages. The 
average market beta coefficient for the international firms in the sample is 
approximately 0.778 [st.dev.: 48.3%]. Finally, the average magnitude of the 
PER_IMPROVE variable is 0.341 [st.dev.:47.5%]. This result indicates that, on 
average, 34.1% of the firms in the sample have improved the quality of their financial 
statements based on IR through the period under examination.  
In table 6 the descriptive statistics for all variables used in hypotheses 4 to 6 are 
reported. In Panel A the descriptive statistics for all the dependent variables of the 
equations are presented (7), (8), (9), (14), (15) and (16). On average, the firms in the 
sample indicate a market value of their assets that is four times larger than their assets’ 
replacement cost (st.dev.: 11.034). The average return on assets of the firms is 3.8% 
(st.dev.: 6%). Furthermore, the average market value per share of the sample is 622.806 
million Euros (st.dev.: 4420.951). The average market-to-book ratio is 4.349 (st.dev.: 
1.268), implying that the 82 firms of the sample exhibit high growth opportunities. On 
average the P/E ratio is 3.195 (st.dev.: 2.4%), indicating that the firms were evaluated 
significantly positively by investors regarding their future profitability. On average the 
P/BV is 33.272 (st.dev.: 289.139), indicating that the firms have healthy future profit 
projections and that investors are probably are willing to pay a premium for that 
probability.  
In panel B the descriptive statistics for financial, corporate governance and other control 
variables are reported. On average, 50.43% of the firms have independent board 
members on their audit committee (st.dev.: 36.635). The average number of board 
members is approximately 11 in the sample (st.dev.:3.1). The degree of board 
independence in the sample firms is approximately 33.6% (st.dev.:20.6%). On average, 
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in 54.1% of the firms the CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors 
(st.dev.:49.9%). The proportion of the firms’ equity held by institutional shareholders 
is on average 18.4% (st.dev.:14.4%).  
In panel C the descriptive statistics for the other independent variables of the models 
are reported. On average, 78.8% of the sample firms are audited by Big 4 auditors 
(40.9%). On average, the natural logarithm of the number of the firms’ employees 
is/9.439 (st.dev.:1.726). The average beta of the sample firms is 0.778 (st.dev.: 48.3%). 
The average volatility of the annual growth of firms’ operating income in the sample is 
1.956 (st.dev.:16.145). Finally, the average size of the firms’ annual reports is 
approximately 131 pages (st.dev.: 73.703).  
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics relevant to hypotheses 4 to 6 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of firms. The period of interest is 2011-2015 and the sample consists of 82 international firms 
from around the world listed in the IR database (http://examples.integratedreporting.org/reporters?start=A).  TOBIN’S_Q is the ratio of the market 
value of assets to the replacement costs of assets (Cheng, 2008 ; Jermias and Gani, 2014). ROA is the return on assets in fiscal year t calculated as 
net income during year t scaled by total assets at the begging of the year. MVPS is the market value of equity scaled by the number of common shares 
MBR is market – to – book ratio in fiscal year t. It is calculated as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the 
year. P/E is the price to earnings ratio which is calculated by dividing the market value price per share by the earnings per share. P/BV is the price 
to book ratio which is calculated by dividing the market price per share by book value per share.  DS is IR Disclosure Score Index. DS is derived 
from the scale of total received score of each firm to the maximum score (equals with 28 observations based on KING III checklist). DDS is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a firm has gathered an IR disclosure score which is equal to or greater than the median price notifications percentage of all 
sampled firms and 0 if otherwise. For more details see section 4.5.5. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year t. ROE is 
the return on equity in fiscal year t calculated as net income during year t scaled by total equity at the begging of the year. CFO is the Operating 
cash flow in fiscal year t scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. CASH is the cash and short – term investment at the end of fiscal year t 
scaled by total assets at the begging of the year. TURNOVER is a measure of asset utilization that captures how efficiently the firm’s assets are used 
and is estimated as the ratio of annual sales to total assets at the end of fiscal year t. DEBT_RATIO is a proxy of leverage equal to total liabilities 
to total assets at the end of fiscal year t. BVPS is the book value of equity scaled by the number of common shares. EBTPS is earnings before interest 
and taxation scaled by the number of common shares. LEVERAGE2 is another proxy for firm’s leverage calculated as the ratio of total debt to total 
assets..PPE is net properties, plant and equipment divided to total assets at the end of fiscal year t (Clarkson et al., 2008). GROWTH is the growth 
in total assets from the begging to the end of year t. DAC are the discretionary accruals. The normal proportion of accruals estimated by the Jones 
(1991) model. DAC are the residuals that derived from the estimation of the normal accruals equation {DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Bartov et 
al., 2001; Kothari et al., 2004; Garza – Gomez et al., 2006}. SMOOTHNESS is the ratio of the standard deviation of operating income divided by 
the standard deviation of cash flow from operations. PERIDAU is the percentage of independent board members on the audit committee. BSIZE is 
the number of director on the Board. BOARDIND is the board independence ratio measured as the number of independent directors divided by total 
board size. DUALITY is a dummy variable which takes 1 when a firm’s CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors and 0 otherwise. INST 
is the ratio of number of shares owned by institutional shareholders to total outstanding common shares. BIG_4 is a dummy variable. When a firm 
is audited by a Big 4 accounting firm the dummy variable is equal to 1 and 0 otherwise. LN_EMPLOY is the natural logarithm of the number of the 
employees .BETA is the market beta coefficient obtained from Datastream for each firm and for each year.  
Variable Mean Median Std.Dev. Max Min N 
Panel A: Depended Variables 
TOBIN’S_Q 4.281 1.254 11.034 85.021 0.072 389 
ROA 0.038 0.037 0.060 0.486 -0.329 389 
MVPS 622.806 24.832 4420.951 49177.220 0.390 377 
MBR 4.349 1.268 11.123 85.021 0.156 382 
P/E 3.195 0.024 20.454 270.719 3.48E-05 338 
P/BV 33.272 0.068 289.139 3135.360 7.04E-06 375 
Panel B: Control Variables 
1. Financial Variables: 
vvvaVariables: 
      
DS 0.702 0.679 0.151 1.000 0.464 410 
DDS 0.598 1.000 0.491 1.000 0.000 410 
SIZE 10.266 10.122 2.326 15.963 4.522 389 
ROE 0.055 0.097 1.011 0.877 -19.565 388 
CFO 0.072 0.072 0.060 0.261 -0.288 389 
CASH 0.115 0.089 0.115 0.891 0.000 387 
TURNOVER 0.927 0.677 0.722 3.811 0.044 389 
DEBT_RATIO 0.591 0.598 0.161 0.996 0.069 388 
BVPS 245.655 17.547 522.863 3197.838 0.066 383 
EBTPS 28.794 2.395 76.330 459.332 -224.670 381 
PPE 0.313 0.260 0.225 0.890 0.002 388 
GROWTH 0.025 0.028 0.486 1.000 -7.636 410 
STDEVΔOI 1.956 2.024 16.145 76.364 0.082 379 
ABSDAC 0.031 0.023 0.039 0.451 5.42E-05 388 
SMOOTHNESS 1.877 0.787 6,025 79.262 0.015 365 
2. Corporate Governance Variables: 
PERIDAU 50.430 50.000 36.635 100.000 0.000 410 
BSIZE 11.156 11.000 3.100 20.000 5.000 410 
BOARDIND 0.336 0.286 0.206 0.889 0.000 410 
DUALITY 0.541 1.000 0.499 1.000 0.000 410 
INST 0.184 0.171 0.144 0.632 0.000 410 
3. Other Control Variables: 
BIG_4 0.788 1.000 0.409 1.000 0.000 405 
LN_EMPLOY 9.439 9.602 1.726 12.427 4.094 410 
BETA 0.778 0.697 0.483 2.739 -0.397 410 
PAR (in pages) 130.681 127.000 73.703 346.000 14.000 410 
5.2 IR Disclosures Quality and Corporate Governance 
In tables 7 and 8, the results of the relationship between the financial reporting quality 
as expressed by IR disclosure information and corporate governance mechanisms are 
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reported. Table 8 presents the correlations among the variables used in model (1). It is 
observed that there is a positive and significant (1% level) correlation (in both the 
Spearman and Pearson methods) between the IR disclosure score index (DS) and the 
corporate governance variables (variables 14 to 21). These results confirm the argument 
that firms that disclose high-quality IR information tend to display more effective 
corporate governance mechanisms. Although these individual results are significant, 
they rely on on a multi-factor regression analysis for more valid and reliable results 
(Magnis and Iatridis, 2017).  
In table 8, the estimation results of model (1) are reported. The coefficients of interest 
are α13-α20. In model (A), it is an estimated equation (1) with pooled OLS, whereas in 
model (B), the fixed effects approach is applied. Comparing columns 3-4 to columns 
5-6, it is found that there are no important differences in either the signs of the estimated 
coefficients or the significance of these outputs. There is a positive and significant 
association in both models (A) and (B) at the 1% level between IR and DS. This finding 
indicates that firms that redact their IR reports with the term “Integrated Report” tend 
to exhibit higher quality accounting disclosures compared to those using the term 
“Annual Report”. The PERIDNC and PERNEAC variables are positively and 
significantly associated with DS at the 1% level, indicating that firms with a high 
proportion of independent and non-executive board members on nomination and audit 
committees tend to display higher IR disclosure quality, confirming the findings of 
Zahra and Stanton (1988), Core et al. (1999), Haniffa and Cooke (2005), Huafang and 
Jianguo (2007), and Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008). In contrast, the analysis shows that 
the existence of a smaller percentage of independent members of the nomination 
committee, who are independent of the board, tend to exhibit more quantitative IR 
disclosures. In addition, firms in which the CEO is also the chairman of the board of 
directors tend to display higher IR disclosure quality compared to firms in which the 
CEO and chairman of the board are different. This result confirms the findings of 
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Haniffa and Cooke (2002), who argue that a unified leadership structure improves 
decision-making and leads to a higher quality of accounting disclosures. 
The asset turnover ratio (AS_TURN) is positively and significantly associated with DS 
at the 1% level, implying that firms that manage their assets effectively, to generate 
revenue, tend to display more quantitative IR disclosures. The study also finds that 
firms that are characterized as large in size (in terms of both book and market value) 
and with large debt levels, disclose higher-quality IR information, confirming the 
findings of Lang and Lundholm (1993), Iatridis (2015), Deegan and Gordon (1996), 
Patten (1991; 2002) and Amiraslani et al. (2013). In contrast, firms that experience 
higher growth (MBR) report lower IR disclosure quality and conceal unfavorable 
performance measures. Their goal is to avoid disappointing capital providers and, on 
the contrary, to facilitate their growth process (Iatridis, 2011). Furthermore, firms with 
high profitability, which is proxied by ROE, tend to display lower-quality IR disclosure 
because ROE and DS are associated negatively and significantly at the 1% level.  
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Table 7: Correlation Matrix for Hypothesis 1 
Spearman correlations reported below the diagonal and Pearson correlations above the diagonal. The superscripts a, band c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Correlations for H1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
(1) DS  1.00 0.61
a 0.01 0.23a -0.05 0.10c 0.12b -0.11c 0.22a 0.14b -0.09c 0.28a 0.50a 0.65a 0.31a 0.70a 0.35a 0.19a 0.63a 0.63a 0.29a 
(2) IR  0.58a 1.00 0.05 0.23
a 0.05 0.,05 0.18a -0.04 0.15a 0.01 -0.09 0.09 0.26a 0.54a 0.27a 0.53a 0.19a 0.08 0.45a 0.52a 0.12b 
(3) PP_E  -0.02 0.05 1.00 -0.18
a -0.31a -0.14b -0.05 -0.26a -0.10c -0.05 0.03 0.10c -0.16a -0.02 -0.10c -0.08 0.00 0.25a -0.04 0.06 -0.12b 
(4) AS_TURN  0.11b 0.23a -0.08 1.00 
0.16a 0.03 -0.08 -0.15a -0.03 -0.08 0.05 -0.01 0.14b 0.12b 0.30a 0.20a 0.01 -0.08 0.15a 0.13b 0.27a 
(5) DER  0.15a -0.01 -0.19a 0.30a 1.00 -0.02 -0.34
a 0.94a 0.36a 0.09 0.01 -0.08 0.02 -0.06 -0.13b -0.13b -0.11c 0.01 -0.09c -0.08 -0.15a 
(6) DIVPAY  -0.02 -0.09 -0.18a -0.13b -0.04 1.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.13
b 0.11c 0.16a -0.11c 0.10c 0.08 0.13b 
(7) MBR  0.28a 0.15a 0.12b 0.02 -0.69a -0.04 1.00 
-0.30a 0.29a 0.07 -0.28a -0.10c 0.11b 0.15a 0.08 0.16a 0.14b -0.09 0.06 0.15a 0.07 
(8) SIZE  -0.17a -0.08 -0.18a -0.10c 0.90a 0.06 -0.69a 1.00 0.38
a 0.15a 0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.09 -0.23a -0.20a -0.11c 0.02 -0.13b -0.12b -0.24a 
(9) LNMV  0.08 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.18a 0.01 0.41a 0.23a 1.00 0.18
a 0.01 -0.04 0.20a 0.09 -0.18a 0.13b 0.02 0.03 0.16a 0.16a -0.13b 
(10)  DEBT_RATIO  0.10c -0.01 -0.06 -0.14b 0.01 0.08 0.18a 0.14b 0.05 1.00 
-0.12b 0.05 0.09c -0.07 0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.10c 0.12b 0.11c -0.08 
(11) ROE  0.07 -0.13b -0.15a 0.02 -0.14b 0.25a 0.08 -0.09 0.00 0.17a 1.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.16
a -0.04 0.03 0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.09c 
(12) BIG_4  0.26a 0.09 0.06 -0.04 -0.13b 0.07 0.05 -0.12b -0.07 0.00 0.13b 1.00 0.14
b 0.27a 0.17a 0.26a 0.29a 0.08 0.23a 0.35a 0.19a 
(13) PAR  0.52a 0.27a -0.15a 0.06 0.01 0.13b 0.16a 0.03 0.20a 0.05 0.24a 0.12b 1.00 
0.35a 0.26a 0.37a 0.09 0.16a 0.40a 0.38a 0.21a 
(14) PERIDNC  0.65a 0.52a -0.03 0.07 -0.05 0.02 0.05 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10c -0.01 0.26a 0.33a 1.00 0.26
a 0.70a 0.51a -0.10c 0.57a 0.53a 0.34a 
(15) PERINBB  0.25a 0.19a -0.09 0.25a -0.14b 0.20a 0.08 -0.23a -0.21a -0.06 0.16a 0.20a 0.24a 0.31a 1.00 0.38
a 0.04 -0.14b 0.28a 0.31a 0.34a 
(16) PERNEAC  0.72a 0.53a -0.10c 0.16a -0.19a 0.02 0.29a -0.25a 0.00 -0.05 0.02 0.25a 0.36a 0.65a 0.34a 1.00 
0.34a -0.07 0.72a 0.70a 0.32a 
(17) PERNENC  0.35a 0.17a -0.04 -0.06 -0.14b 0.09 0.06 -0.10c -0.10c -0.05 0.08 0.31a 0.07 0.52a 0.11b 0.36a 1.00 -0.11
b 0.27a 0.28a 0.38a 
(18) DUALITY  0.22a 0.08 0.25a 0.03 0.03 -0.12b 0.03 0.03 0.16a 0.10c 0.16a 0.08 0.13b -0,07 -0.15a -0.03 -0.16a 1.00 0.06 0.24
a -0.18a 
(19) CGC  0.67a 0.45 -0.07 0.11b -0.14a 0.11c 0.26a -0.16a 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.23a 0.42a 0.54a 0.24a 0.72a 0.29a 0.06 1.00 
0.66a 0.18a 
(20) NC  0.66a 0.52a 0.02 0.11b -0.14b 0.03 0.26a -0.16a 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.35a 0.38a 0.50a 0.29a 0.74a 0.28a 0.24a 0.66a 1.00 0.15
a 
(21) INST  0.22a 0.08 -0.18a 0.20a -0.18a 0.04 0.12b -0.25a -0.10c -0.13b 0.19a 0.18a 0.18a 0.32a 0.48a 0.27a 0.36a -0.19a 0.16a 0.13b 1.00 
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Table 8: Corporate Governance and IR 
The table below summarizes the equation’s results using Pooled and Fixed Effects OLS: 
DSi,t = a0 + a1 IRi,t+ a2 PPEi,t + a3AS_TURNi,t + a4 DERi,t + a5 DIVPAYi,t+ a6MBRi,t +  + a7SIZEi,t-1 + a8LNMVi,t + a9DEBT_RATIOi,t+ a10ROEi,t 
+ a11BIG_4i,t + a12PARi,t + a13PERIDNCi,t +a14 PERINBBi,t + a15PERNEACi,t + a16PERNENCi,t +  a17DUALITY + a18CGCi,t + a19NCi,t + 
a20INSTi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects}+  eit 
The period of interest is 2011-2015. This sample consists of 82 international firms listed in the IR database 
(http://examples.integratedreporting.org/reporters?start=A). DS is IR Disclosure Score Index. DS is derived from the scale of total received 
score of each firm to the maximum score (equals with 28 observations based on KING III checklist). For more details see section 4.5.5. 
Definitions of the rest of the variables are provided in notes to Table 5. Z – statistic and p – values (in the parentheses) for each estimated 
variable are provided in columns (4) and (6). The superscripts *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Dependent Variable: DS Results 
  Model (A)  (Pooled OLS) Model (B)  (Fixed Effects) 
Variable Predictions Estimations  Z –Statistic (P-values)   Estimations  Z –Statistic (P-values)   
Intercept  ? 0.1866*** 3.91 (0.00) 0.2902*** 4.43 (0.00) 
IR + 0.6629*** 5.60 (0.00) 0.0649*** 5.33 (0.00) 
PPE ? 0.0176 0.78 (0.43) -0.0178 -0.67 (0.50) 
AS_TURN + 0.0564*** 4.11 (0.00) 0.0568*** 4.04 (0.00) 
DER - -0.0306*** -2.69 (0.01) -0.0323***  -2.80 (0.01) 
DIVPAY + 0.0071** 2.16 (0.03) 0.0070** 2.10 (0.04) 
MBR ? -0.0005*** -2.72 (0.01) -0.0005** -2.49 (0.01) 
SIZE + 0.0027** 2.26 (0.02) 0.0284**  2.32 (0.02) 
LNMV + 0.0124*** 3.74 (0.00) 0.0123***  3.59 (0.00) 
DEBT_RATIO + 0.0598** 2.13 (0.03) 0.0573*  1.89 (0.06) 
ROE ? -0.0222*** -5.23 (0.00) -0.0227*** -5.33  (0.00) 
BIG_4 + 0.0043 0.36 (0.72) 0.0143  1.16 (0.25) 
PAR + 0.0272*** 3.45 (0.00) 0.0182**  2.12 (0.03) 
PERIDNC + 0.0016*** 6.57 (0.00) 0.0015***  6.16 (0.00) 
PERINBB + -0.0012*** -3.31 (0.00) -0.0011***  -2.94 (0.00) 
PERNEAC + 0.0009*** 4.26 (0.00) 0.0010***  4,51 (0.00) 
PERNENC + 0.0002 0.82 (0.41) 0.0003  1.24 (0.22) 
DUALITY - 0.0740*** 7.24 (0.00) 0.0804*** 7.45 (0.00) 
CGC + 0.0082 0.61 (0.54) 0.0071  0.52 (0.60) 
NC + -0.0051 -0.35 (0.73) -0.0103  -0.69 (0.49) 
INST + 0.148*** 3.89 (0.00) 0.1386***  3.43 (0.00) 
Industry Fixed Effects  No  Yes   
Year Fixed Effects  No  Yes  
Adj.R2  0.5971  0.5999  
Rn2 statistic   920.992***  968.726***  
Ν  322  322  
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5.3 IR and discretionary accruals  
Table 9 shows the Spearman and Pearson correlations for all variables included in 
equation (3). The dependent variable DAC is correlated negatively and significantly (at 
the 5% level or higher) with SIZE and CFO, implying that large firms (in total asset 
terms) and firms with high operating cash flows tend to display more conservative 
earnings management practices. In contrast, firms that appear to offer high growth 
opportunities and high profitability tend to apply more aggressive earnings 
manipulation techniques. 
In table 10, the results from the estimation of equation (3) are reported. The coefficients 
of interest are γ1-γ3. In model (A), it is an estimated equation (3) based on a pooled 
OLS, whereas in model (B), a fixed effects approach is adopted. In both models (A) 
and (B), the DS associates negatively and significantly at the 1% level with DAC. This 
output confirms Iatridis’ (2011) findings and indicates that firms that present high-
quality IR information tend to adopt milder earnings management techniques. 
Additionally, table 10 shows that IR is significantly negative at the 1% level, implying 
that firms that produce IR reports named “Integrated Report” tend to display lower 
discretionary accruals compared to those that use the name “Annual Report”. In table 
10, it is observed that IR_DS and DAC are positively and significantly associated at the 
1% level, implying that firms that display high-quality IR information and that redact 
their financial reports according to IR principles, tend to exhibit lower earnings quality 
compared to firms that do not exhibit such characteristics. In the same table, it is 
observed that earnings management practices are more common in firms in which the 
CEO also plays the role of chairman because DAC and DUALITY are positively and 
significantly associated at the 1% level. This result confirms the findings of Irani and 
Oesch (2013). 
Table 10 shows that DAC is associated negatively and significantly at the 5% level (or 
better) with SIZE, MBR, CFO, CASH, CGC (only in model (B)) and INST. These 
results imply that large firms with a corporate governance committee exhibiting high 
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growth opportunities have high operating cash flows and liquidity levels and are 
composed of a high proportion of common shares, owned by institutional shareholders; 
and they tend to display lower discretionary accruals compared to firms that do not 
exhibit such characteristics. Hence, the findings of Lin et al. (2006), Chevis et al. 
(2007), Lenk and Szczesny (2007), Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) and Iatridis 
(2011) are confirmed. In contrast, in the same table, it is observed that the LEV, ROA 
and BIG_4 (only in model (B)) variables are positively and significantly (at the 5% 
level or better) associated with DAC, implying that firms with a high level of leverage 
and profitability engage more in earnings management.   
Table 9: Correlation Matrix for Hypothesis 2a 
Spearman correlations reported below the diagonal and Pearson correlations above the diagonal. The superscripts a, band c denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Correlations for H2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) DAC  1.00 0.01 -0.09
c -0.10c -0.12b -0.02 0.04 0.54a -0.50a -0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.05 
(2) DS  0.03 1.00 0.62
a -0.09c -0.11b 0.10c 0.33a 0.08 0.09c -0.18a 0.19a 0.63a 0.33a 
(3) IR  -0.06 0.58
a 1.00 -0.18a -0.07 0.18a 0.11b -0.06 0.04 -0.05 0.09c 0.46a 0.13a 
(4) LEV  -0.07 -0.10
b -0.19a 1.00 0.10c 0.08 0.05 -0.09c 0.10c -0.32a 0.21a -0.12b -0.24a 
(5) SIZE  -0.18
a -0.16a -0.12b 0.10c 1.00 0.10a 0.08 0.05 -0.09c 0.10c -0.32a 0.21a -0.12b 
(6) MBR  0.12
b 0.24a 0.17a 0.10c -0.69a 1.00 -0.11b -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 -0.10c 0.07 0.05 
(7) BIG_4  0.07 0.31
a 0.11b 0.04 -0.11b 0.03 1.00 0.12b 0.10c -0.20a 0.11b 0.23a 0.19a 
(8) ROA  0.37
a 0.06 -0.07 -0.19a -0.12b 0.00 0.08 1.00 0.41a -0.18a 0.08 0.12b 0.18a 
(9) CFO -0.53
a 0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.41a 1.00 -0.24a 0.22a 0.11b 0.08 
(10) CASH -0.02 -0.20
a 0.00 -0.27a 0.07 -0.12b -0.08 0.01 -0.13b 1.00 -0.14a -0.16a -0.09c 
(11) DUALITY  0,00 0.21
a 0.09c 0.21a 0.04 0.02 0.11b 0.12b 0.19a -0.18a 1.00 0.05 -0.21a 
(12) CGC  -0.03 0.66
a 0.46a -0.14a -0.16a 0.23a 0.23a 0.05 0.08 -0.10c 0.05 1.00 0.24a 
(13) INST  0.08 0.29
a 0.11b -0.24a -0.26a 0.10c 0.19a 0.24a 0.09c -0.06 -0.20a 0.23a 1.00 
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Table 10: IR and Earnings Quality 
The table below summarizes the equation’s results using Pooled and Fixed Effects OLS: 
DACi,t = γ0 + γ1DSi,t + γ2IRi,t +γ3(IR*DS)i,t + γ4LEVi,t + γ5SIZEi,t+ γ6MBRi,t + γ7BIG_4i,t + γ8ROAi,t + γ9CFOi,t + γ10CASHi,t + 
γ11DUALITYi,t + γ12CGCi,t + γ13INSTi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} + ui,t   
The period of interest is 2011-2015. The sample consists of 82 international firms listed in the IR database 
(http://examples.integratedreporting.org/reporters?start=A).The dependent variable is discretionary accruals (DAC) and 
obtained from the Jones (1991) model.  Definitions of the rest of the variables are provided in notes to Table 5. Z – statistic and p 
– values (in the parentheses) for each estimated variable are provided in columns (4) and (6). The superscripts *, ** and *** 
denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Dependent Variable: DAC Results 
  Model 1  (Pooled OLS) Model 2  (Fixed Effects) 
Variable Predictions Estimations  Z –Statistic (P-values)   Estimations  Z –Statistic (P-values)   
Intercept  ? 0.0800** 9.52 (0.00) 0.0917*** 10.74 (0.00) 
DS - -0.0372*** -3.10 (0.00) -0.0393*** -3.57 (0.00) 
IR - -0.0444*** -4.63 (0.00) -0.0342*** -3.86 (0.00) 
IR_DS - 0.0658*** 4.94 (0.00) 0.0484*** 3.92 (0.00) 
LEV - 0.0112** 2.02 (0.04) 0.0113** 2.16 (0.03) 
SIZE - -0.0024*** -7.25 (0.00) -0.0024*** -7.68 (0.00) 
MBR - -0.0001*** -4.03 (0.00) -5.53E-05** -2.33 (0.02) 
BIG_4 - 0.0019 0.96 (0.34) 0.0061*** 3.35 (0.00) 
ROA + 0.8818*** 62.13 (0.00) 0.8835*** 65.60 (0.00) 
CFO + -0.8968*** -63.88 (0.00) -0.9051*** -69.37 (0.00) 
CASH - -0.0372*** -5.08 (0.00) -0.0292*** -4.32 (0.00) 
DUALITY + 0.0073*** 4.44 (0.00) 0.0075*** 4.98 (0.00) 
CGC - -0.0031 -1.60 (0.11) -0.0042** -2.35 (0.02) 
INST - -0.0229*** -3.88 (0.00) -0.0225*** -3.99 (0.00) 
Industry Fixed Effects  No  Yes   
Year Fixed Effects  No  Yes  
Adj.R2  0.7307  0.7423  
Rn2 statistic   6085.52***  7321.07***  
Ν  376  376  
 
Table 11 shows the Spearman and Pearson correlations for all variables included in 
equation (5). The dependent variable DAC is correlated negatively and significantly (at 
the 5% level or higher) with SIZE and LEV, implying that large firms (in total asset 
terms) and firms with high leverage ratio tend to display more conservative earnings 
management practices. In contrast, firms owned largely by institutional shareholders 
and presenting high profitability tend to apply more aggressive earnings manipulation 
techniques. 
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Table 11: Correlation Matrix for  Hypothesis 2b 
Spearman and Pearson correlations among discretionary and control variables are illustrated in the table below. Below the diagonal the Spearman correlations are reported while Pearson correlations are reported above 
the diagonal. The superscripts ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
Correlations for H1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) DAC  1.00 0.04 -0.09* -0.09* -0.16*** 0.03 0.07 0.17*** -0.03 -0.06 -0.08 -0.10* 0.04 0.11** 
(2) DS  0.04 1.00 0.62*** -0.10* -0.11** 0.05 0.33*** -0.07 0.09* -0.18*** 0.12** -0.05 0.18 0.33*** 
(3) IR  -0.10** 0.58*** 1.00 -0.17*** -0.07 0.12** 0.11** -0.07 0.04 -0.05 0.09* 0.12** 0.08 0.14*** 
(4) LEV  -0.14*** -0.12** -0.19*** 1.00 0.10* -0.11** 0.03 0.07 0.19*** -0.30*** 0.17*** -0.04 0.20*** -0.21*** 
(5) SIZE  -0.18*** -0.16*** -0.12** 0.11** 1.00 -0.43*** -0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.33*** 0.29*** 0.02 -0.24*** 
(6) MBR  0.07 0.19*** 0.15*** 0.15*** -0.68*** 1.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.05 0.13** -0.06 0.14*** 
(7) BIG_4  0.11** 0.31*** 0.11** 0.02 -0.11** 0.04 1.00 -0.01 0.10* -0.20*** -0.03 0.00 0.11** 0.19*** 
(8) ROE  0.70*** 0.08 -0.09* 0.17*** -0.07 0.10* 0.08 1.00 0.19*** -0.01 0.03 -0.14*** 0.06 0.09* 
(9) CFO  0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.13*** -0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.35*** 1.00 -0.24*** 0.17*** -0.34*** 0.22*** 0.08 
(10) CASH  -0.05 -0.20*** 0.00 -0.26*** 0.07 -0.13*** -0.08 -0.08 -0.13** 1.00 -0.14*** 0.17*** -0.14*** -0.09* 
(11) BSIZE  -0.08 0.16*** 0.10* 0.21*** 0.37*** -0.18*** 0.01 0.10** 0.17*** -0.03 1.00 0.01 0.23*** -0.25*** 
(12) BOARIND  -0.06 -0.05 0.15*** -0.07 0.17*** 0.03 -0.01 -0.13** -0.35*** 0.13*** -0.06 1.00 0.04 -0.19*** 
(13) DUALITY  0.13** 0.21*** 0.08 0.22*** 0.03 0.05 0.11** 0.12** 0.19*** -0.18*** 0.23*** 0.09* 1.00 -0.21*** 
(14) INST  0.18*** 0.29*** 0.11** -0.20*** -0.25*** 0.13** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.08 -0.06 -0.22*** -0.16*** -0.20*** 1.00 
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In table 12 the estimation results of equation 5 are presented. IR disclosure score (DS) 
is associated negatively and significantly, at the 1% level, with the discretionary 
accruals (DAC). Furthermore, in the model (2) the dummy variable DDS is associated 
negatively and significantly, at the 5% level with the DAC. This outputs confirms 
Iatridis (2011) findings and implies that firms with high IR disclosure quality tend to 
exhibit higher earnings quality, in comparison with firms with low IR disclosure 
quality. In addition, firms which compose annual reports with the sign “Integrated 
Reporting” tend to display higher accruals quality in comparison with firms in which 
in their annual reports have the sign “Sustainability Reporting” or “Annual Report”. 
This is because “IR” variable is associated negatively and significantly, at the 1% level, 
with “DAC” variable. Furthermore, big firms with high levels of leverage and operating 
cash flows tend to display higher earnings quality in comparison with small firms with 
low levels of leverage because the variables “SIZE”, “LEV” and “CFO” are associated 
negatively and significantly with the “DAC” at the 1% level. Firms with high growth 
opportunities, high profitability and liquidity which are audited by a big 4 accounting 
firm tend to exhibit lower earnings quality in contrast with firms with the opposite 
characteristics. These findings are based on the fact that the variables “MBR”, “ROE”, 
“CASH” and “BIG_4” are associated positively and significantly with the “DAC” at 
the 5% level or better. As expected, firms with a high number of members on their 
boards tend to exhibit lower earnings quality in comparison to firms with smaller board 
size. This finding stems from the fact that the variable “BSIZE” associated negatively 
and significantly, at the 1% level, with the “DAC”.  Additionally, it is observed that 
there is a positive and significant association, at the 1% level, between the “DUALITY” 
and “DAC”, implying that firms in which the CEO is also chairman of the board exhibit 
lower earnings quality in contrast with firms in which the CEO and the chairman are  
independent. Finally, in table 12, it is observed that INST” and “DAC” are associated 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
07/06/2020 14:11:01 EEST - 137.108.70.13
174 
 
negatively and significantly, at the 1% level, implying that the earnings quality of a 
firm is strengthened by the monitoring activities of institutional shareholders.   
Table 12: IR and Discretionary Accruals for hypothesis 2b 
The table below summarizes the equation’s results using Fixed Effects OLS: 
 DACi,t = γ0 + γ1DSi,t + γ2IRi,t + γ3(IR*DS)i,t +  γ4LEVi,t + γ5SIZEi,t+ γ6MBRi,t + γ7BIG_4i,t + γ8ROEi,t + γ9CFOi,t + γ10CASHi,t + 
γ11BSIZEi,t + γ12BOARDINDi,t + γ13DUALITYi,t + γ14INSTi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} + ui,t   (5a)  
DACi,t = γ0 + γ1DDSi,t + γ2IRi,t + γ3LEVi,t + γ4SIZEi,t+ γ5MBRi,t + γ6BIG_4i,t + γ7ROEi,t + γ8CFOi,t + γ9CASHi,t + γ10BSIZEi,t + 
γ11BOARDINDi,t + γ12DUALITYi,t + γ13INSTi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} + ui,t   (5b)  
The period of interest is 2011-2015. The  sample consists of 82 international firms from around the world listed in the IR database 
(http://examples.integratedreporting.org/reporters?start=A). The dependent variable is discretionary accruals (DAC) and 
obtained from the Ball and Shivakumar (2006, 2008) model.  Definitions of the rest of the variables are provided in notes to Table 
5.T – statistic and p – values (in the parentheses) for each estimated variable are provided in column (4). The standard errors are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity and industry – and year – level (two – dimensional) clustering (Petersen, 2009). The superscripts 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Dependent Variable: DAC Estimations 
Variable Predicted Sign Model 1 T –Statistic           
(P-values) 
Model 2 T –Statistic              
(P-values) 
Intercept  ? 0.0565*** 4.76 (0.00) 0.0352*** 3.85 (0.00) 
DS - -0.0361*** -2.66 (0.01)   
DDS -   -0.0047** -2.12(0.03) 
IR - -0.0364*** -3.10 (0.00) -0.0094*** -4.18 (0.00) 
IR_DS - 0.0399** 2.41 (0.02)   
LEV - -0.0486*** -6.55 (0.00) -0.0491*** -6.59 (0.00) 
SIZE - -0.0017*** -3.31 (0.00) -0.0017*** -3.18 (0.00) 
MBR - 0.0003*** 3.16 (0.00) 0.0003*** 3.20 (0.00) 
BIG_4 - 0.0055** 2.24 (0.02) 0.0053** 2.25 (0.02) 
ROE + 0.2734*** 304.12 (0.00) 0.2775*** 309.02 (0.00) 
CFO + -0.3069*** -17.23 (0.00) -0,3093*** -17.22 (0.00) 
CASH - 0.0396*** 4.39 (0.00) 0.0399*** 4.41 (0.00) 
BSIZE - -0.0009*** -2.76 (0.01) -0.0008** -2.49 (0.01) 
BOARDIND - 0.0037 0.69 (0.49) 0.0031 0.57 (0.57) 
DUALITY + 0.0126*** 6.19 (0.00) 0.0120*** 5.93 (0.00) 
INST - -0.0226*** -2.91 (0.00) -0.0189** -2.57 (0.01) 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2  53.996%  54.443%  
Ν  377  377  
 
5.4. IR disclosures quality and agency cost 
Table 13 presents the correlations found among all variables included in equation (6). 
It is observed that agency costs (AG_COST) correlate positively and significantly (at 
the 5% level) with the IR disclosure score index (DS) in both the Spearman and Pearson 
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correlation triangle. This finding indicates that high-quality IR disclosure leads to high 
levels of agency costs. Although these univariate results are very interesting, they do 
not capture all the other factors that most likely affect the extent of the agency costs. 
Hence, it relies on a multivariate analysis for more accurate results (Kanagaretnam et 
al., 2011; Magnis and Iatridis, 2017).  
In table 14, the estimation output from the estimation of equation (6) are reported. The 
coefficients of interest are λ1 and λ2. Regardless of the estimation method (Pooled or 
Fixed Effects OLS), the estimations of the independent variables do not deviate. In table 
14, it is observed that DS and AGENCOST are negatively and significantly related at 
the 1% level. This result implies that firms that disclose high-quality IR information 
tend to display lower agency costs, confirming the findings of La Fond and Watts 
(2008). Additionally, during the research period, firms that improved their financial 
reporting quality, adopting (more) IR principles, and exhibit lower agency costs, as 
illustrated in table 14; the AGENCOST and REP_IMPROVE variables are associated 
negatively and significantly at the 5% level. It is important to note that AGENCOST 
and DAC are positively and significantly associated at the 1% level, indicating that 
firms that engage in more aggressive earnings management techniques tend to exhibit 
higher levels of agency costs. This result confirms the findings of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), Liang (2004), Goldman and Slezak (2006), Drymiotes and Hemmer (2013) and 
Eisenhardt (1989). 
In the sample, the large firms that engage less in earnings management and exhibit high 
levels of leverage tend to display lower agency costs. In contrast, firms with high 
profitability ratios and market capitalization and display increasing growth prospects, 
tend to exhibit higher information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders and 
therefore higher agency costs (Smith and Watts, 1982). In addition, firms in which the 
CEO is also the chairman of the board tend to exhibit high agency costs compared to 
those in which the CEO is a non-executive director. 
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Table 13: Correlation Matrix for H3 Hypothesis 
Spearman correlations are reported below the diagonal and Pearson correlations above the diagonal. The superscripts a,, band c 
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Correlations for H3 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) AG_COST  1.00 0.13b 0.07 0.05 -0.06 0.04 -0.30a 0.04 0.51a 0.03 0.20a -0.33a 
(2) DS  0.13b 1.00 -0.09c 0.03 0.09c -0.07 -0.11b 0.17a 0.10c 0.18a 0.33a -0.29a 
(3) REP_IMPROVE  -0.02 -0.01 1.00 8.18E-05 0.06 0.03 0.14a 0.14a -0.06 -0.11b 0.00 0.08 
(4) DAC2  0.04 0.03 -0.01 1.00 -0.15a 0.16a -0.17a -0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.09c -0.09c 
(5) DEBT_RATIO  0.16a 0.06 0.02 -0.24a 1.00 -0.10b 0.14a 0.17a 0.08 0.08 -0.08 -0.07 
(6) ROE  0.29a 0.08 0.,08 0.65a 0.18a 1.00 0.00 0.00 -0.25a 0.07 0.09c -0.04 
(7) SIZE  -0.45a -0.16a 0.16a -0.19a 0.12b -0.08 1.00 0.39a -0.27a 0.02 -0.24a 0.29a 
(8) LNMV  0.28a 0.05 0.11b 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.25a 1.00 0.31a 0.03 -0.14a 0.19a 
(9) MBR  0.66a 0.24a -0.03 0.10b 0.20a 0.09c -0.69a 0.39a 1.00 -0.10c 0.05 -0.10c 
(10) DUALITY  0.20a 0.21a -0.11b 0.14a 0.07 0.13a 0.03 0.16a 0.03 1.00 -0.20a -0.07 
(11) INST  0.10c 0.29a -0.03 0.14a -0.14a 0.18a -0.26a -0.13a 0.10c -0.19a 1.00 -0.25a 
(12) BETA  -0.24a -0.26a 0.09c -0.10c 0.00 -0.20a 0.34a 0.15a -0.20a -0.03 -0.24a 1.00 
 
Table 14: IR and agency cost 
AGENCOST = λ0 + λ1DSi,t + λ2REP_IMPRi,t +λ3DACi,t + λ4DEBT_RATIOi,t + λ5ROEi,t +λ6SIZEi,t + λ7LNMVi,t + λ8MBRi,t 
+λ9DUALITYi,t + λ10INSTi,t +λ11BETAi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} +  vi,t   
The period of interest is 2011-2015. The thesis sample consists of 82 international firms listed in IR database 
(http://examples.integratedreporting.org/reporters?start=A).Agency cost (AGENCOST) is the dependent variable and obtained 
by multiplying the Tobin’s Q ratio with the CFO (operating cash flows divided with the firm’s total assets).Definitions of the rest 
of the variables are provided in notes to Table 5. Z – statistic and p – values (in the parentheses) for each estimated variable are 
provided in columns (4) and (6). The superscripts *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Dependent Variable: AGENCOST Results 
  Model (A)  (Pooled OLS) Model (B)  (Fixed Effects) 
Variable Predictions Estimations  Z –Statistic (P-values)   Estimations  Z –Statistic (P-values)   
Intercept  ? 0.2231*** 7.27 (0.00) 0.2554*** 6.72 (0.00) 
DS - -0.1126*** -3.82 (0.00) -0.1580*** -4.91 (0.00) 
REP_IMPROVE - -0.0180** -2.26 (0.02) -0.0191** -2.40 (0.02) 
DAC  + 1.4280*** 18.19 (0.00) 1.2683*** 15.89 (0.00) 
DEBT_RATIO - -0.1339*** -5.52 (0.00) -0.0909*** -3.53 (0.00) 
ROE + 0.5236*** 133.15 (0.00) 0.4850*** 123.79 (0.00) 
SIZE ? -0.0189*** -9.26 (0.00) -0.0175*** -8.68 (0.00) 
LNMV ? 0.0145*** 4.94 (0.00) 0.0117*** 3.85 (0.00) 
MBR + 0.0120*** 79.97 (0.00) 0.0122*** 79.19 (0.00) 
DUALITY + 0.0579*** 7.21 (0.00) 0.0624*** 7.79 (0.00) 
INST - 0.0171 0.58 (0.56) 0.0335 1.08 (0.28) 
BETA ? -0.0121 -1.36 (0.17) -0.0125 -1.41 (0.16) 
Industry Fixed Effects  No  Yes  
Year Fixed Effects  No   Yes  
Adj.R2  0.2971  0.2981  
Rn2 statistic   24549.20***  22937.71***  
Ν  382  382  
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5.5. IR and firm performance 
In table 15 the correlation matrix for all variables used in the model (7) are presented. 
Consistent with the hypothesis that there is a positive association between IR disclosure 
quality and firm performance, there is a positive and significant (at the 1% level) 
correlation between the variables DS (and DDS) and TOBIN’S_Q. Despite the fact that 
these individual results are interesting, they do not control for all other factors likely to 
influence the extent of performance variability of firms. Hence, a multivariate analysis 
for making inferences is applied (Kanagaretnam et al., 2011; Magnis and Iatridis, 
2017).  
In table 16 the results from the estimation of equation (7) are reported. This table 
presents the estimations of the first model. As a dependent variable it uses TOBIN’S_Q 
ratio, which is estimated as a proxy for firm performance. TOBIN’S_Q is the ratio of 
the market value of assets to the replacement cost of assets (Cheng 2008; Jermias and 
Gani, 2014). It creates two models, model 7(a) and 7(b), in which the IR disclosure 
quality is checked in two different ways. In model 7(a) it uses the independent variable 
DDS and in model 7(b) the DS. In the first column of this table the explanatory variables 
tested in models 7(a) and 7(b) are analyzed. In the next column the predicted signs of 
each variable are listed. Then, the values of the coefficients of models 7(a) and 7(b) are 
depicted in columns 3 and 5, respectively. The T-statistic and p-values results of models 
7(a) and 7(b) are shown in columns 4 and 6, respectively. 
The coefficient of interest is α1. Independent variables DDS and DS are associated 
positively and significantly at the 1% level with TOBIN’S_Q, implying that firms with 
a higher IR disclosure quality tend to exhibit higher performance in comparison with 
those which display a lower IR disclosure quality. Furthermore, as expected, stronger 
corporate governance mechanisms lead to higher performance. Specifically, in table 16 
it is observed that firms in which the CEO is simultaneously chairman of the board of 
directors present lower performance in comparison with firms in which the CEO and 
the chairman of the board are independent persons. Additionally, firms with a high 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
07/06/2020 14:11:01 EEST - 137.108.70.13
178 
 
number of board members tend to display a lower performance in comparison with 
firms with a smaller board size, confirming the findings of Weisbach (1988) and 
Jermias and Gani (2014).The negative association between board size and performance 
is also consistent with the argument that a larger board takes more time and effort to 
reach consensus and encounters more free-riding problems among directors (Cheng, 
2008). In table 16 it is observed that a higher independence of the board of directors 
leads to higher performance because BOARDIND is associated positively and 
significantly at the 1% level with TOBIN’S_Q. Additionally, the results indicate that 
institutional ownership (INST) is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
that firms benefit from the monitoring activities of institutional shareholders, and 
confirming the findings of Bushee (1998) and Cyert et al. (2002).  
Furthermore, the findings suggest that firm size is negatively and significantly 
associated with performance both in models 7(a) and 7(b). This result is consistent with 
the findings of previous studies (e.g., Jermias, 2007; Westphal, 1999). Finally, as 
expected, firms that are highly leveraged tend to display high performance due the fact 
that LEVERAGE2 is negatively and significantly, associated with TOBIN’S_Q at the 
1% level, confirming the findings of Lee and Yeo (2016). 
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Table 15: Correlation Matrix for H4 Hypothesis 
Spearman and Pearson correlations among performance and control variables are illustrated in the table below. Below the diagonal the Spearman correlations are reported while Pearson correlations are reported 
above the diagonal.  TOBIN’S_Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to the replacement costs of assets (Cheng, 2008 ; Jermias and Gani, 2014). DDS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has gathered an IR 
disclosure score which is equal or greater than the median price notifications percentage of all sampled firms and 0 if otherwise. DS is IR Disclosure Score Index. DS is derived from the scale of total received score of 
each firm to the maximum score (equals with 28 observations based on KING III checklist). For more details see section 4.5.5. DUALITY is a dummy variable which takes 1 when a firm’s CEO is also the chairman of 
the board of directors and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is the number of director on the Board.  BOARDIND is the board independence ratio measured as the number of independent directors divided by total board size.  INST 
is the ratio of number of shares owned by institutional shareholders to total outstanding common shares. GROWTH is the growth in total assets from the begging to the end of year t. TURNOVER is a measure of asset 
utilization that captures how efficiently the firm’s assets are used and is estimated as the ratio of annual sales to total assets at the end of fiscal year t. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year 
t. LEVERAGE2 is another proxy for firm’s leverage calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets. STDEVΔOI is the standard deviation of the annual change in operating income. T – statistic and p – values (in 
the parentheses) for each estimated variable are provided in columns to the right of these outputs. The superscripts ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Correlations for H1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) TOBIN’S_Q 1.00 0.15*** 0.07 -0.07 -0.02 -0.12** 0.16*** -0.13** -0.05 -0.41*** -0.07 -0.05 
(2) DDS 0.20*** 1.00 0.73*** 0.20*** 0.12** 0.11** 0.26*** -0.02 0.10* -0.14*** -0.04 0.01 
(3) DS 0.23*** 0.81*** 1.00 0.20*** 0.13*** 0.03 0.33*** -0.01 0.26*** -0.11** -0.09* 0.00 
(4) DUALITY 0.07 0.20*** 0.22*** 1.00 0.23*** -0.05 -0.19*** -0.02 -0.12** 0.02 0.20*** 0.09* 
(5) BSIZE -0.15*** 0.14*** 0.18*** 0.23*** 1.00 -0.03 -0.24*** -0.03 -0.24*** 0.34*** 0.19*** 0.23*** 
(6) BOARDIND -0.01 0.11** 0.05 -0.09* 0.05 1.00 0.20*** -0.02 0.01 -0.30*** -0.04 -0.27*** 
(7) INST 0.16*** 0.25*** 0.29*** -0.18*** -0.20*** 0.18*** 1.00 0.06 0.33*** -0.23*** -0.24*** -0.07 
(8) GROWTH 0.06 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.14*** -0.15*** 0.20*** 1.00 0.16*** 0.09* 0.02 -0.01 
(9) TURNOVER 0.10** 0.07 0.16*** 0.01 -0.22*** -0.12** 0.26*** 0.19*** 1.00 -0.16*** -0.44*** 0.03 
(10) SIZE -0.66*** -0.15*** -0.16*** 0.03 0.38*** -0.18*** -0.25*** -0.09* -0.14*** 1.00 0.09** 0.37*** 
(11) LEVERAGE2 0.15*** -0.07 -0.10* 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.00 -0.24*** -0.06 -0.44*** 0.09* 1.00 -0.05 
(12) STDEVΔOI -0.59*** -0.10* -0.05 0.01 0.30*** -0.13*** -0.19*** -0.11** -0.11** 0.85*** -0.03 1.00 
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Table 16: IR and firm’s performance 
This table presents the estimations from the equations below: 
TOBIN’S_Qi,t = a0 + a1DDSi,t + a2DUALITYi,t + α3BSIZEi,t + α4BOARDINDi,t + a5INSTi,t + a6GROWTHi,t + a7TURNOVERi,t + 
a8SIZEi,t + a9LEVERAGEi,t + a10STDEVΔOIi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} + vi,t  7(a) 
TOBIN’S_Qi,t = a0 + a1DSi,t + a2DUALITYi,t + α3BSIZEi,t + α4BOARDINDi,t + a5INSTi,t + a6GROWTHi,t + a7TURNOVERi,t + 
a8SIZEi,t + a9LEVERAGEi,t + a10STDEVΔOIi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} + vi,t  7(b) 
The period of interest is 2011-2015. The sample consists of 82 international firms listed in the IR database 
(http://examples.integratedreporting.org/reporters?start=A). Ιt uses the TOBIN’S_Q ratio as a proxy for the firm’s performance. 
Specifically, TOBIN’S_Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to the replacement costs of assets (Cheng, 2008 ; Jermias and 
Gani, 2014). The (independent) variables of interest are the DDS and the DS. DDS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has 
gathered an IR disclosure score which is equal or greater than the median price notifications percentage of all sampled firms and 
0 if otherwise). For more details see section 4.5.5. DS is IR Disclosure Score Index. DS is derived from the scale of total received 
score of each firm to the maximum score (equals with 28 observations based on KING III checklist). All other variables are defined 
in the footnotes of Table 6. T – statistic and p – values (in the parentheses) for each estimated variable are provided in columns to 
the right of these outputs The superscripts *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Dependent Variable: TOBIN’S_Q  Model 1(a)  Model 1(b) 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
 Coefficient  T –Statistic             
(P-values) 
Coefficient T –Statistic              
(P-values) 
Intercept  ?  41.6400*** 14.57 (0.00)  39.9024*** 18.86 (0.00) 
DDS +  2.1976*** 8.99 (0.00)    
DS +     5.0003*** 3.55 (0.00) 
DUALITY -  -2.6488*** -7.93 (0.00)  -2.5211*** -9.12 (0.00) 
BSIZE -  -0.6605*** -6.71 (0.00)  -0.6611*** -6.67 (0.00) 
BOARDIND +  14.4302*** 14.99 (0.00)  13.9629*** 17.52 (0.00) 
INST +  6.8921*** 6.21 (0.00)  7.1305*** 5.55 (0.00) 
GROWTH +  -1.1512*** -3.49 (0.00)  -1.1347*** -3.13 (0.00) 
TURNOVER +  -3.4886*** -9.13 (0.00)  -3.7259*** -8.17 (0.00) 
SIZE +  -2.6598*** -20.05 (0.00)  -2.6964*** -20.16 (0.00) 
LEVERAGE2 -  -10.7879*** -6.77 (0.00)  -11.3636*** -7.05 (0.00) 
STDEVΔOI ?  1.16E-05*** 14.49 (0.00)  1.31E-05*** 7.39 (0.00) 
Industry Fixed Effects   Yes   Yes  
Year Fixed Effects   Yes   Yes  
Adj. R2   32.765%   32.248%  
Ν   375   375  
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5.6. IR disclosures quality and value relevance 
In table 17 the correlation matrix for all variables used in model (8) is presented. 
Consistent with the hypothesis regarding a positive association between the value 
relevance of summary accounting information and IR disclosure quality, there is a 
positive and significant (at the 10% level or better) correlation (by Pearson) between 
the variables DS and DDS and the market value per share (MVPS). As expected, the 
book value per share (BVPS) is correlated positively and significantly (at the 1% level) 
with the MVPS. Although these individual results are interesting, a multivariate 
analysis for making inferences is applied (Kanagaretnam et al., 2011; Magnis and 
Iatridis, 2017). MVPS is significantly associated with SIZE, ROE and LEVERAGE2 
both at Spearman and Pearson correlations. Pearson’s results align with those of 
Lourenco et al. (2014). 
In table 18, the estimation results of the second research hypothesis are illustrated. Two 
sub-models, model 8(a) and 8(b) were created, in which the IR disclosure quality were 
checked in two different ways. Model 8(a) uses the independent variable DDS and in 
model 8(b) the DS variable. In the first column of this table, the explanatory variables 
tested in models 8(a) and 8(b) are analyzed. In the next column the predicted signs of 
each variable are listed. Then, the values of the coefficients of models 8(a) and 8(b) are 
depicted in columns 3 and 5, respectively. The t-statistic and p-values results of models 
8(a) and 8(b) are shown in columns 4 and 6, respectively. 
The dependent variable is MVPS. The coefficients of interest are λ1-λ3. Firms with a 
high IR disclosure quality tend to display high market value per share because DDS (or 
DS) and MVPS are associated positively and significantly at the 1% level. Furthermore, 
the basic summary information focuses on the accounting variables BVPS and EBTPS, 
which are positive and highly significant at the 1% level. This finding can be interpreted 
as an increase in the book value of equity and earnings before taxes affecting positive 
market valuation of the firms during the five-year period (2011-2015). Additionally, it 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
07/06/2020 14:11:01 EEST - 137.108.70.13
182 
 
is observed that the variables LEVERAGE2, ROE and CASH are positively and 
significantly associated at the 5% level or better with the dependent variable MVPS, 
implying that firms with high levels of leverage, profitability and liquidity display 
higher market valuation, confirming the findings of Iatridis (2012b) and Lourenco et 
al. (2014). 
Firms with a large number of employees tend to exhibit higher market valuation levels 
in comparison with firms with smaller numbers of employees. Firms in which an audit 
committee is considered as a corporate governance mechanism, tend to relish higher 
valuation from the markets because the variable PERIDAU is associated positively and 
significantly at the 1% level with the MVPS. Stakeholders can more effectively 
evaluate large firms with a high proportion of fixed assets to total assets in comparison 
to firms without these characteristics. Finally, firms in which the CEO is also chairman 
of the board tend to display lower market valuation in comparison with firms in which 
the CEO and the chairman of the board are different persons. 
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Table 17: Correlation Matrix for H5 Hypothesis 
Spearman and Pearson correlations among value relevance and control variables are illustrated in the table below. Below the diagonal the Spearman correlations are reported while Pearson correlations are reported 
above the diagonal. MVPS is the market value of equity scaled by the number of common shares. DDS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has gathered an IR disclosure score which is equal or greater than the 
median price notifications percentage of all sampled firms and 0 if otherwise. For more details see section 4.5.5. DS is IR Disclosure Score Index. DS is derived from the scale of total received score of each firm to the 
maximum score (equals with 28 observations based on KING III checklist). BVPS is the book value of equity scaled by the number of common shares. EBTPS is earnings before interest and taxation scaled by the number 
of common shares. LEVERAGE2 is another proxy for firm’s leverage calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets. ROE is the return on equity in fiscal year t calculated as net income during year t scaled by total 
equity at the begging of the year. CASH is the cash and short – term investments at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total assets at the begging of the year. PPE is net properties, plant and equipment divided into total 
assets at the end of fiscal year t (Clarkson et al., 2008).SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year t. DUALITY is a dummy variable which takes 1 when a firm’s CEO is also the chairman of 
the board of directors and 0 otherwise. PERIDAU is the percentage of independent board members on the audit committee. The superscripts ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Correlations for H5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) MVPS 1.00 0.09* 0.16*** 0.46*** 0.48*** 0.06 0.00 0.02 -0.09* 0.22*** -0.13** 0.13** 
(2) DDS 0.00 1.00 0.73*** -0.20*** -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.20*** 0.11** -0.13*** 0.21*** 0.26*** 
(3) DS 0.04 0.82*** 1.00 -0.14*** -0.06 -0.09* -0.07 -0.18*** 0.07 -0.11** 0.19*** 0.34*** 
(4) BVPS 0.32*** -0.24*** -0.22*** 1.00 0.79*** -0.05 0.01 0.11** -0.15*** 0.59*** 0.00 -0.07 
(5) EBTPS 0.27*** -0.13** -0.11** 0.67*** 1.00 -0.05 0.03 0.06 -0.08 0.42*** -0.03 -0.06 
(6) LEVERAGE2 -0.16*** -0.07 -0.10* -0.23*** -0.04 1.00 -0.09* -0.32*** 0.23*** 0.09* 0.21*** -0.18*** 
(7) ROE -0.15*** 0.07 0.07 -0.31*** 0.23*** 0.14*** 1.00 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.06 
(8) CASH 0.08 -0.21*** -0.21*** 0.19*** 0.13** -0.26*** -0.11** 1.00 -0.30*** 0.02 -0.14*** -0.10* 
(9) PP_E 0.04 0.07 0.06 -0.12** -0.16*** 0.20*** -0.12** -0.31*** 1,00 -0.29*** 0.29*** 0.00 
(10) SIZE -0.21*** -0.14*** -0.15*** 0.61*** 0.50*** 0.08 -0.05 0.10** -0.22*** 1.00 -0.01 -0.08 
(11) DUALITY 0.07 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.00 0.09* 0.21*** 0.15*** -0.18*** 0.30*** 0.00 1.00 0.03 
(12) PERIDAU 0.10** 0.22*** 0.32*** -0.12** -0.18*** -0.15*** 0.01 -0.15*** -0.01 -0.07 0.04 1.00 
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Table 18: IR and value relevance  
MVPSi,t = λ0 + λ1DDSi,t + λ2BVSi,t+ λ3EBITPSi,t + λ4LEVERAGEi,t + λ5ROE,t  + λ6CASHi,t  + λ7PPEi, + λ8SIZEi,t + λ9DUALITYi,t  
+ λ10PERIDAUi,t + λ11LN_EMPLOYi,t + {Industry Effects} +  {Year Effects} + eit  2(a) 
MVPSi,t = λ0 + λ1DSi,t + λ2BVSi,t+ λ3EBITPSi,t + λ4LEVERAGEi,t + λ5ROE,t  + λ6CASHi,t + λ7PPEi, + λ8SIZEi,t + λ9DUALITYi,t  + 
λ10PERIDAUi,t + λ11LN_EMPLOYi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} + eit  2(b) 
The period of interest is 2011-2015. The sample consists of 82 international firms listed in the IR database 
(http://examples.integratedreporting.org/reporters?start=A). MVPS is the market value of equity scaled by the number of common 
shares. The (independent) variables of interest are the DDS and the DS. DDS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has gathered 
an IR disclosure score which is equal or greater than the median price notifications percentage of all sampled firms and 0 if 
otherwise. For more details see section 4.5.5. DS is IR Disclosure Score Index. DS is derived from the scale of total received score 
of each firm to the maximum score (equals with 28 observations based on KING III checklist). All other variables are defined in 
the footnotes of the table6. T – statistic and p – values (in the parentheses) for each estimated variable are provided in columns 
(4) and (6). The superscripts *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Dependent Variable: MVPS  Model 2(a) Model 2(b) 
Variable  Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficients T –Statistic 
(P-values) 
Coefficients T –Statistic     
(P-values) 
Intercept  ? -54.1924 -0.34 (0.73) -526.2385* 
 
-1.91 (0.06) 
0 
DDS + 176.7375*** 2.84 (0.00)   
DS +   698.7813*** 2.68 (0.01) 
BVPS + 0.4635** 2.57 (0.01) 0.4433** 2.58 (0.01) 
EBTPS + 1.5421* 1.72 (0.09) 1.6554* 1.87 (0.06) 
LEVERAGE2 - 1048.4020*** 3.01 (0.00) 1035.1190*** 3.02 (0.00) 
ROE + 17.5671** 2.01 (0.04) 20.7386** 2.13 (0.03) 
CASH + 640.9936*** 3.11 (0.00) 659.6236*** 3.01 (0.00) 
PPE - -273.6916** -2.29 (0.02) -212.1900* -1.96 (0.05) 
SIZE + -64.7998*** -2.75 (0.01) -60.5224*** -2.76 (0.01) 
DUALITY - -202.8197*** -2.98 (0.00) -211.9690*** -2.97 (0.00) 
PERIDAU ? 2.9593*** 2.97 (0.00) 2.7332*** 3.02 (0.00) 
LN_EMPLOY ? 54.0869** 2.53 (0.01) 53.8607** 2.54 (0.01) 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2  37.573%  38.289%  
Ν  375  375  
 
5.7. Multiple-based valuation model (P/E) and IR disclosures quality 
Table 19 depicts the correlation matrix for all variables used in model (9). Consistent 
with the argument, there is a positive correlation at the 1% level (according to 
Spearman’s or Pearson’s approach) between the P/E and the IR disclosure quality 
metrics (DDS and DS). Furthermore, in table 20 a negative and significant correlation 
is noticed at the 10% level among the P/E and the DAC, marginally confirming the 
argument that firms with higher earnings quality display a higher valuation by analysts 
in comparison to firms with lower earnings quality.  
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Table 20 reports the results from the estimation of equation (9). The dependent variable 
is the P/E. This model tests  whether the firms with high IR disclosure quality create 
higher value. DDS and DS are used as proxies for IR disclosure quality. Parallel with 
the goal to test whether firms with high IR disclosure quality tend to exhibit higher 
valuation index compared to firms with lower IR disclosure quality, it is investigated 
whether firms with high earnings quality display high value. Using a sample of only IR 
firms, two proxies were created to measure earnings quality: accruals quality and 
smoothness (Francis et al.,2005; Eliwa et al., 2016). Hence, four different regression 
models 9(a) to 9(d) were created, in which the implications of IR disclosure quality and 
of the earnings quality in the firm’s valuation are enhanced. Model 9(a) uses the 
independent variable DDS as a proxy of IR disclosure quality and DAC as a proxy of 
earnings quality. Model 9(b) uses the independent variable DDS as a proxy of IR 
disclosure quality and SMOOTHNESS as a proxy of earnings quality. Model 9(c) uses 
the independent variable DS as a proxy of IR disclosure quality and DAC as a proxy of 
earnings quality. Model 9(d) uses the independent variable DS as a proxy of IR 
disclosure quality and SMOOTHNESS as a proxy of earnings quality. 
Table 20 depicts the results of the four models. In the first column the explanatory 
variables tested in the models are analyzed. The next column lists the predicted signs 
of each variable. Then, the values of the coefficients of models 9(a) to 9(d) are depicted 
in columns 3, 5, 7 and 9, respectively. The t-statistic and p-values of models 9(a) to 9(d) 
are shown in columns 4, 6, 8 and 10, respectively. The results suggest that the 
introduction of the IR regime in 2010 has statistically significant and positive impacts 
on the P/E multiple. The estimates of the impacts on DDS in models 9a and 9b are 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level or better and the impacts on DS in 
models 9c and 9d are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level associated 
with the P/E. This finding implies that firms which display higher IR disclosure quality 
tend to exhibit higher price-to-earnings ratios, confirming H6. Both earnings quality 
metrics (DAC and SMOOTHNESS) are negatively and significantly associated, at the 
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1% and 10% level, respectively, with the P/E, implying that firms with high earnings 
quality display high value. Moreover, in models 9c and in 9d, the explanatory variable 
DDS is replaced with DS but the same results are found as in models 9a and 9b. Further, 
firms which display a high debt ratio are related negatively and significantly at the 5% 
level or better with the P/E ratio. Finally, it is observed that the variable DEBT_RATIO 
is negatively and statistically significantly associated at the 5% level or better with the 
dependent variable P/E, implying that firms with high levels of leverage display lower 
P/E indexes. 
Table 19: Correlation Matrix for H6 Hypothesis 
 Spearman and Pearson correlations among cost of equity and control variables are illustrated in the table below. Below the 
diagonal the Spearman correlations are reported while Pearson correlations are reported above the diagonal. This table presents 
descriptive statistics for the sample of firms. The period of interest is 2011-2015 and the sample consists of 82 international firms 
from around the world listed in the Integrated Reporting (IR) database 
(http://examples.integratedreporting.org/reporters?start=A). P/E is the price to earnings ratio which is calculated by dividing the 
market value price per share by the earnings per share. DAC are the discretionary accruals. The normal proportion of accruals 
estimated by the Jones (1991) model. DAC are the residuals that derived from the estimation of the normal accruals equation 
{DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Bartov et al., 2001; Kothari et al., 2004; Garza – Gomez et al., 2006}. SMOOTHNESS is the 
ratio of the standard deviation of operating income divided by the standard deviation of cash flow from operations. DDS is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has gathered an IR disclosure score which is equal or greater than the median price 
notifications percentage of all sampled firms and 0 if otherwise. For more details see section 4.5.5. DS is the IR Disclosure Score 
Index. DS is derived from the scale of total received score of each firm to the maximum score (equals with 28 observations based 
on KING III checklist). GROWTH is the growth in total assets from the begging to the end of year t.  BETA is the market beta 
coefficient obtained from Datastream for each firm and for each year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of 
fiscal year t. DEBT_RATIO is a proxy of leverage equals with total liabilities to total assets at the end of fiscal year t. BVPS is 
the book value of equity scaled by the number of common shares. The superscripts ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively 
Correlations for H6 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) P/E  1,00 -0.04 -0.02 0.10* 0.02 -0.08 -0.07 -0.31*** -0.20*** 
(2) DAC  -0.10* 1.00 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.00 -0.12** -0.19*** 
(3) SMOOTHNESS  -0.07 0.06 1.00 0.09 -0.02 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 
(4) DDS  0.15*** 0.04 0.01 1.00 0.72*** -0.02 -0.21*** -0.15*** 0.09* 
(5) DS  0.21*** 0.05 -0.11* 0.81*** 1.00 -0.01 -0.28*** -0.13** 0.05 
(6) GROWTH  0.11* 0.01 -0.11* -0.01 0.07 1.00 0.05 0.08 0.06 
(7) BETA  -0.14** -0.06 0.00 -0.21*** -0.25*** -0.07 1.00 0.36*** 0.02 
(8) SIZE  -0.73*** -0.16*** -0.04 -0.17*** -0.20*** -0.09 0.35*** 1.00 0.09 
(9) DEBT_RATIO  -0.02 -0.27*** -0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.07 1.00 
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Table 20: Multiple – based valuation model (P/E) and IR disclosures quality 
This table summarizes the equation’s results using Fixed Effects OLS:   
P/Ei,t = κ0 + κ1DACi,t + κ2DDSi,t +  κ6GROWTHi,t + κ4BETAi,t + κ5SIZEi,t + κ7DEBT_RATIOi,t + vi,t  3(a) 
P/Ei,t = κ0 + κ1SMOOTHNESSi,t + κ2DDSi,t +  κ6GROWTHi,t + κ4BETAi,t + κ5SIZEi,t + κ7DEBT_RATIOi,t + vi,t  3(b) 
P/Ei,t = κ0 + κ1DACi,t + κ2DSi,t +  κ6GROWTHi,t + κ4BETAi,t + κ5SIZEi,t + κ7DEBT_RATIOi,t + vi,t  3(c) 
P/Ei,t = κ0 + κ1SMOOTHNESSi,t + κ2DSi,t +  κ6GROWTHi,t + κ4BETAi,t + κ5SIZEi,t + κ7DEBT_RATIOi,t + vi,t  3(d) 
The period of interest is 2011-2015. The sample consists of 82 international firms listed in IR database (http://examples.integratedreporting.org/reporters?start=A). P/E is the price to earnings ratio which is calculated by dividing 
the market value price per share by the earnings per share. DAC are the discretionary accruals. The normal proportion of accruals estimated by the Jones (1991) model. DAC are the residuals that derived from the estimation of the 
normal accruals equation {DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Bartov et al., 2001; Kothari et al., 2004; Garza – Gomez et al., 2006}. SMOOTHNESS is the ratio of the standard deviation of operating income divided by the standard 
deviation of cash flow from operations. The (independent) variables of interest are the DDS and the DS. DDS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has gathered an IR disclosure score which is equal or greater than the median 
price notifications percentage of all sampled firms and 0 if otherwise. For more details see section 4.5.5. DS is the IR Disclosure Score Index. DS is derived from the scale of total received score of each firm to the maximum score 
(equals with 28 observations based on KING III checklist). All other variables are defined in the footnotes of the table 6. The superscripts *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Dependent Variable: P/E  Model 3(a) Model 3(b) Model 3(c) Model 3(d) 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficient T –Statistic 
(P-values) 
Coefficient T –Statistic     
(P-values) 
Coefficient T –Statistic    
(P-values) 
Coefficient T –Statistic     
(P-values) 
Intercept  ? 44.1269*** 2.86 (0.00) 42.8036*** 5.66 (0.00) 41.5468*** 4.83 (0.00) 40.7740*** 4.86 (0.00) 
DAC - -60.7901** -2.08 (0.04)   -56.5646*** -3.12 (0.00)   
SMOOTHNESS -   -0.1265*** -3.64 (0.00)   -0.1017*** -3.12 (0.00) 
DDS + 4.6844** 2.16 (0.03) 4.7202*** 6.06 (0.00)     
DS +     8.8132*** 3.99 (0.00) 8.3519*** 3.65 (0.00) 
GROWTH + -2.0161 -1.37 (0.17) -1.9721*** -5.21 (0.00) -2.0868*** -5.35 (0.00) -2.0627*** -5.73 (0.00) 
BETA - 3.3522* 1.70 (0.09) 2.8896*** 11.36 (0.00) 3.1430*** 7.87 (0.00) 2.6803*** 7.29 (0.00) 
SIZE + -2.6755*** -2.82 (0.01) -2.5732*** -7.24 (0.00) -2.7131*** -6.88 (0.00) -2.6219*** -7.30 (0.00) 
DEBT_RATIO - -34.0365** -2.49 (0.01) -32.9486*** -4.87 (0.00) -33.3307*** -5.68 (0.00) -32.2496*** -5.22 (0.00) 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2  14.234%  13.410%  13.440%  12.609%  
Ν  338  317  338  317  
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6. Robustness checks 
6.1. IR Disclosures quality and corporate governance 
Additional analyses were performed to check the robustness of the results reported in 
the previous section. Initially, the estimation results of equation (1) were verified using 
the natural logarithm of the checklist score (DIS_QUALITY) to estimate the IR 
disclosure quality for each firm. The results are reported in table 21 and are similar to 
those reported in table 8. The following equation is estimated: 
DIS_QUALITYi,t = a0 + a1 IRi,t+ a2 PPEi,t + a3AS_TURNi,t + a4 DERi,t +  a5 DIVPAYi,t+ 
a6MBRi,t +  + a7SIZEi,t-1 + a8LNMVi,t + a9DEBT_RATIOi,t+ a10ROEi,t + a11BIG_4i,t + a12PARi,t 
+ a13PERIDNCi,t +a14 PERINBBi,t + a15PERNEACi,t + a16PERNENCi,t +  a17DUALITY + 
a18CGCi,t + a19NCi,t + a20INSTi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects}+ eit  (11) 
Specifically, IR and DIS_QUALITY are positively and significantly associated at the 
1% level. This finding indicates that firms that compose their financial reports 
containing most “Integrated Reporting Principles” tend to exhibit higher IR disclosure 
quality compared to firms that illustrate basic IR information in their reports. 
Furthermore, the PERIDNC and PERNEAC variables are positively and significantly 
associated (at the 1% level) with DIS_QUALITY, indicating that firms with a high 
proportion of independent board members on the nomination committee and non-
executive board members on the audit committee tend to display higher IR disclosures 
compared to firms without these corporate governance characteristics.  
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Table 21: Corporate governance and IR 
The table below summarizes the equation’s results using Pooled and Fixed Effects OLS: 
DIS_QUALITYi,t = a0 + a1 IRi,t+ a2 PPEi,t + a3AS_TURNi,t + a4 DERi,t + a5 DIVPAYi,t+ a6MBRi,t +  + a7SIZEi,t-1 + a8LNMVi,t + 
a9DEBT_RATIOi,t+ a10ROEi,t + a11BIG_4i,t + a12PARi,t + a13PERIDNCi,t +a14 PERINBBi,t + a15PERNEACi,t + a16PERNENCi,t +  
a17DUALITY + a18CGCi,t + a19NCi,t + a20INSTi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects}+ eit (11) 
The period of interest is 2011-2015. the sample consists of 82 international firms listed in the IR database 
(http://examples.integratedreporting.org/reporters?start=A). The dependent variable is the disclosure quality (DIS_QUALITY) 
which is the natural logarithm of the disclosure score of each firm. The definitions for the other variables are provided in the notes 
of table 5. The columns (4) and (6) contain the z – statistic values and the p – values (in the parentheses) for each estimated 
variable. The superscripts *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
Dependent Variable: DIS_QUALITY Results 
  Model (A)  (Pooled OLS) Model (B)  (Fixed Effects) 
Variable Predictions Estimations  Z –Statistic (P-values)   Estimations  Z –Statistic (P-values)   
Intercept  ? 2.2256*** 32.55 (0.00) 2.3865*** 25.53(0.00) 
IR + 0.0817*** 4.81 (0.00) 0.0794*** 4.58(0.00) 
PPE ? 0.0083 0.26(0.80) -0.0450 -1.18 (0.24) 
AS_TURN + 0.0694*** 3.52 (0.00) 0.0680*** 3.39(0.00) 
DER - -0.0424*** -2.61 (0.01) -0.0442*** -2.69(0.01) 
DIVPAY + 0.0091* 1.92 (0.06) 0.0088* 1.86(0.06) 
MBR ? -0.0006** -2.16 (0.03) -0.0005* -1.94(0.05) 
SIZE + 0.0374** 2.16 (0.03) 0.0383** 2.19(0.03) 
LNMV + 0.0145*** 3.04 (0.00) 0.0143*** 2.94(0.00) 
DEBT_RATIO + 0.1050*** 2.60 (0.01) 0.0913** 2.12(0.03) 
ROE ? -0.0249*** -4.09 (0.00) -0.0256*** -4.23(0.00) 
BIG_4 + 0.0138 0.81(0.42) 0.0274 1.56 (0.12) 
PAR + 0.0461*** 4.07 (0.00) 0.0319*** 2.60(0.01) 
PERIDNC + 0.0020*** 5.70 (0.00) 0.0019*** 5.45(0.00) 
PERINBB + -0.0010** -2.07 (0.04) -0.0009 -1.54 (0.12) 
PERNEAC + 0.0015*** 4.62 (0.00) 0.0016*** 4.92(0.00) 
PERNENC + 0.0003 0.69(0.49) 0.0004 0.96 (0.34) 
DUALITY - 0.1107*** 7.57 (0.00) 0.1224*** 7.96(0.00) 
CGC + 0.0164 0.85(0.40) 0.0156 0.80 (0.42) 
NC + 0.0064 0.31(0.76) -0.0037 -0.17 (0.86) 
INST + 0.1348** 2.47 (0.01) 0.1173** 2.04 (0.04) 
Industry Fixed Effects  No  Yes  
Year Fixed Effects  No  Yes  
Adj.R2  0.6410  0.6407  
Rn2 statistic   898.64***  953.64  
Ν  322  322  
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6.2 IR and earnings quality 
Second, the estimation results of equation (3) were verified using an alternative model, 
in which the calculation of normal accruals was based on Ball and Shivakumar (2006, 
2008). Dechow et al., (1995), Kothari et al., (2004) and Ball and Shivakumar (2006) 
found that in Jones (1991) model the estimation of normal accruals on change in 
revenues and on property, plant and equipment is mis – specified. This model ignores 
the roles of accruals in reducing noise in earnings (Dechow, 1994; Dechow and 
Schrand, 2010) and its timely loss recognition (Ball and Shivakumar, 2006). Thus, 
normal accruals using Jones’ model are estimated and a piecewise linear variant to 
capture the contribution of accruals in noise reduction and in timely loss recognition 
(Chahine et al., 2015): 
ACCit = ρ0 + ρ1Δsalesit + ρ2PPEit + ρ3CFOit + ρ4DCFOit + ρ5(DCFO*CFO)it + vit (12) 
Where, 
Variable Explanation of  Equation  (12)  
Variable Description 
ACC 
The total accruals estimated as the difference between net income and cash flow from operating 
activities 
Δsales The change in revenues during period t, PPE is property, plant and equipment). 
CFO Operating cash flow in fiscal year t scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. 
DCFO A dummy variable that takes the value one if CFO<0 and zero otherwise 
 
DAC2 is the discretionary accruals that are estimated using the above model (12) and 
are the residuals from that model (Chahine et al., 2015).  
To test the main hypothesis 2a, the model below was created: 
DAC2i,t = γ0 + γ1DSi,t + γ2IRi,t +γ3(IR*DS)i,t +  γ4LEVi,t + γ5SIZEi,t+ γ6MBRi,t + γ7BIG_4i,t + 
γ8ROAi,t + γ9CFOi,t + γ10CASHi,t + γ11DUALITYi,t + γ12CGCi,t + γ13INSTi,t + {Industry Effects} 
+ {Year Effects} + ui,t  (13) 
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In table 22 it is observed that the H2 holds, implying that firms which display a high 
level of IR disclosures are likely to exhibit lower discretionary accruals (DAC2 and DS 
are associated negatively and significantly at the 5% level). Additionally, firms that title 
reports IR “Integrated Report” tend to display higher IR disclosure quality compared to 
those using the title “Annual Reports” (DAC2 and IR are associated negatively and 
significantly at the 1% level).   
Table 22: IR and earnings quality 
The table below summarizes the equation’s results using Pooled and Fixed Effects OLS: 
DAC2i,t = γ0 + γ1DSi,t + γ2IRi,t +γ3(IR*DS)i,t +  γ4LEVi,t + γ5SIZEi,t+ γ6MBRi,t + γ7BIG_4i,t + γ8ROAi,t + γ9CFOi,t + γ10CASHi,t + 
γ11DUALITYi,t + γ12CGCi,t + γ13INSTi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} + ui,t  (13) 
The period of interest is 2011-2015. The sample consists of 82 international firms listed in IR database 
(http://examples.integratedreporting.org/reporters?start=A).Discretionary accruals(DAC2) is the dependent variable and 
obtained from the Ball and Shivakumar (2006,2008) model.  Definitions of the rest of the variables are provided in notes to Table 
5. Z – statistic and p – values (in the parentheses) for each estimated variable are provided in columns (4) and (6). The superscripts 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
Dependent Variable: DAC2 Results 
  Model (A)  (Pooled OLS) Model (B)  (Fixed Effects) 
Variable Predictions Estimations Z –Statistic (P-values) Estimations Z –Statistic (P-values) 
Intercept  ? 0.0293*** 4.14 (0.00) 0.0433*** 6.07(0.00) 
DS - -0.0207** -2.05 (0.04) -0.0245*** -2.67 (0.01) 
IR - -0.0268*** -3.33 (0.00) -0.0209*** -2.83 (0.00) 
IR_DS - 0.0403*** 3.59 (0.00) 0.0294*** 2.86 (0.00) 
LEV - 0.0036 0.77(0.44) 0.0058 1.32(0.19) 
SIZE - -0.0022*** -7.88 (0.00) -0.0023*** -8.75 (0.00) 
MBR - -4.28E-05** -2.01 (0.04) -8.95E-05 -0.45(0.65) 
BIG_4 - 0.0017 1.06(0.29) 0.0053*** 3.53 (0.00) 
ROA + 0.8962*** 75.00 (0.00) 0.9074*** 80.81 (0.00) 
CFO + -0.3483*** -29.47(0.00) -0.3728*** -34.27 (0.00) 
CASH - -0.0345*** -5.59 (0.00) -0.0234*** -4.16 (0.00) 
DUALITY + 0.0054*** 3.90 (0.00) 0.0059*** 4.75 (0.00) 
CGC - -0.0041** -2.53 (0.01) -0.0047*** -3.19 (0.00) 
INST - -0.0184*** -3.70 (0.00) -0.0203*** -4.33 (0.00) 
Industry Fixed Effects  No  Yes  
Year Fixed Effects  No  Yes  
Adj.R2  0.7088  0.7151  
Rn2 statistic   6344.62***  7885.18***  
Ν  376  376  
 
Holthausen et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2004) suggest ways to combat concerns 
about the potential correlations among performance and the residuals from the Jones 
model and modified Jones (Jones, 1991) model (DeChow et al., 1995). Jones’ model 
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consists of regressing total accruals (ACC) on three variables : the change in revenues 
(ΔREV), which models the normal component of working capital accruals; and the 
level of gross property, plant and equipment (PPE), included to control for the non-
discretionary component of depreciation and amortization expense, the main 
component of long-term accruals and return on assets (ROA). All three variables and 
the intercept are divided by lagged total assets in order to avoid problems of 
heteroskedasticity. The discretionary accruals (DAC2) are the residuals that derived 
from the estimation of the equation (14) (Kothari et al., 2004). Then, the model below 
is employed: 
𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊,𝒕
𝑻𝜜𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
 = β0 + β1 (
𝟏
𝜯𝜜𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
)+ β2 (
𝜟𝑹𝑬𝑽𝒊,𝒕  
𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
) + β3 (
𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊,𝒕
𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
)+   β4 (
𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊,𝒕
𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
) + εi,t (14) 
 
Variable Explanation of  Equation  (14) 
Variable Description 
ACC The total accruals equals with the net income minus the operating cash flow at the end of fiscal year t.  
TA Book value of total assets at the begging of year t. 
ΔREV The change in sales revenue from the preceding year. 
ΔREC The change in receivables from the preceding year. 
PPE 
Net properties, plant and equipment divided into total assets at the end of fiscal year t (Clarkson et al., 
2008). 
ROA 
Return on Assets in fiscal year t-1 , calculated as net income during year t scaled by total assets at the 
begging of the year. 
 
To test main hypothesis 2b, the two sub-models below were created: 
DAC2i,t = γ0 + γ1DSi,t + γ2IRi,t +  γ3(IR*DS)i,t +  γ4LEVi,t + γ5SIZEi,t+ γ6MBRi,t + γ7BIG_4i,t + 
γ8ROEi,t + γ9CFOi,t + γ10CASHi,t + γ11BSIZEi,t + γ12BOARDINDi,t + γ13DUALITYi,t + γ14INSTi,t 
+ {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} + ui,t   (15a)  
DAC2i,t = γ0 + γ1DDSi,t + γ2IRi,t +   γ3LEVi,t + γ4SIZEi,t+ γ5MBRi,t + γ6BIG_4i,t + γ7ROEi,t + 
γ8CFOi,t + γ9CASHi,t + γ10BSIZEi,t + γ11BOARDINDi,t + γ12DUALITYi,t + γ13INSTi,t + {Industry 
Effects} + {Year Effects} + ui,t   (15b) 
Where, DAC2 are the residuals that derived from the estimation of the equation (14). 
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Table 23: IR and discretionary accruals 
The table below summarizes the equation’s results using Fixed Effects OLS: 
 DAC2i,t = γ0 + γ1DSi,t + γ2IRi,t +  γ3(IR*DS)i,t +  γ4LEVi,t + γ5SIZEi,t+ γ6MBRi,t + γ7BIG_4i,t + γ8ROEi,t + γ9CFOi,t + γ10CASHi,t + 
γ11BSIZEi,t + γ12BOARDINDi,t + γ13DUALITYi,t + γ14INSTi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} + ui,t   15(a)  
DAC2i,t = γ0 + γ1DDSi,t + γ2IRi,t +   γ3LEVi,t + γ4SIZEi,t+ γ5MBRi,t + γ6BIG_4i,t + γ7ROEi,t + γ8CFOi,t + γ9CASHi,t + γ10BSIZEi,t + 
γ11BOARDINDi,t + γ12DUALITYi,t + γ13INSTi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} + ui,t   15(b) 
The period of interest is 2011-2015.The sample consists of 82 international firms listed in IR database 
(http://examples.integratedreporting.org/reporters?start=A). The dependent variable is discretionary accruals (DAC) and 
obtained from the Jones (1991) model.  Definitions of the rest of the variables are provided in notes to Table 5. T – statistic and p 
– values (in parentheses) for each estimated variable are provided in columns (4) and (6). The superscripts *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Dependent Variables: DAC2  Estimations 
Variable Predicted Sign Model 1 T –Statistic      
(P-values) 
Model 2 T –Statistic     
(P-values) 
Intercept  ? 0.1457*** 9.82 (0.00) 0.1025*** 8.12 (0.00) 
DS  - -0.0680*** -4.02 (0.00)   
DDS -   -0.0060** -2.09 (0.04) 
IR - -0.0656*** -4.58 (0.00) -0.0074** -2.54 (0.01) 
IR_DS - 0.0841*** 4.16 (0.00)   
LEV - -0.0383*** -4.11 (0.00) -0.0392*** -4.04 (0.00) 
SIZE - -0.0047*** -5.64 (0.00) -0.0046*** -5.28 (0.00) 
MBR - -0.0018** -2.30 (0.02) -0.0022*** -2.78 (0.01) 
BIG_4 - 0.0097*** 3.22 (0.00) 0.0091*** 3.03 (0.00) 
ROE + 0.2367*** 213.74 (0.00) 0.2501*** 217.99 (0.00) 
CFO + -0.8593*** -39.33 (0.00) -0.8608*** -37.77 (0.00) 
CASH - 0.0220** 1.98 (0.05) 0.0060 0.52 (0.60) 
BSIZE - -0.0003 -0.68 (0.50) 0.0000 -0.08 (0.94) 
BOARDIND - 0.0058 0.91 (0.36) 0.0067 1.02 (0.31) 
DUALITY + 0.0162*** 6.47 (0.00) 0.0152*** 5.91 (0.00) 
INST - -0.0342*** -3.55 (0.00) -0.0279*** -2.95 (0.00) 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2  56.295%  58.021%  
Ν  377  377  
 
In order to check the robustness of earnings quality measurement a different approach 
to Jones’ (1991) method is included for the calculation of accruals. The Kothari et al. 
(2004) method is employed instead of the Ball and Shivakumar (2006, 2008) method. 
It is observed in table 23 that H2b holds. Specifically both the disclosure quality 
measures – DS and DDS – are negatively and significantly (at the 5% level or better) 
associated with the discretionary accruals index (DAC2). These findings imply that 
firms with high IR quality tend to exhibit lower discretionary accruals in comparison 
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with firms with lower IR quality. The other results remain the same as reported in 
section 5.3.   
6.3. IR and agency cost 
Thirdly, the relation between high accounting disclosures due to the adoption of the IR 
principles and the agency cost are investigated, modifying the variable that represents 
this cost. To test main hypothesis 3, the model below was created:  
AGENY_C = λ0 + λ1DSi,t + λ2REP_IMPRi,t +λ3DAC2i,t + λ4DEBT_RATIOi,t +  λ5ROEi,t 
+λ6SIZEi,t + λ7LNMVi,t + λ8MBRi,t + λ9DUALITYi,t + λ10INSTi,t +λ11BETAi,t + {Industry 
Effects} + {Year Effects} + vi,t   (16) 
Thus, AGENCY_C = Q*FCF is introduced, which measures the growth opportunities 
using the industry adjusted Tobin’s Q (Iatridis, 2012b). Tobin’s Q is defined as market 
capitalization plus total debt scaled by total assets (McConnell and Servaes, 1990). A 
dummy variable is subsequently constructed, which takes 1 if the firm’s industry 
adjusted Tobin’s Q is less than the sample mean (i.e. low growth firms) and zero 
otherwise (i.e., high growth firms) (Doukas et al., 2005). Free cash flows (FCF) equal 
operating income before depreciation minus tax charge plus interest expense and 
dividends pail scaled by total assets (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989). 
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Table 24: IR and agency cost 
The table below summarizes the equation’s results using Pooled and Fixed Effects OLS: 
AGENY_C = λ0 + λ1DSi,t + λ2REP_IMPRi,t +λ3DAC2i,t + λ4DEBT_RATIOi,t +  λ5ROEi,t +λ6SIZEi,t + λ7LNMVi,t + λ8MBRi,t 
+λ9DUALITYi,t + λ10INSTi,t +λ11BETAi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} + vi,t   
The period of interest is 2011-2015. The sample consists of 82 international firms listed in the IR database 
(http://examples.integratedreporting.org/reporters?start=A). Agency Cost (AGENCY_C) is the dependent variable and generated 
by multiplying Q with the FCF. Q is the Tobin’s Q variable which is defined as market capitalization plus total debt scaled by total 
assets (McConnel and Servaes, 1995). A dummy variable is subsequently constructed, which takes 1 if the firm’s industry adjusted 
Tobin’s Q is less than the sample mean (i.e. low growth firms) and zero otherwise (i.e., high growth firms) {Doukas et al, 2005}. 
FCF are the free cash flows which is the operating income before depreciation minus tax charge plus interest expense and 
dividends paid scaled by total assets (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989). DAC2 are the discretionary accruals obtained from the Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006,2008)model. Definitions of the rest of the variables are provided in notes to Table 5. Z – statistic and p – values 
(in parentheses) for each estimated variable are provided in columns (4) and (6). The superscripts *, ** and *** denote significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Dependent Variable: AGENCY_C Results 
  Model (A)  (Pooled OLS) Model (B)  (Fixed Effects) 
Variable Predictions Estimations Z –Statistic (P-values) Estimations Z –Statistic (P-values) 
Intercept ? 0.0634*** 3.57 (0.00) 0.1029*** 4.53 (0.00) 
DS - -0.0390** -2.29 (0.02) -0.0482** -2.51 (0.01) 
REP_IMPROVE - -0.0010 -0.22(0.83) -0.0025 -0.52 (0.60) 
DAC2 + 0.7481*** 16.50 (0.00) -0.7782*** -16.32 (0.00) 
DEBT_RATIO - -0.1050*** -7.49 (0.00) -0.0893*** -5.80 (0.00) 
ROE + 0.3327*** 146.55 (0.00) 0.3359*** 143.57 (0.00) 
SIZE ? -0.0055*** -4.70(0.00) 0.0057*** 4.75 (0.00) 
LNMV ? 0.0020 1.20(0.23) -0.0042** -2.30 (0.02) 
MBR + 0.0003*** 3.06 (0.00) -0.0002** -2.05 (0.04) 
DUALITY + 0.0073 1.58(0.11) 0.0114** 2.39 (0.02) 
INST - -0.0232 -1.36(0.18) -0.0169 -0.91 (0.36) 
BETA ? 0.0101** 1.96 (0.05) 0.0062 1.17 (0.24) 
Industry Fixed Effects  No  Yes  
Year Fixed Effects  No  Yes  
Adj.R2  0.2769  0.2819  
Rn2 statistic  25366.75***  24997.04***  
Ν  382  382  
 
6.4. IR and firm’s performance 
Following Lee and Yeo’s (2016) and Jermias and Gani’s (2014) methodology of 
sensitivity analysis, operating profitability is used as an alternative measure of firm 
performance instead of Tobin’s Q index, which was tested in section 5.5. The relation 
between IR disclosure quality and the subsequent profitability of the sample are 
examined. Specifically, whether the accounting return on assets (ROA) is associated 
with IR disclosure quality is tested. Table 25 depicts the results of models 14(a) and 
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14(b). From the  table it is noticed that H2 holds. Both DS and DDS are positively and 
significantly associated at the 5% level or better with the ROA, implying that firms 
which exhibit higher IR disclosure quality are outperforming. The remainder of the 
results are similar to those in table 16. The following equation is estimated: 
ROAi,t = a0 + a1DISCLOSURE_QUALITYi,t + a2DUALITYi,t + α3BSIZEi,t + α4BOARDINDi,t 
+ a5INSTi,t + a6GROWTHi,t +  a7FIRM_SIZEi,t + a8DEBT_RATIOi,t + {Industry Effects} + 
{Year Effects} + vi,t   (14) 
Two sub-models were created, model 14(a) and 14(b), which tested the IR disclosure 
quality in two different ways. In model 14(a) the independent variable DDS is used and 
in model 14(b) DS is used.  
ROAi,t = a0 + a1DDSi,t + a2DUALITYi,t + α3BSIZEi,t + α4BOARDINDi,t + a5INSTi,t + 
a6GROWTHi,t +  a7FIRM_SIZEi,t + a8DEBT_RATIOi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} 
+ vi,t  14(a) 
ROAi,t = a0 + a1DSi,t + a2DUALITYi,t + α3BSIZEi,t + α4BOARDINDi,t + a5INSTi,t + 
a6GROWTHi,t +  a7FIRM_SIZEi,t + a8DEBT_RATIOi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} 
+ vi,t  14(b) 
In the first column of table 25, the explanatory variables tested in models 14(a) and 
14(b) are mentioned. The next column lists the predicted signs of each variable. Then, 
the values of the coefficients of models 14(a) and 14(b) are depicted in columns 3 and 
5, respectively. The t-statistic and p-values results of models 14(a) and 14(b) are shown 
in columns 4 and 6, respectively. 
Additionally, firms with a large number of board members tend to exhibit lower 
performance in comparison with firms whose board size is limited. This result is based 
on the fact that BSIZE is associated negatively and significantly at the 1% level with 
the ROA, confirming the findings of Weisbach (1988) and Jermias and Gani (2014). 
Firms in which the CEO and the chairman are the same person tend to exhibit lower 
performance in comparison with firms in which the CEO is not simultaneously 
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chairman of the board. In both models 14(a) and 14(b), it is found that boards with a 
high percentage of independent directors tend to exhibit higher performance since the 
BOARDIND and the ROA are associated positively and significantly at the 1% level. 
Moreover, similar to models 7(a) and 7(b), it is observed that institutional ownership 
(INST) is positively and significantly associated at the 1% level with the ROA, which 
suggests that the sample firms benefit from the monitoring activities of institutional 
shareholders. In this robust model, the results predict that firm size is positively and 
significantly associated with performance both in models 14(a) and 14(b). This result 
is opposite to the result of the basic model tested in section 5.5. Nevertheless, this result 
is consistent with the findings of previous studies (e.g., Lee and Yeo, 2016). Finally, in 
the sensitivity analysis an alternative proxy of leverage is used. DEBT_RATIO is used, 
which equals total liabilities to total assets at the end of fiscal year t. As expected, firms 
which are highly leveraged tend to display high performance because DEBT_RATIO 
is negatively and significantly associated at the 1% level with the ROA.  
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Table 25: IR and firm’s performance 
ROAi,t = a0 + a1DSi,t + a2DUALITYi,t + α3BSIZEi,t + α4BOARDINDi,t + a5INSTi,t + a6GROWTHi,t +  a7FIRM_SIZEi,t + 
a8DEBT_RATIOi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} + vi,t  14(a) 
ROAi,t = a0 + a1DDSi,t + a2DUALITYi,t + α3BSIZEi,t + α4BOARDINDi,t + a5INSTi,t + a6GROWTHi,t +  a7FIRM_SIZEi,t + 
a8DEBT_RATIOi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} + vi,t  14(b) 
The period of interest is 2011-2015. The sample consists of 82 international firms listed in IR database 
(http://examples.integratedreporting.org/reporters?start=A). ROA is the return on assets in fiscal year t calculated as net income 
during year t scaled by total assets at the begging of the year. DDS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has gathered an IR 
disclosure score which is equal or greater than the median price notifications percentage of all sampled firms and 0 if otherwise. 
For more details see section 4.5.5. DS is IR Disclosure Score Index. DS is derived from the scale of total received score of each 
firm to the maximum score (equals with 28 observations based on KING III checklist). DUALITY is a dummy variable which takes 
1 when a firm’s CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is the number of director on the Board.  
BOARDIND is the board independence ratio measured as the number of independent directors divided by total board size.  INST 
is the ratio of number of shares owned by institutional shareholders to total outstanding common shares. GROWTH is the growth 
in total assets from the begging to the end of year t. FIRM_SIZE is the natural logarithm of total revenue at the end of fiscal year 
t. DEBT_RATIO is a proxy of leverage equals with total liabilities to total assets at the end of fiscal year t. T – statistic and p – 
values (in parentheses) for each estimated variable are provided in the columns to the right of each estimated coefficient. The 
superscripts *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Dependent Variable: ROA                         
  Model 6(a) Model 6(b) 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient T –Statistic 
(P-values)   
Coefficient T –Statistic     
(P-values)   
Intercept  ? -0.0719*** -3.07 (0.00) -0.0515** -2.13 (0.03) 
DDS + 0.0324*** 3.13 (0.00) 0.0324*** 3.13 (0.00) 
DS +   0.0392*** 2.98 (0.00) 
DUALITY - -0.0164*** -2.98 (0.00) -0.0182*** -3.21 (0.00) 
BSIZE - -0.0012*** -3.77 (0.00) -0.0014*** -4.23 (0.00) 
BOARDIND + 0.0768*** 10.08 (0.00) 0.0736*** 9.62 (0.00) 
INST + 0.0755*** 5.90 (0.00) 0.0887*** 7.58 (0.00) 
GROWTH + -0.0107** -1.99 (0.05) 0.0105** 1.98 (0.05) 
FIRM_SIZE + 0.0020** 2.19 (0.03) 0.0019** 2.10 (0.04) 
DEBT_RATIO - -0.0442*** -3.80 (0.00) -0.0389*** -3.36 (0.00) 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes   
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2  18.028%  17.476%  
Ν  388  388  
 
6.5. IR disclosures quality and value relevance 
To test the robustness of the value relevance of the summary accounting information of 
section 5.6, a different dependent variable was introduced to capture the market 
predictions of a firm’s growth opportunities. Hence, the market-to-book ratio (MBR) is 
used as a value relevance of the summary accounting information metric and is 
calculated by dividing the market capitalization to the net book value. Model 15 is 
estimated based on Cormier and Magnan’s (2007) approach. It tests whether firms with 
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high IR disclosure quality are related positively to MBR. The following equation is 
estimated: 
MBRi,t = λ0 + λ1DISCLOSURE_QUALITYi,t + λ2(1/BV)i,t+ λ3(EBIT/BV)i,t + λ4DEBT_RATIOi,t 
+ λ5CFOi,t + λ6TURNOVER i,t + λ7SIZEi,t + λ8DUALITYi,t  + λ9BIG4i,t + λ10PARi,t + 
λ11LN(EMPLOYEES)i,t + {Industry Effects} +  {Year Effects} + eit  (15) 
Two sub-models, 15(a) and 15(b) were created, which test the IR disclosure quality in 
two different ways. Model 15(a) uses the independent variable DDS and model 15(b) 
uses DS.  
MBRi,t = λ0 + λ1DDSi,t + λ2(1/BV)i,t+ λ3(EBIT/BV)i,t + λ4DEBT_RATIOi,t + λ5CFOi,t + 
λ6TURNOVER i,t + λ7SIZEi,t + λ8DUALITYi,t  + λ9BIG4i,t + λ10PARi,t + λ11LN(EMPLOYEES)i,t 
+ {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} + eit  15(a)     
MBRi,t = λ0 + λ1DSi,t + λ2(1/BV)i,t+ λ3(EBIT/BV)i,t + λ4DEBT_RATIOi,t + λ5CFOi,t + 
λ6TURNOVER i,t + λ7SIZEi,t + λ8DUALITYi,t  + λ9BIG4i,t + λ10PARi,t + λ11LN(EMPLOYEES)i,t 
+ {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} + eit 15(b)     
Table 26 illustrates the sensitivity analysis results based on the second research 
hypothesis. In the first column of this table, the explanatory variables tested in models 
15(a) and 15(b) are tested. The next column lists the predicted signs of each variable. 
Then, the values of the coefficients in models 15(a) and 15(b) are depicted in columns 
3 and 5, respectively. The t-statistic and p-values results of models 15(a) and 15(b) are 
shown in columns 4 and 6, respectively. 
Table 26 depicts the results of models 15(a) and 15(b). In that table it is observed that 
firms which disclose higher IR accounting information are linked with increased value 
relevance, shown by the fact that both DDS and DS are positively and significantly 
associated at the 5% level with the MBR. The remainder of the results are similar to 
those in table 18 in section 5.6.  
Furthermore, the basic summary information focuses on the accounting variables 1/BV 
and EBIT/BV, which are positive and highly significant at the 1% level. This finding 
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can be interpreted as an increase in the book value of equity scaled by the number of 
common shares and the earnings before interest and taxation scaled by the number of 
common shares that positively affect the market valuation of the firms during the five-
year period (2011-2015).  
Table 26: IR and value relevance  
MBRi,t = λ0 + λ1DDSi,t + + λ2(1/BV)i,t+ λ3(EBIT/BV)i,t + λ4DEBT_RATIOi,t + λ5CFOi,t + λ6TURNOVERi,t + λ7SIZEi,t + 
λ8DUALITYi,t  + λ9BIG4i,t + λ10PARi,t + λ11LN_EMPLOYi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} + eit 15(a) 
MBRi,t = λ0 + λ1DSi,t + + λ2(1/BV)i,t+ λ3(EBIT/BV)i,t + λ4DEBT_RATIOi,t + λ5CFOi,t + λ6TURNOVERi,t + λ7SIZEi,t + λ8DUALITYi,t  
+ λ9BIG4i,t + λ10PARi,t + λ11LN_EMPLOYi,t + {Industry Effects} + {Year Effects} + eit 15(b) 
The period of interest is 2011-2015. The sample consists of 82 international firms listed in IR database 
(http://examples.integratedreporting.org/reporters?start=A). MBR is the market capitalization to the net book value. DDS is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has gathered an IR disclosure score which is equal or greater than the median price 
notifications percentage of all sampled firms and 0 if otherwise. For more details see section 4.5.5. DS is IR Disclosure Score 
Index. DS is derived from the scale of total received score of each firm to the maximum score (equals with 28 observations based 
on KING III checklist). 1/BV is the book value of equity scaled by the number of common shares. EBIT/BV is earnings before 
interest and taxation scaled by the number of common shares. DEBT_RATIO is a proxy of leverage equals with total liabilities to 
total assets at the end of fiscal year t. CFO is the Operating cash flow in fiscal year t scaled by total assets at the beginning of the 
year. TURNOVER is a measure of asset utilization that captures how efficiently the firm’s assets are used and is estimated as the 
ratio of annual sales to total assets at the end of fiscal year t. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year 
t. DUALITY is a dummy variable which takes 1 when a firm’s CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors and 0 otherwise. 
. BIG_4 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is audited by a Big 4 accounting firm and 0 if otherwise. PAR is the natural 
logarithm of the number of pages number of the annual reports. LN_EMPLOY is the natural logarithm of the number of the 
employees. The superscripts *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Dependent Variable: MBR Model 7(a) Model 7(b) 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficient T –Statistic     
(P-values) 
Coefficient T –Statistic    
(P-values) 
Intercept  ? 0.3508 0.47 (0.64) 0.2244 0.29 (0.77) 
DDS + 0.2474** 2.49 (0.01)   
DS +   0.7546** 2.14 (0.03) 
1/BV + 552.1458*** 6.69 (0.00) 547.4455*** 6.76 (0.00) 
EBIT/BV + 0.4476*** 6.38 (0.00) 0.4399*** 6.52 (0.00) 
DEBT_RATIO - 0.7671** 2.32 (0.02) 0.1961 0.59 (0.56) 
CFO + 1.67E-06** 2.49 (0.01) 1.61E-06** 2.37 (0.02) 
TURNOVER + -0.1263* -1.93 (0.05) -0.2108*** -2.81 (0.01) 
SIZE + -0.0538 -1.51 (0.13) -0.0548 -1.55 (0.12) 
DUALITY - -0.3470*** -2.82 (0.01) -0.3147*** -2.63 (0.01) 
BIG_4 ? -0.4760*** -2.92 (0.00) -0.4607*** -2.76 (0.01) 
PAR + 0.2020** 2.45 (0.01) 0.1878** 2.44 (0.02) 
LN_EMPLOY ? 0.0024 0.09 (0.93) -0.0025 -0.10 (0.92) 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2  61.630%  61.118%  
Ν  378  378  
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Additionally, it is observed that the variables DEBT_RATIO and CFO are positively 
and significantly associated at the 10% level or better with high levels of leverage, and 
operating cash flows display higher market valuation, confirming the findings of 
Iatridis (2012b) and Lourenco et al. (2014). Stakeholders can better evaluate firms 
whose integrated reports contain a large number of pages. Finally, firms in which the 
CEO is also chairman of the board tend to display lower market valuation in comparison 
with firms in which the CEO and the chairman are different persons. 
6.6. Multiple-based valuation model (P/BV) and IR disclosures quality  
To test the robustness of the firms’ value creation model in section 5.7, another 
multiple-based valuation model is used based on P/BV. Specifically, in these robustness 
checks the following model is estimated: 
P/BVi,t = κ0 + κ1EARNINGS_QUALITYi,t + κ2DISCLOSURE_QUALITYi,t +  κ3GROWTHi,t 
+ κ4BETAi,t + κ5SIZEi,t + κ6DEBT_RATIOi,t + vi,t  (16) 
Because two proxies are used for the DISCLOSURE_QUALITY, DDS and DS, and 
two proxies for EARNINGS_QUALITY, the following four sub-models are estimated: 
P/BVi,t = κ0 + κ1DACi,t + κ2DDSi,t + κ3GROWTHi,t + κ4BETAi,t + κ5SIZE,t + κ6DEBT_RATIOi,t 
+ vi,t  16(a) 
P/BVi,t = κ0 + κ1SMOOTHNESSi,t + κ2DDSi,t + κ3GROWTHi,t + κ4BETAi,t + κ5SIZEi,t + 
κ6DEBT_RATIOi,t + vi,t  16(b) 
P/BVi,t = κ0 + κ1DACi,t + κ2DSi,t + κ3GROWTHi,t + κ4BETAi,t + κ5SIZEi,t + κ6DEBT_RATIOi,t 
+ vi,t  16(c) 
P/BVi,t = κ0 + κ1SMOOTHNESSi,t + κ2DSi,t + κ3GROWTHi,t + κ4BETAi,t + κ5SIZEi,t + 
κ6DEBT_RATIOi,t + vi,t  16(d) 
Table 27  reports the results from the estimation of equation (9). This robust model 
checks whether firms which depict high disclosure quality accounting information 
based on the King III report principles and the IIRC framework are evaluated better by 
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analysts. It tests the same hypothesis, replacing the dependent variable with the P/BV 
ratio. As in section 5.7, two earnings quality proxies are considered, discretionary 
accruals and earnings smoothness, and two metrics for IR, disclosure quality DDS and 
DS.  
Four different regression models - models 16(a) to 16(d)- were created to enhance the 
implications of IR disclosure quality and earnings quality in a firm’s valuation. In 
model 16(a) the independent variable DDS is used as a proxy of IR disclosure quality 
and DAC as a proxy of earnings quality. Model 16(b) uses the independent variable 
DDS as a proxy of IR disclosure quality and SMOOTHNESS as a proxy of earnings 
quality. In model 16(c) the independent variable DS is used as a proxy of IR disclosure 
quality and DAC as a proxy of earnings quality. Model 16(d) uses the independent 
variable DS as a proxy of IR disclosure quality and SMOOTHNESS as a proxy of 
earnings quality. Table 27 depicts the results of the four models. In the first column of 
this table, the explanatory variables tested in models 16(a) to 16(d) are analyzed. The 
next column lists the predicted signs of each variable. Then, the values of the 
coefficients of models 16(a) to 16(d) are depicted in columns 3, 5, 7 and 9, respectively. 
The t-statistic and p-values results of models 16(a) to 16(d) are shown in columns 4, 6, 
8 and 10, respectively. In the regression outputs of models 16a and 16b, the DDS is 
positively and significantly associated at the 1% level with the P/BV. This finding 
suggests that firms which exhibit higher IR disclosure quality tend to display higher 
price-to-book value ratios, again confirming H4. Both earnings quality measures (DAC 
and SMOOTHNESS) are negatively and significantly associated at the 1% level with 
the P/BV, implying that firms which display lower earnings management techniques 
tend to create more value. Moreover, in models 16c and 16d, IR disclosure quality is 
considered using the variable DS and DDS , reaching the same results as models 16a 
and 16b. To sum up, firms which are highly leveraged are linked to lower valuation by 
investors.  
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Table 27: Multiple – based valuation model (P/BV) and IR disclosures quality 
This table summarizes the equation’s results using Fixed Effects OLS:   
P/BVi,t = κ0 + κ1DACi,t + κ2DDSi,t +  κ3GROWTHi,t + κ4BETAi,t + κ5SIZEi,t + κ6DEBT_RATIOi,t + vi,t  16(a) 
P/BVi,t = κ0 + κ1SMOOTHNESSi,t + κ2DDSi,t +  κ3GROWTHi,t + κ4BETAi,t + κ5SIZEi,t + κ6DEBT_RATIOi,t + vi,t  16(b) 
P/BVi,t = κ0 + κ1DACi,t + κ2DSi,t +  κ3GROWTHi,t + κ4BETAi,t + κ5SIZEi,t + κ6DEBT_RATIOi,t + vi,t  16(c) 
P/BVi,t = κ0 + κ1SMOOTHNESSi,t + κ2DSi,t +  κ3GROWTHi,t + κ4BETAi,t + κ5SIZEi,t + κ6DEBT_RATIOi,t + vi,t  16(d) 
The period of interest is 2011-2015. The sample consists of 82 international firms listed in the IR database (http://examples.integratedreporting.org/reporters?start=A). P/BV is the price to book ratio which is calculated by dividing 
the market price per share by book value per share. DAC are the discretionary accruals. The normal proportion of accruals estimated by the Jones (1991) model. DAC are the residuals that derived from the estimation of the normal 
accruals equation {DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Bartov et al., 2001; Kothari et al., 2004; Garza – Gomez et al., 2006}. SMOOTHNESS is the ratio of the standard deviation of operating income divided by the standard deviation 
of cash flow from operations. DDS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has gathered an IR disclosure score which is equal or greater than the median price notifications percentage of all sampled firms and 0 if otherwise. For 
more details see section 4.5.5. DS is IR Disclosure Score Index. DS is derived from the scale of total received score of each firm to the maximum score (equals with 28 observations based on KING III checklist). GROWTH is the 
growth in total assets from the begging to the end of year t.  BETA is the market beta coefficient obtained from Datastream for each firm and for each year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year t. 
DEBT_RATIO is a proxy of leverage equals with total liabilities to total assets at the end of fiscal year t. T – statistic and p – values (in the parentheses) for each estimated variable are provided in columns to the right of  these 
outputs. The superscripts *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Dependent Variable: P/BV       
  Model 8(a) Model 8(b) Model 8(c) Model 8(d) 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficient T –Statistic       
(P-values)   
Coefficient T –Statistic       
(P-values)   
Coefficient T –Statistic       
(P-values)   
Coefficient T –Statistic       
(P-values)   
Intercept  ? 2.6711*** 21.49 (0.00) 2.5509*** 20.06 (0.00) 2.3531*** 14.66 (0.00) 2.2753*** 15.41 (0.00) 
DAC - -2.4570*** -3.90 (0.00)   -2.4118*** -3.89 (0.00)   
SMOOTHNESS -   -0.0083*** -10.79 (0.00)   -0.0064*** -7.96 (0.00) 
DDS + 0.2866*** 14.85 (0.00) 0.2955*** 12.46 (0.00)     
DS +     0.7137*** 5.30 (0.00) 0.6554*** 5.18 (0.00) 
GROWTH + 0.0462** 2.14 (0.03) 0.0437 1.49 (0.14) 0.0398* 1.86 (0.06) 0.0357 1.22 (0.22) 
BETA - -0.2674*** -3.53 (0.00) -0.2416*** -3.55 (0.00) 0.2737*** 3.89 (0.00) 0.2444*** 3.94 (0.00) 
SIZE + 0.1657*** 16.72 (0.00) 0.1575*** 30.03 (0.00) -0.1681*** -17.62 (0.00) -0.1605*** -30.45 (0.00) 
DEBT_RATIO - -1.9479*** -12.16 (0.00) -1.8385*** -10.02 (0.00) -1.9349*** -13.39 (0.00) -1.8117*** -11.02 (0.00) 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R2  17.419%  15.817%  16.811%  15.067%  
Ν  377  354  377  354  
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6.7 Heckman’s endogeneity test 
Additionally, Heckman’s (1979) two-stage model is implemented to address 
endogeneity concerns. Firms with a high disclosure quality may systematically exhibit 
high value, a high value relevance of summary accounting information and better 
valuation from the markets. Conversely, firms with a financial identity characterized 
by high value, a high value relevance of summary accounting information and better 
valuation from the markets may adopt a more integrated method to disclose their 
financial information.  
In the first stage of the Heckman approach, the following Probit model to derive the 
inverse Mills ratio (IMILLS) is estimated: 
DDSi,t = φ0 + φ1FIRM_SIZEi,t + φ2LEVERAGE_RATIOi,t + φ3FCFi,t + φ4ROAi,t + φ5MBRi,t 
+εi,t (17) 
Where, 
Variable Explanations of Equation (17) 
Variable Description 
DDS 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has gathered an IR disclosure score which is equal or greater 
than the median price notifications percentage of all sampled firms and 0 if otherwise. For more 
details see section 4.5.5 
FIRM_SIZE 
A firm’s size at the end of fiscal year t. It is calculated as the natural logarithm of the annual 
revenue.    
LEVERAGE_RATIO 
A leverage ratio in fiscal year t. Calculated as total long – term debt scaled by total assets at the 
end of year t. 
FCF 
Free Cash Flows equal with the operating income before depreciation minus tax charge plus 
interest expense and dividends pail scaled by total assets (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989).  
ROA 
Return on Assets in fiscal year t, calculated as net income during year t scaled by total assets at the 
begging of the year. 
MBR 
Market – to – Book ratio at the end of fiscal year t. Calculated as the market value of equity divided 
by the book value of equity at the end of the year.  
IMILLS Inverse Mills Ratio (see Appendix). 
 
In the second stage, IMILLS is included as an independent variable in equations (7), 
(8) and (9). Francis and Lennox (2008) discuss concerns regarding the application of 
the Heckman (1979) procedure in an accounting context. Following their suggestion, 
in model (17) variables were created that differ from those used in the second-stage 
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models. It is also tested for multicollinearity when including IMILLS in the second 
stage. The variance inflation factor (VIF) for each variable to the second-stage models 
does not exceed 10; thus, multicollinearity does not impede the interpretation of the 
second- stage results (Dielman, 2001).  
In the second stage, the coefficient of IMILLS in all models is statistically significant 
at the 5% level or better, suggesting that self-selection may be a problem in the analysis. 
Despite the fact that IMILLS is included in the regression model as an independent 
variable, the results of the second-stage regression are similar to those reported in tables 
5.5, 5.6 and 5.7.   
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Table 28: Heckman’s test  
This table summarizes the results from the 2SLS Estimation of the Heckman (1979) procedure to address the potential endogeneity issues of the sample selection:   
1st Stage Equation: DDSi,t = φ0 + φ1FIRM_SIZEi,t + φ2LEVERAGE_RATIOi,t + φ3FCFi,t + φ4ROAi,t + φ5MBRi,t +εi,t  
2nd Stage Equations: Equations (7), (8), 9(a) and 9(b) with the addition of the IMILLS as an independent variable. 
DDS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has gathered an IR disclosure score which is equal or greater than the median price notifications percentage of all sampled firms and 0 if otherwise. For more details see section 4.5.5. FIRM_SIZE is a firm’s size at the end of fiscal year t. It is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of the annual revenue.  FCF Free Cash Flows equal with the operating income before depreciation minus tax charge plus interest expense and dividends pail scaled by total assets (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989).  ROA is the net income during year t scaled by 
total assets at the begging of the year. MBR is the Market – to – Book ratio at the end of fiscal year t. It is calculated as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the year. All other variables are defined in the footnotes of table 5 and table 6. IMILLS is the 
Inverse Mills Ratio.  In the 2nd Stage all models have been estimated with the fixed effects approach. In model 4 the leverage ratio is the total debt to total assets at the end of year t, in the model 5 the leverage ratio is the total debt to the total assets at the end of year t and in models 6a and 
6b the leverage ratio is total liabilities to total assets at the end of fiscal year t. The superscripts *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 Probit Model 4 Model 5 Model 6a Model 6b 
variables  Coefficient 
Wald –Statistic 
(P-values) 
Coefficient 
Wald –Statistic 
(P-values) 
Coefficient 
Wald –Statistic 
(P-values) 
Coefficient 
Wald –Statistic 
(P-values) 
Coefficient 
Wald –Statistic 
(P-values) 
Intercept  0.5952 1.47 (0.23) 3.8905 *** 220.41(0.00) 21.1407 0.02 (0.89) 79.9595*** 10.41 (0.00) 72.8970*** 45.65 (0.00) 
FIRM _SIZE -0.1038** 6.47 (0.01)         
LEVERAGE_RATIOS 0.9071** 4.73 (0.03) 0.1780 0.70 (0.40) 914.885*** 7.67 (0.01) -76.4951*** 9.06 (0.00) -68.6738*** 26.76 (0.00) 
FCF 1.71E-06 2.36 (0.12)         
ROA 2.1464* 3.69 (0.05)         
MBR 0.0089*** 9.80 (0.00)         
IMILLS   -2.1302*** 129.26 (0.00) -317.6606** 6.23 (0.01) -73.3682*** 8.50 (0.00) -65.1807*** 29.70 (0.00) 
DDS   -0.1965*** 11.40 (0.00) 157.4986*** 6.75 (0.01) 0.7442 0.50 (0.48) 0.6154 0.72 (0.40) 
DUALITY   0.2032*** 14.51 (0.00) -202.9229*** 8.96 (0.00)     
BSIZE   -0.0129 1.86 (0.17)       
BOARDIND   -0.1904 2.08 (0.15)       
INST   0.3974** 3.97 (0.05)       
GROWTH   0.0273 0.28 (0.60)   -1.0578 0.31 (0.58) -1.3245 1.35 (0.25) 
TURNOVER   -0.0641 2.16 (0.14)       
SIZE   -0.1163*** 47.91 (0.00) -45.6230* 3.81 (0.05) 1.0435 2.39 (0.12) 0.8054* 2.85 (0.09) 
STDEVΔOI   6.48E-07 1.66 (0.20)       
BVPS     0.4774*** 6.79 (0.01)     
EBTPS     1.3895 2.42 (0.12)     
ROE     20.8353** 4.03 (0.05)     
CASH     731,5187*** 10.79 (0.00)     
PPE     -204,3387* 3.10 (0.08)     
PERIDAU     2.8255*** 8.34 (0.00)     
LN_EMPLOY     50.5243** 5.85 (0.02)     
EARNINGS QUALITY       -118.7740*** 8.26 (0.00) -0.0934 2.34 (0.13) 
BETA       3.7256* 3.36 (0.07) 2.4874*** 189.51 (0.00) 
N 382 369 375 338 317 
R2|McFadden R2 5.372% 19.261% 37.957% 29.699% 26.204% 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
07/06/2020 14:11:01 EEST - 137.108.70.13
207 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
This study examines whether firms that include IR in their annual reports behave 
differently, delivering more transparent financial and non-financial information to 
investors. The latter can help manage various risks and identify investment 
opportunities more clearly. It is hypothesized that highly integrated firms provide high-
quality accounting disclosure and exhibit more effective corporate governance 
mechanisms. Better quality is observed in the released profits, and they reveal lower 
agency costs, due to the reduction of information asymmetry among stakeholders to 
managers. Here, some similarities are found with previous studies because IR is a tool 
that empowers the level of accounting (financial and non-financial) information. 
However, Chaidali and Jones (2017) state that IR preparers report problems arising 
from a lack of adequate and clear guidance, high preparation costs, the format, and the 
length of the integrated report. As a result, IR preparers believe these problems 
undermine the credibility of IR. The results of this thesis prove that the advantages of 
IR are greater than the disadvantages (Lee and Yeo, 2016; De Villiers et al.,2017; 
Maroun, 2017). 
This analysis concludes that the quality of accounting information is increased when 
firms employ specific board characteristics, such as independence, duality, and 
diversity (Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010). Therefore, according to the thesis 
findings, the higher the percentage of independent directors on the board is, the more it 
is likely to be aligned with integrated reporting disclosure principles and to be in 
accordance with the IIRC framework. It is found that firms should create nomination 
committees and include on their boards a high number of independent and non-
executive board members, as Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) conclude in their report. A 
positive linkage between the firm’s environmental performance and the number of 
independent directors and boards is also found (De Villiers et al., 2011). All of the 
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previous results are in favor of the long-term goal of the IRCC, helping clarify the 
company’s approach to its long-term strategic opportunities. 
The findings of this thesis support the hypothesis that IR firms are less likely to engage 
in aggressive earnings management through discretionary accruals. A negative and 
significant association between discretionary accruals, profitability, operating cash 
flows, liquidity levels and the proportion of common shares owned by institutional 
shareholders is proven, confirming the findings of Chevis et al. (2007) and Iatridis 
(2011). Moreover, firms that improve their disclosure quality by adopting IR principles, 
engage less in earnings management and exhibit high levels of leverage, tending to 
display lower agency costs. In contrast, firms in which the CEO is also the chairman of 
the board tend to exhibit higher agency costs compared to those in which the CEO is a 
non-executive director. Large firms with high growth opportunities and applying more 
IR principles, display more effective corporate governance mechanisms and less 
discretionary accruals and limit information asymmetry. This can improve the quality 
of information available to providers of financial capital, leading to a more efficient 
and productive allocation of capital. The results of this thesis are also robust in 
alternative definitions of the dependent variables by hypothesis. Thus, outputs are 
characterized by reliability and validity. 
Moreover, the relation between IR and firm market valuation are examined. The IR 
disclosure level in an international sample of 82 non-financial firms that complied with 
IR, in the period of the application year (2011) and four years later (until 2015) were 
exploited. The IR disclosure quality is interpreted by applying two different estimated 
indexes, which are symbolized as DS and DDS, based on the King III report and the 
IIRC framework. Consistent with the initial predictions, it is found that the positive 
association between firm performance and IR disclosure quality is stronger in firms 
with a high percentage of institutional shareholders, suggesting that IR improves the 
information environment in complex firms, such as firms with low leverage levels and 
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in which the CEO is not simultaneously chairman of the board. The results align with 
Lee and Yeo (2016), and a study conducted by Nanyang Business School (2014) 
(IIRC,2015). Similarly, a positive and statistically significant association is found 
between the IR disclosure quality index (DS and DDS) and Tobin’s Q, after controlling 
for various firm characteristics, such as firm size, sales growth, and leverage, and 
corporate governance mechanisms, such as the number of directors on the board, the 
ratio of number of shares owned by institutional shareholders to total outstanding 
common shares, and the board independence ratio, which is measured as the number of 
independent directors divided by total board size. This study highlights the corporate 
disclosure philosophy behind IR, the goal of which is to provide information about a 
firm’s future value creation, related to the firm’s long-term strategy (De Villiers et 
al.,2017).  
It is found that firms with a high IR disclosure quality tend to display high market value 
per share. The findings suggest that higher market valuation appears in firms with high 
levels of leverage, profitability and liquidity. More valid and effective valuation occurs 
in large firms with a high proportion of fixed assets to total assets, in firms with a large 
number of employees, and in firms that establish audit committees. The findings also 
suggest a change in value relevance with permanent characteristics, which supports the 
long-term goal of the IIRC, by clarifying a company’s approach to its long-term 
strategic opportunities and risks, securing long-term funding and developing long-term 
endorsements from supra-national bodies. These integrated approaches not only enable 
a complete estimation of fair value but also improve valuation models.  
Finally, the impact of IR implementation on a multiple valuation model is investigated. 
Considering that IR is intended to link King III report principles and financial 
performance, it is theorized that if there is any effect, it will be higher for firms that do 
not converge with the King III report principles and apply the principles strictly. 
Further, if there is a need for the link provided by IR, IR disclosure quality based on 
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the King III report principles will not be associated with P/E and P/BV multiples before 
IR is implemented, whereas it will be integrated once reports are provided. Similar to 
Bernardi and Stark (2016), it is concluded that firms displaying a higher IR disclosure 
quality tend to exhibit higher P/E ratios. It is expanded this survey and test the relation 
between a multiple-based valuation model and earnings management. The models 
employed two different proxies, capturing a range of earnings management activities, 
such as the magnitude of total accruals, the smoothness of earnings relative to cash 
flows and the association between accounting accruals and operating cash flows, 
implying that firms with high earnings quality display high value. Moreover, the results 
match those of KPMG (2015), which tested the behavior of 80 firms from the Asia 
Pacific region that used IR and found a significant association between higher IR 
disclosure quality and higher P/BV ratio. It is predicted that IR implementation will 
helps firms focus on aspects that materially affect their long-term ability to create value. 
7.1. Implications 
Previous literature argued that regulators and standard setters do not fully understand 
the reasons for and consequences of IR implantation (i.e. De Villiers et al., 2017; 
Chaidali and Jones, 2017). Hence, this thesis has implications for regulators and 
accounting standards setters when they are faced by firms applying IR. In other words, 
the findings of this research give insights to policy makers and accounting regulators, 
in aiding their understanding of the effects of IR on corporate governance, earnings 
quality, agency cost, firm’s performance, value relevance and multiple-based valuation 
models. The results will be useful for European and international accounting standard 
setters and other authorities. This study provides insight into how a satisfactory level 
of economic integration can be achieved through the better use of IR disclosures. These 
interdependent changes will reflect the trends of globalization and higher expectations 
for corporate transparency and accountability as defined by IR concepts. 
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At the theoretical level, this thesis adds to the new and limited body of interpretive 
research, which illustrates the assurance implications of an emerging reporting 
practices (see De Villiers et al., 2014; Simnett and Huggins, 2015; Maroun, 2017). IR 
is a new reporting method that proposes the integration of financial and non-financial 
information in a single report (De Villiers et al., 2017), and as mentioned in previous 
sections it was established in 2011. This thesis provides a first step to researchers and 
investors to acquire an idea about the association between IR disclosure quality (based 
on King III report) and corporate governance mechanisms, earnings quality, agency 
costs, value relevance and firm’s valuation.  
In addition to the creation of more accurate non-financial information available for data 
vendors, IR provides a higher level of stakeholder trust, a better identification of 
opportunities and better resource allocation decisions, including cost reductions (Dixon 
et al., 2004; Moroney et al., 2012). IR creates closer engagement with investors and 
other stakeholders and includes the current and prospective progress of employees, 
which can help them to upgrade their skills (Simnett et al., 2009). IR is in its early 
stages and is still under development in practice. Nevertheless, this type of reporting 
can be used in all industries, in private and public firms and in all types of organizations. 
Its application is intended to improve communication between companies and capital 
markets. Combining financial and non-financial information highlights firm strategy 
performance, underscores the interdependency of information (KPMG, 2011) and can 
be a useful mechanism for firms (Adams and Frost, 2008). The use of IR by both firms 
and organizations will enhance their ability to attract new long-time investors with ESG 
consciousness, to raise capital. This should improve their capital adequacy and financial 
and non-financial profile.  
IR implementation will create expectations regarding a higher degree of economic 
integration. In the future, IR could eventually replace existing corporate reports. 
Organizations should be able to decide the way in which information will be presented; 
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for instance, information could include an overarching document with various other 
reports or a single stand-alone document covering all material aspects (Ernst and 
Young, 2014). Other groups that benefit from this research are professional accountants 
and academics. 
7.2. Contributions 
This thesis includes several contributions and contributes to the global literature 
because it provides evidences for a higher degree of economic integration through IR 
implementation. It is contributes to the growing evidence that IR is an effective 
accounting tool and its use is likely to be rewarded by capital markets because it helps 
firms to rethink and integrate their strategies and business models in line with 
stakeholder expectations. Through communication and transparency, IR can be used 
effectively to interpret the advantages of using the King III report principles and to 
explain to investors how an organization creates value over time. Moreover, the use of 
IR provides firms with the ability to tell their own story, preventing analysts from 
making assumptions on their behalf. This study concludes that when the IIRC 
Framework was introduced, firms disclosed more than just financial information and 
began to outperform (IIRC, 2015). 
To the best of knowledge, the thesis provides large-sample empirical evidence on the 
association between IR and corporate governance variables, earnings quality and 
agency costs based on the most recent IIRC Framework (2013), using two different 
approaches of OLS estimation (Pooled and Fixed Effects OLS) in the panel data 
analysis from the 2011-2015 period. The findings of the thesis are based on a positive 
relation between corporate governance mechanisms and a negative association between 
earnings management and agency costs providing evidence that the disclosure 
accounting quality increases and the benefits of IR exceed the costs of IR.  
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Focusing on the hypotheses of firm valuation, the contributions of this thesis extend in 
several directions. In addition, it examines how the level of IR disclosure quality 
improves the view of value relevance of summary accounting information (i.e., the 
market value of equity). The thesis explored how the use of integrated analysis can 
create value by testing the behavior of a multiple-based valuation model. In addition to 
contributing to the academic debate on the market valuation implications of IR 
performance, the findings of this study support the calls for more IR, showing that the 
interaction of financial and non-financial information has market valuation implications 
(Baboukardos, 2017). 
In particular, this study provides evidence that a high level of IR disclosure and high 
earnings quality tend to produce higher valuation indexes (P/E and P/BV), compared to 
firms with lower earnings and IR disclosure quality. This survey is accepted as valid, 
the results suggest that IR provides useful accounting information on links between 
King III report principles and financial performance. In addition, it supports the theory 
that the value of these links will improve the level of IR disclosure and encourage the 
introduction of integrated reports. The results complement the findings of Bernardi and 
Stark (2016), who found a positive relation between the high level of ESG disclosures 
and the IR disclosure level, concluding that IR improves analysts’ estimations regarding 
the value and performance of a firm. In essence, keeping other factors constant, it is 
concluded that high IR disclosure quality is linked to an increase in market valuation, 
not only in firms that use IR on a mandatory basis (see Bernardi and Stark, 2016; Lee 
and Yeo, 2016;Atkins and Maroun, 2015) but also in firms that voluntarily decide to 
implement IR. 
7.3. Limitation and future research 
The size of this sample is a limitation of this thesis. A sample of 173 listed firms was 
collected from the official website of IIRC. However, from the 173 firms, 34 did not 
provide adequate data in Datastream, 57 were firms from the financial, insurance and 
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real estate sector and were removed from the sample19. Finally, the sample consisted of 
82 listed firms from 25 countries. Because the treatment of IR is not perceived to the 
same degree between countries, this is another limitation of this thesis. The compliance 
IR rate is different from country to country and this is mainly due to the different 
applicable institutional and legislative frameworks they apply. Hence, future papers 
should extend this research by investigating the level of IR implementation in common 
and code law countries. Another idea is to compare the voluntary with the mandatory 
IR implantation. Moreover, a future survey should contain some macroeconomic 
variables, which can outline the institutional and legislative framework of each country 
and can better define the voluntary application of IR. 
Furthermore, there are two limitations in using self-constructed disclosure scores 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001). First, there is considerable researcher judgment involved in 
data collection and checklist creation. Second, these disclosure scores are constructed 
using data from available documents, such as published annual reports and websites 
(Lee and Yeo, 2016). Future papers should extend this research by testing several other 
disclosure score indexes, based either on King III report or on King IV report, which 
may affect the earnings quality, agency cost, firm’s performance, value relevance and 
multiple-based valuation models. 
Finally, a future research survey should investigate the association between dividend 
policy and the level of IR disclosure quality. 
 
                                                 
 
19 These firms use accounting methods that are not comparable with those of industrial firms (Iatridis, 
2012a). 
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Appendix  
A.1.  King Report on Corporate Governance 
The committee that issued the Report on Corporate Governance is King Committee on 
Corporate Governance. The Report on Corporate Governance is a statement which 
gives guidelines for the corporate governance techniques and operation of firms in 
South Africa. Three reports were published in 1994 the King I report, 2002 the King II 
report, and 2009 the King III report and a fourth revision, the King IV report in 2016. 
The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IoDSA) owns the copyright of the King 
Report on Corporate Governance and the King Code of Corporate Governance. The 
listed firms in Johannesburg Stock Exchange obligatory should apply the King III 
report. The King Report on corporate governance has been reported as "the most 
effective summary of the best international practices in corporate governance" (Iod, 
2009, 2016). 
In contrast other corporate governance codes such as Sarbanes-Oxley, King Report on 
Corporate Governance and the King Code of Corporate Governance are non-legislative 
and is based on principles and practices. It listed on the 2010 Combined Code from the 
United Kingdom and is made a trial to set up in Netherlands. The basic idea of the code 
sources of the three key elements of leadership, sustainability and good corporate 
citizenship. It fronts good governance as essentially being effective, ethical leadership. 
King Report on Corporate Governance and the King Code of Corporate Governance 
are intended to convey the impression that leaders should direct the firm to implement 
sustainable economic, social and environmental performance. It expects sustainability 
as the most important moral and economic imperative of this century (Iod, 2009, 2016). 
A.1.1. King I report 
The King I report on corporate governance was published in 1994 in South Africa. It 
contained an integrated guide of recommended standards of conduct for boards and 
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directors of listed financial and non-financial firms. It analyzes either the financial and 
regulatory aspects or the non financial data with an integrated approach that involved 
all stakeholders (Iod, 1994, 2016).  
It was applied to all South Africa listed firms and generally large public and private 
entities and organizations, such as banks, insurance firms. The size “large” is mentioned 
to firms with shareholder equity over R50 million, but encouraged all entities to adopt 
the King I report. The principles which are contained to the King I report are analyzed 
below. The first principle focuses on board of directors which makes-up and mandates 
them, giving explicit information about the role of non-executive directors and the 
categories of people who should constitute the non-executive directors. Second, it sets 
the appointments to the board and guidance on the maximum term for executive 
directors. Third, it determines and informs investors about the remuneration of the 
executive and non-executive director’s, the frequency of meetings of Board. Finally, it 
is responsible for creating a balanced annual reporting and the requirement for effective 
auditing, the creation of affirmative action programs and the existence of the firms’ 
code of ethics (Iod, 1994). 
A.1.2. King II report 
King II report is a revision of King I report, enriching with new sections relevant to the 
sustainability, the role of corporate board and risk management. The King II report was 
issued on March 2002. It is used by departments of State or national, provincial or local 
government administration falling under the Local Government: Municipal Finance 
Management Act, and public institutions. Also, the King II report encourages all firms 
to adopt the applicable principles from the code. The most important principles of King 
II report examine the internal audit and risk management policies and illustrate the 
integrated sustainability reporting. It focuses on the firm’s directors and on their 
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responsibilities. The King II report is not enforced through legislation but exist with a 
number of laws that used to firms and directors including the Firms Act (Iod, 2002).  
A.1.3. King III report 
The King II report had some imperfections, such as the King II report was not correct 
to include sustainability as a separate chapter, pushing firms to report on it separately 
from other factors. In 2009 a new revised King III report issued and governance, 
strategy and sustainability were integrated. The King III report introduces an integrated 
report which merges an annual financial report with a sustainability report and 
recommends entities to apply it and create sustainability reports based on the Global 
Reporting Initiative's Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. The innovation of King III 
report is that this report is applicable to all entities, public, private and non-profit. It 
encourages all entities to apply the King III report principles by using IR and explains 
how its principles can be applied. The code of governance was available from March 
2010 (Iod, 2009).  In the table below it is mentioned the summary of the nine topics of 
King III report that used in the checklist of this thesis. 
Table A1 Nine topics of King III report (Deloitte, 2009; Iod, 2009; PWC, 2009;IIRC, 2015; 
ACCA, 2016). 
Topics                               Summary of the topic 
Ethical 
leadership and 
corporate 
citizenship 
The board should: 
 
 provide effective leadership based on an ethical foundation 
 ensure that the company is and is seen to be a responsible corporate 
citizen 
 ensure that the company’s ethics are managed effectively 
 appreciate that strategy, risk, performance and sustainability are 
inseparable 
 ensure that the company has an effective and independent audit 
committee 
 be responsible for risk and IT governance 
 ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations 
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 ensure an effective risk based internal audit function 
 appreciate that stakeholders’ perceptions affect the company’s 
reputation 
 ensure integrity of the company’s integrated report 
 report on the effectiveness of internal controls 
 consider business rescue proceedings as soon as the company is 
financially distressed 
 appoint the CEO and establish a framework for the delegation of 
authority 
 comment on the independence of the independent non-executive 
directors in the integrated report 
 formalize a process for induction and ongoing training and 
development of directors 
 be assisted by a competent, suitably qualified and experienced 
company secretary 
 evaluate the performance of the board, its committees and the 
individual directors every year 
 agree on a governance framework between the group and its 
subsidiary boards 
 
Boards and 
directors 
The Board and directors should : 
 
 operate ethically and with integrity, and as a responsible corporate 
citizen , 
 considers the interests of the community within which it operates, 
 integrate governance, strategy, risk, performance and 
sustainability, 
 comply with laws and regulations,  
 identify and manages risks, 
 and employ structures and processes to ensure the integrity of its 
IR.  
 
Audit 
committees 
(include: the 
nomination of the 
external auditor for 
appointment and to 
verify the 
independence of the 
auditor) 
The audit committee should: 
 
 determine the audit fee and the scope of the appointment,  
 ensure that the appointment complies with the requirements of the 
Firms Act, 
 determine the nature and extent of non-audit services,  
 and pre-approve any contract for non-audit service. 
 
The 
governance of 
risk 
 Risk management should be seen as an integral part of the firm’s 
strategic and business processes.  
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 The Board’s responsibility for governance of risk should be set out 
in a risk management policy and plan. 
 The Board should consider the risk policy and plan, and should 
monitor the whole risk management process.  
 While the Board remains responsible for the risk management 
policy and the determination of the firm’s risk appetite and risk 
tolerance, management is responsible for the design, 
implementation and effectiveness of risk management.  
 The Board should receive combined assurance regarding the 
effectiveness of the risk management process. 
 
The 
governance of 
information 
technology (IT) 
The directors should: 
 
 ensure proper IT governance,  
 the proper alignment of IT with the performance and sustainability 
objectives of the firm,  
 and the proper management of operational IT risk, including 
security.  
The risk committee may be assigned responsibility to oversee the 
management of IT risk.  
The audit committee should consider IT as it relates to financial risk 
and reporting. 
 
Compliance 
with laws, 
rules, codes 
and standards 
The Board should: 
 
 ensure awareness of and compliance with laws, rules, codes and 
standards throughout the business.  
 Be responsible for the implementation of an effective compliance 
framework and processes, and for the effective management of the 
firm’s compliance risk.  
 mandate management to establish a compliance function to 
implement measures and procedures to ensure that the Board’s 
policy on compliance is implemented. 
 
Internal audit The internal audit function should: 
 
 be positioned at a level within the firm to understand the strategic 
direction and goals of the firm.  
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 develop a program to test the internal controls vis-a-vis specific 
risks.  
 provide assurance with reference to the adequacy of controls to 
identify risks that may impair the realisation of specific goals as 
well as opportunities that will promote the achievement of the 
firm’s strategic goals. 
 form an integral part of the combined assurance model. 
 provide a written assessment of internal controls and risk 
management to the Board, and specifically on internal financial 
controls to the audit committee. 
 
Governing 
stakeholder 
relationships 
The board should: 
 
 appreciate that stakeholders’ perceptions affect a company’s 
reputation 
 delegate to management to proactively deal with stakeholder 
relationships 
 strive to achieve the appropriate balance between its various 
stakeholder groupings, in the best interests of the company 
 ensure equitable treatment of shareholders 
 ensure transparent and effective communication with 
stakeholders 
 ensure that disputes are resolved effectively, efficiently and 
expeditiously. 
 
Integrated 
reporting and 
disclosure 
The Board should: 
 
 ensure that the positive and negative impacts of the firm’s 
operations, as well as plans to improve the positives and eradicate 
the negatives, are conveyed in the integrated report.  
 delegate oversight of the integrated report to an appropriate 
committee (either the audit committee or a sustainability 
committee).  
 
The audit committee should: 
 oversee the provision of independent assurance over sustainability 
issues, 
 and assist the Board by reviewing the integrated reporting and 
disclosure to ensure that it does not contradict financial reporting. 
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The emerging governance trends that mentioned in King III report are linked to the 
alternative dispute resolution, risk-based internal audit, shareholder approval of non-
executive directors’ remuneration and the evaluation of board and directors’ 
performance. Moreover, it contains a number of new principles to address data and 
information not previously included in the King reports such as IT governance, business 
rescue and fundamental and affected transactions in terms of director’s responsibilities 
during mergers, acquisitions (Iod, 2009). 
A.1.4. King IV report 
King IV was issued on 1 November 2016. It was applied as a draft for a 2-year period 
and another year grace period to conform organizations and firms to the King IV report. 
King IV report strengthens the idea that effective corporate governance techniques are 
holistic and interrelated set of arrangements to be understood and applied in an 
integrated manner. It contains a set of voluntary principles and leading practices. 
King IV is based on outcomes. The principles and practices of the King IV report are 
related to desired outcomes, therefore articulating the advantages of good corporate 
governance. The basic difference is that King IV report based on “apply and explain” 
regime in contrast with the King III report based on “apply or explain” regime. 
The most important characteristics of King IV report related to the delegation to 
management, the delegation to committees, the corporate governance services to the 
governing body, the audit committee disclosures, the risk governance, the combined 
assurance model, Social and ethics committees, performance evaluations, and 
technology and information (PWC, 2016; Iod, 2016). 
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